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P R E FA C E
This doctoral dissertation investigates the notion of physical neces-
sity. Specifically, it studies whether it is possible to account for non-
accidental regularities without the standard assumption of a pre-ex-
istent set of governing laws. Thus, it takes side with the so called
deflationist accounts of laws of nature, like the humean or the antire-
alist. The specific aim is to complement such accounts by providing a
missing explanation of the appearance of physical necessity.
In order to provide an explanation, I recur to fields that have not
been appealed to so far in discussions about the metaphysics of laws.
Namely, I recur to complex systems’ theory, and to the foundations
of statistical mechanics. The explanation proposed is inspired by how
complex systems’ theory has elucidated the way patterns emerge, and
by the probabilistic explanations of the 2nd law of thermodynamics.
More specifically, this thesis studies how some constraints that make
no direct reference to the dynamics can be a sufficient condition for
obtaining in the long run, with high probability, stable regular behav-
ior. I hope to show how certain metaphysical accounts of laws might
benefit from the insights achieved in these other fields.
According to the proposal studied in this thesis, some regularities are
not accidental not in virtue of an underlying physical necessity. The
non-accidental character of certain regular behavior is only due to
its overwhelming stability. Thus, from this point of view the goal be-
comes to explain the stability of temporal patterns without assuming
a set of pre-existent guiding laws. It is argued that the stability can
be the result of a process of convergence to simpler and stable reg-
ularities from a more complex lower level. According to this project,
if successful, there would be no need to postulate a (mysterious) in-
termediate category between logical necessity and pure contingency.
Similarly, there would be no need to postulate a (mysterious) set of
pre-existent governing laws.
Part I of the thesis motivates part II, mostly by arguing why further
explanation of the notions of physical necessity and governing laws
should be welcomed (chapter 1), and by studying the plausibility of a
lawless fundamental level (chapters 2 and 3). Given so, part II devel-
ops the explanation of formation of simpler and stable behavior from
a more complex underlying level.
Keywords: Laws of Nature, Physical Necessity, Randomness, Statis-
tical Mechanics, Typicality, Method of Arbitrary Functions, Symmetry
principles
iv
P R E FA C I O
Esta tesis doctoral investiga la noción de necesidad física. Concreta-
mente, estudia si es posible explicar las regularidades no accidentales
sin la asunción habitual de un conjunto preexistente de leyes que go-
biernan la Naturaleza. Al dispensar de dicha asunción se pone del
lado de las llamadas teorías deflacionistas sobre leyes de la Natu-
raleza, como la humeana o la antirealista. El propósito principal de
la tesis es el de complementar dichas teorías con una explicación —
ausente a día de hoy— sobre la apariencia de necesidad física.
Para proveer dicha explicación, recurro a campos a los que no se
había recurrido en la literatura sobre metafísica de leyes: a la teoría
de sistemas complejos y a los fundamentos de mecánica estadística.
Concretamente, la explicación propuesta está inspirada por la forma
en que la teoría de sistemas complejos da cuenta de la emergencia
de patrones y por las explicaciones probabilísticas de la 2a ley de la
termodinámica. Más en detalle, esta tesis estudia cómo ciertas restric-
ciones —que no hagan referencia directa a cómo debe ser la dinámica
del sistema— puedan ser suficientes para obtener a largo plazo, y con
alta probabilidad, regularidades estables. Espero mostrar cómo cier-
tas teorías metafísicas sobre leyes pueden beneficiarse de los resulta-
dos obtenidos en estos otros campos.
Según esta propuesta, la razón por la cual ciertas regularidades son
no accidentales no es debido a una necesidad física subyacente. Es
sólo debido a su inmensa estabilidad, fruto de un proceso de con-
vergencia a regularidades estables. Así pues, el objetivo viene a ser
el de conseguir explicar la estabilidad de patrones temporales sin pre-
suponer un conjunto de leyes preexistente. Si esta propuesta es cor-
recta no haría falta postular una (misteriosa) categoría intermedia en-
tre la necesidad lógica y la contingencia pura. Del mismo modo, no
haría falta postular un (misterioso) conjunto de leyes preexistentes.
La parte I de la tesis motiva la parte II argumentando por qué las no-
ciones de necesidad física y de leyes gobernantes son efectivamente
misteriosas, y que una explicación debería ser bienvenida (capítulo 1),
y estudiando la plausibilidad de un nivel fundamental sin leyes (capí-
tulos 2 y 3). La parte II desarrolla la explicación de la formación de
comportamiento estable más simple desde un nivel subyacente más
complejo (en última instancia, caótico o aleatorio).
Palabras clave: Leyes de la Naturaleza, Necesidad Física, Aleato-
riedad, Mecánica Estadística, Tipicalidad, Método de Funciones Arbi-
trarias, Principios de simetría
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1
N O N - A C C I D E N TA L R E G U L A R I T I E S W I T H O U T
P H Y S I C A L N E C E S S I T Y
Abstract
This first chapter exposes what motivates the whole dissertation: the
apparent existence of non-accidental regularities. In particular, I explore
the plausibility that physical necessity is not a genuine category of our
ontology. I take side with deflationist accounts of laws, like the humean or
the antirealist, and aim to provide a missing explanation of why some
regularities in the world seem to be non-accidental. In this chapter, after
spelling out what this problem exactly amounts to, and justifying that it is
indeed an important problem, I take a survey of the answers in the extant
philosophical literature about laws of nature. It is shown that none of them
provides a satisfactory answer to this trait of laws. Then, I finish the
chapter by looking at current physics, i.e. at whether our current best
empirically tested physical theories provide any hint on such metaphysical
questions. Specifically, I pursue the strategy of understanding laws in
terms of symmetry principles, given the ubiquitous and prominent role of
the latter. I present an interesting candidate in Quantum Field Theory that
might fill the desired role.
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4 non-accidental regularities without physical necessity
1.1 introduction
the objective The riddle that motivates this whole dissertation
is the apparent existence of non-accidental regularities in the world. ItThe goal:
non-accidental
regularities,
is the well-known fact that some regular behavior around us seems
not to be a cosmic coincidence. Some classic examples are:
(i) All emeralds are green ;
(ii) Massive bodies attract each other;
(iii) Sugar gets dissolved in water ;
(iv) Stars end up going out ; or
(v) All uranium spheres are less than a mile in diameter.
There seems to be some reason behind these regularities, unlike others
that we would take as accidental, as mere contingencies. For instance,
Reichenbach and Hempel compared (v) with the celebrated:
(vi) All gold spheres are less than one mile in diameter.
While (vi) clearly appears to be an accidental true generalization,
(v) is not: it is not that we have merely found (v) to be the case,
there cannot be uranium spheres bigger than a mile in diameter (cf.
[Van Fraassen, 1989, 27]).
Tradition has it that the apparently non-accidental regularities from
(i) to (v) are explained by appeal to the existence of laws of nature, or
to some causal mechanism responsible of such regularities, or to both.
In fact, this dissertation reflects about something we are very used to
—used since the scientific revolution—, that is: the fact that scientists
have been discovering regularities that, at least apparently, seem to be
not accidental, and explain them in virtue of the existence of laws of
nature. In particular, my focus is on the laws of physics. Presumably,
these are the fundamental laws to which the rest of laws reduce (this
reductionist view won’t be necessary, though).
What is the default orthodox view on physical laws? It is roughly
this: the laws are a set of rules, written in mathematical language,
presumably exceptionless and holding universally across space and
time, which ultimately guide the behavior and temporal evolution
of the whole universe and all the entities therein. (Not all physical
laws are laws of temporal evolution, but leave that aside for now).
Purportedly, it is due to these laws that some regularities are not
accidental.
The notion of law yields the idea that there are some events or
things in Nature that are physically necessary, that in the actual world
they cannot be otherwise: it is not possible in the actual world thatand physical
necessity... massive objects do not attract each other, or that something travels
faster than the speed of light (assuming in the examples that our
current laws are true, which of course might not be correct). Some
philosophers and physicists, then, have claimed that there is, between
pure contingency and logical or mathematical necessity, an interme-
diate degree: physical necessity, also named ’natural necessity’. Phys-
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ical necessity is thus intrinsically related with the concept of non-
accidental regularity and with the concept of law of nature.
Consider another of the examples above: we think that the fact that
all emeralds are green is not a mere contingency that just happened
by chance. But it is not either grounded by any logical truth: logi-
cal necessities are compatible with emeralds being blue. In fact, we
think we can conceive a possible world where emeralds are blue, or
where massive bodies repel each other. There is something between
logical necessity and mere contingency that makes the emeralds in
this world to be green: physical necessity.
However, ever since David Hume famously cast the doubt on the
notions of causation, physical necessity and laws1, no satisfactory
philosophical account has been provided (I shall elaborate this claim
in sec. 1.4).
One can tackle this situation only in terms of causation or in terms
of laws, not necessarily of both. Thus, one saves the need to explain
one of the two. And presumably, if you manage to account for one
of them, a related notion of physical necessity follows. Bertrand Rus-
sell famously advocated for the exclusion of the notion of causation
[Russell, 1953], while Nancy Cartwright [Cartwright, 1999] has been
a pioneer in dispensing with laws and place causation in its stead2.
This thesis takes side with the former. The move of postulating gen- ...without
fundamental lawsuine causation to account for regular behavior is not contemplated
here.
Specifically, this thesis takes side with deflationist accounts of laws,
like the humean or the antirealist. This means that there are not gen-
uine laws as a primitive category of our ontology. Then, I study
whether it is possible to obtain stable regularities. The existence of
overwhelmingly stable regularities is something that has not been
properly answered by deflationist accounts, as I argue in 1.4.
on the notion of law of nature Physicists, for centuries un-
til the present day, have been aiming to discover how are the laws
that describe and (allegedly) prescribe the evolution of the world —
Maxwell’s equations, Einstein’s field equations, the Schrödinger equa-
tion, and so on. Appropriately, what are these laws is not something The philosophical
questions stemming
from the postulation
of laws
the physicist answers; it could be said that it is not his job. Yet, from
the associated worldview, that is, from the scientific image describing
a world ruled by laws, at least three characteristically philosophical
questions arise:
1. What are the laws,
1 [Hume, 1896, book 1, part 3, sec. 14] and [Hume, 1748, ch. 7].
2 Other advocates of each side are the following. As to skeptics of genuine causation,
[Earman, 1976], [Maudlin, 2007, ch.5], [Hoefer, 2004] (or my draft [Filomeno, 2010]).
As to skeptics of genuine laws, see p. 18, and 1.4.2 p. 25.
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2. Why there are laws,
3. Why there are these laws and not others.
At risk of being too optimistic, I would say that certain progress has
been achieved in contemporary philosophy in what respects ques-
tion ’1’, fleshing out some proposals that were suggested long before
in modern philosophy3.
The orthogonality or not between the three questions is not evident
at first sight. Be it as it may, most contemporary accounts give an
answer to question ’1’, but ignore question ’2’: laws, understood one
way or another, are just assumed to exist.
In philosophy it is desirable to commit only to the necessary premises
—in order to show the bare logical form of the argument, without ir-
relevant premises that in turn could be disputable. So if it were possi-
ble to answer ’1’ without committing to an answer to ’2’, this should
be welcomed. Nevertheless, I shall argue that deflationist accounts
must answer ’2’ to count as minimally satisfactory accounts4.
Thus, what this thesis attempts is to complement deflationist answers
to ’1’ with an answer to ’2’. The answer to ’2’ in a deflationist scenario,
i.e. a scenario without governing laws, amounts to answer why there
is the appearance of laws.
Regarding question ’3’, I shall argue in chapter 3 how it is not or-
thogonal to ’1’ either, but it also turns out to bear an influence upon
the answer to ’1’. In a nuthshell, the choice of a set of laws rather than
other set is argued to be suspicious —an "insoluble problem" quoting
J.A. Wheeler—, so this indirectly supports a qualitatively different al-
ternative —an alternative not consisting of a finite set of equations5.
3 The contemporary accounts are surveyed in 1.4. The predecessors I refer to are
[Hume, 1896], [Mill, 1884]; previously, partakers in the scientific revolution like [Ba-
con, 1620], [Galilei, 1632], or [Descartes, 1644, II, 37]. [Dorato, 2000, ch. 1] overviews
the historical genesis of the idea of law of nature since greek antiquity. The echoes of
the notion of laws presiding over Nature trace back to Lucretius, in De Rerum Natura
[Lucrezio, Ist c. BC, Book V, 56-57]. For a more thorough historical survey see [Ruby,
1986].
4 Let me note that I am also going to ignore a bunch of other interrelated topics. On
the one hand, this can be welcomed for the reasons mentioned. On the other hand,
it is obvious that some of the topics ignored might bear a crucial import on what is
discussed. Unclear metaphysical notions like ’law of nature’ probably depend on the
understanding of other equally mysterious notions, as that of time, space, or motion,
to name the most immediate and unfathomable.
5 Some other discussions have been made around question ’3’, mostly related with the
contingency or necessity of laws; cf. [Swoyer, 1982], [Armstrong, 1983], [Lewis, 1983],
[Sidelle, 2002], [Chalmers, 2002], [Schaffer, 2008], or [McKenzie, 2013]. Roughly, a
side argues that laws could not have been otherwise (in any possible world), and
other side that they could have, i.e. that laws are contingent. Other front of discussion
related with question ’3’ comes from the apparent fine-tuning of the actual laws.
Scientific arguments in its support are found in detail in the book [Barrow and Tipler,
1986], or in [Susskind, 2003]. Serious critical assessments (i.e. that are well aware of
some flagrant fallacies that justly annoy some skeptics on the topic) can be found in
[Ellis, 2006, sec. G], [Smeenk, 2013], [Mosterín, 2004], or in the book [Bostrom, 2002].
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Thus, the main objective of the thesis is to remark and attempt to
provide an answer to what I take to be the main flaw of deflationist
accounts of laws. As I will further elaborate in 1.4, I refer to their
inability to distinguish between accidental from non-accidental regu-
larities. This flaw can also be phrased as their silence regarding the
counterfactual predictive power of laws. I will address the problem by
means of explaining the stability implicit in the very definition of law.
This explanation is carried out, in part II, by appeal to probabilistic The overwhelming
stability of certain
regularities, for a
deflationist
metaphysics
arguments. These arguments are mainly based on convergence theo-
rems of sequences of random variables, like the law of large numbers.
To convey the central worry, take the point of view of the humean.
If the Best System Account is just the best description of the patterns
of the humean mosaic, why it is that some of those patterns display
such an overwhelming stability across all history? Are we just to flatly
accept such a highly special feature —i.e. the stability of certain regu-
larities, allegedly holding across all the humean mosaic— merely as
a brute fact? Or is there some explanation, some reason behind, that
would complement such a point of view? An explanation is what this
thesis aims to develop, i.e. an explanation of why the human mosaic
displays such overwhelmingly stable patterns.
The same worry can be phrased in the framework of the antirealist on
laws [Cartwright, 1999]: How is it that there are, in certain contexts,
something like "nomological machines" that display, even if not uni-
versally, stable temporal patterns?
Likewise, in the framework of the dispositionalist like [Mumford and
Anjum, 2011]: while the causal role of dispositions is arguably capa-
ble of substituting the need for laws, how is it that there are stable
dispositions in the world? And, how are we to understand such prim-
itive dispositions in our ontology?6
All in all, the results presented along this thesis can hopefully com-
plement any of those deflationist accounts of laws.
Thesis: no physical
necessity between
logical necessity and
pure contingency
The project, then, is to study the scenario in which there is no phys-
ical necessity between logical/mathematical necessity and pure con-
tingency. Therefore, the appearance of physical necessity must be ex-
plained. Ultimately, the idea is that laws of nature are not a primitive
genuine constituent of our ontology, but they can be derived from
something else, something more plausible to postulate as primitive.
A first reaction on the picture I am setting forth could be the fol-
lowing: To what amounts a lawless scenario? Is it, at the very least,
meaningful? Again, this is something that deflationist accounts on Is a random
dynamics
meaningful ?
laws have overlooked. Presumably they want to take side with the
actual, highly stable, state of affairs; however, the lack of fundamen-
6 And, to complete the analogy with the three questions above, the analogous to ques-
tion ’3’ is: why there are these dispositions and not others?
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tal laws seems to yield a scenario of pure contingency, of a random
dynamics, that is, of something very different from the actual world
(see 1.4.2 for further elaboration).
In fact, it has been historically difficult to tackle with precision a sce-
nario of pure contingency. A secondary aim of the thesis is to con-
tribute to an improvement in the comprehension of such scenario. To
this end, annex A walks through the recent mathematical insights
into the formalization of the notion of randomness, and annex B sum-
marizes C. S. Peirce’s metaphysics, based on an evolution and rein-
forcement of regular behavior from a random origin.
Likewise, a negative moral is vindicated: an account of lawful be-
havior from pure contingency, from pure randomness, is (arguably)
impossible unless further constraints are postulated.
What is the minimum number of assumptions postulated, and moreThesis (again):
Non-dynamical
constraints
sufficient for stable
behavior...
importantly, whether these assumptions can be non-dynamical (i.e. not
being the direct postulation of a law) is the main object of study of
part II.
If there can be non-dynamical conditions sufficient for (the emergence
of) regular behavior, the possibility of an account of non-accidental
regularities without assuming fundamental laws would be vindicated.
This being said, there is an alternative weaker formulation of the...or general
dynamical principles
more plausible than
current laws
main goal, in which the dynamical assumptions are not avoided. In
such case, the project can be seen as the study of how a smaller set
of dynamical laws can lead to a bigger set of dynamical laws, where
this smaller set is more plausibly justifiable than the bigger set —the
bigger set being the current physical laws. If there are not reasons for
preferring the smaller set, then the project would be of little interest.
In a nutshell, I will recall the doubts raised in the philosophical liter-
ature against the idea of a governing view of laws. I add a critique in
next chapter 2, focused on the particular form of current laws. Thus,
the thesis seeks to arrive at something different from both 1) such
type of governing laws (sec. 1.4.2), and 2) such unnatural and con-
trived current physical laws (ch. 2). As said before, the candidates
entertained are either non-dynamical constraints, or different dynam-
ical but more plausible principles, from which stable regularities can
be accounted7 (ch. 4 and 5).
1.2 outline of the chapters
The thesis is divided in two parts. Part I revolves around the meta-
physical literature on laws, as well as on the contributions that our
current physics might provide (specifically, Quantum Field Theories
(QFT) and the predominant role of local gauge symmetries therein).
7 Prima facie, to give a rough idea, candidates like the principle of conservation of
energy, or (other) global continuous symmetry principles might fit the bill.
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This part exposes the departure point of the thesis: the problem of
the apparently non-accidental character of regularities, i.e. the appar-
ent existence of physically necessary facts, i.e. the stability built in
the very definition of the laws of nature. As such, it aims to motivate
the interest of the proposals of part II. The second part, as previously
explained, consists in the study of the constraints sufficient for the
emergence of regular behavior. Let’s survey every chapter more in
detail.
In chapter 1, after further introductory remarks, I show in section
1.4 the lack of answers of the problem at stake, and why this is a seri-
ous and important flaw of all the accounts. In section 1.5 I take a look Chapter 1
at how contemporary physics might help in our comprehension of the
nature of laws. Whereas it has been historically difficult to flesh out
the details of an account that explains physical necessity as deriving
from logical necessity, I suggest in sec. 1.5 that some arguments, stem-
ming from contemporary physics, might be driving in this direction.
A serious candidate to account for laws solely in terms of symmetry
principles might be found in Quantum Field Theory (QFT). Accord-
ing to a presumed sort of a priori status of symmetry principles (which
I later discuss), this could be an account in the line of the long-sought
logical inevitability of laws (in the line of Plato’s "Phaedo", Leibniz, or
the more recent [Kneale, 1949] or [Swoyer, 1982]). However, the hope
of having the candidate of 1.5 as a full blown account of laws through
symmetries is undermined in chapter 2. Even so, I will defend that
(naturalistic) metaphysics should pursue the general strategy of un-
derstanding laws by understanding symmetry principles.
Chapter 2 reflects on whether anything can be said about the dy-
namics of the fundamental level in light of current physics. It takes Chapter 2
into consideration certain metaphysical criteria, like the simplicity of
a theory, or the naturalness (a scientific criterion, so far barely dis-
cussed among philosophers). More specifically, it assesses to what
extent such criteria should be taken into account in light of how cur-
rent physics is. Two conclusions follow from the analysis. The most
relevant conclusion suggests a qualitatively different physics in the
fundamental level, and in particular it supports a highly complex
fundamental dynamics.
Chapter 3 defends the scenario of a fundamental highly-complex
underlying dynamics. Basically the chapter aims to show the consis- Chapter 3
tency of such metaphysical scenario with current physics, and how it
is in harmony with deflationist accounts of laws. Then, in 3.3 I ana-
lyze a parallel project, carried out by some physicists, highly similar
to this dissertation: the possibility that all (or most) symmetries of
laws are not fundamental but derived. This can be the case by consid-
ering a process of formation of symmetries from an underlying non-
symmetric (highly-complex) lower level. In a nutshell, symmetries
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would typically emerge in the low energy limit for almost all complex
lagrangians. This line of research has been pursued, among others, by
a team of physicists led by H. B. Nielsen [Froggatt and Nielsen, 1991].
That Lorentz symmetry in particular is not fundamental but emer-
gent has also been studied by Ted Jacobson [Jacobson and Wall, 2010].
Before them, physicists John Wheeler [Wheeler, 1983b] and Steven
Weinberg [Weinberg, 1981] have been precursors of the underlying
idea.
Further, the idea of emergence of order from randomness was devel-
oped at length in the XIXth century in the ’evolutionary cosmology’
of C. S. Peirce [Peirce, 1867–1893], [Reynolds, 2002]. I have elaborated
a brief overview of Peirce’s metaphysics in annex B.
Then, Part II assumes this highly-complex dynamics motivated in chap-
ters 2 and 3, and studies the emergence of simpler stable regularities
from an underlying more complex dynamics. This procedure is backed
by probabilistic arguments, in the same line as the statistical explana-
tions of the 2nd law of thermodynamics.
Chapter 4 argues that, if a system displays a chaotic trajectory inChapter 4
phase space and certain non-dynamical conditions hold, stable regu-
larities arise without needing a specific dynamics guiding the evolu-
tion of the system. This is mostly based on the mathematical method
known as method of arbitrary functions. In a nutshell, I follow the re-
search of Michael Strevens (mostly in [Strevens, 2003] and [Strevens,
2013]), and "translate" his insights into the fundamental level. That is,
his analysis is generic and presumably applicable to many high-level
complex sciences (like meterorology, or biology). What I do is to ar-
gue for the applicability of those insights in the fundamental physical
level.
More in detail, he explains how simpler regularities can arise from
more dynamically complex lower levels. I argue how the method
works for any chaotic dynamics, and then I discuss how this exten-
sion to all chaotic trajectories can be significant to the case of a sce-
nario without fundamental guiding laws. To this end I appeal to the
recent insights regarding the shared properties of the notions of ran-
domness and chaos.
Finally, the last chapter 5, tackles the same issue of chapter 4 fromChapter 5
a similar point of view. Specifically, it aims to explain certain stable
behavior, namely the tendency to equilibrium in classical statistical
mechanics, without needing any details as to the particular form of the
dynamics. In the literature on the foundation of statistical mechanics
there is one account that arguably does so, the approach called ’typi-
cality’. Roughly, this approach states that as long as the initial condi-
tions of the model are typical (where the intuitive meaning of ’typi-
cal’ is cashed out with precision in measure-theoretical terms), then
there will be a tendency to equilibrium. I follow [Goldstein, 2001]
and [Frigg, 2009] and explain how they argue that typicality makes
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no reference to the dynamics —in an analogous way as to how, in
ch. 4, the method of arbitrary functions did not mention how the dy-
namics had to be, besides being chaotic. If the details of the dynamics
are irrelevant, this opens the door to consider that such conclusion
—i.e. the tendency to equilibrium in the coarse-grained level— would
obtain for any dynamics, therefore also for a random dynamics. The
chapter aims to support the claims of the independence of the dynam-
ics with computer simulations that I have programmed. Specifically,
the simulations aim to show that the tendency to equilibrium, in the
hard-sphere model of classical statistical mechanics, actually holds for
almost any dynamics. The simulations model a hard-sphere group of
particles that move according to a certain set of laws in a container. I
have programmed the simulation in a way that is very easy to change
the laws that rule their behavior. Thus, for each different set of laws
it can be verified whether the tendency to equilibrium obtains.
I include the results in 5.4, and the code is in the annex C. A brief
illustration of such simulations can be found online in the links:
https://vimeo.com/90044328
https://vimeo.com/90863487
1.3 further introductory remarks
the focus on fundamental physics This thesis focuses on
the physical necessity in the fundamental level. Assuming reduction-
ism, the physical necessity of the high-level non-accidental regular-
ities, as those stated before in (i)-(v), ultimately comes from (is re-
ducible to, supervenes on) the physical necessity contained in the
most fundamental level, object of study of theoretical physics.
So, I will focus on the specific form of the elementary interactions of
contemporary physics. Now, they might display a different form than
the regularities (i), (iii), or (v). This difference, perhaps, turns out to
be informative and provides a better comprehension of laws and of
physical necessity. In general, all regularities were roughly schema-
tized in 1st order logic as ∀x(Fx→ Gx), being F and G two universals
—like F being an emerald and G being green. This formalization has
been clarificatory, and the philosophy of science based on it has con-
tributed to a better comprehension of the nature of laws. However,
the physical necessities expressed by fundamental physics are stated
in a different way, and this perhaps turns out to make a difference.
"order" and "chaos": what is to be explained? Let me
make an important strategical observation; an observation about an
implicit choice regarding what is going to be the explanandum in these
sort of metaphysical inquiries. The point is on whether laws, or the lack
of them, is what has to be explained. The choice crucially bears upon the
resulting metaphysics.
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What has been usually chosen along the history of physics?
Since the modern conception of science, dating it back at least to the
time of Galileo Galilei, tradition has it that scientists aim at discover-
ing underlying patterns in the world. The universe seemed to follow a
determined behaviour, following certain rules, principles, or laws. In
this respect, Einstein famously remarked that the most incomprehen-
sible thing about the universe is that it is comprehensible [Einstein,
1936]. The universe is indeed following a pattern, and we can describe
it in the language of mathematics. Galilei’s metaphor of the book of
the world written in mathematical terms has been confirmed for cen-
turies ever since8. But at the same time, Einstein himself, who was
wondering in the previous quote about the order of Nature (and our
ability to grasp it), was feeling uncomfortable with the possibility of
objective indeterminism in the dawn of quantum theory: his famous
quote "God does not play dice" conveys such worry. This zeitgeist
has been ubiquitous along the history of physics. It can be said that
there is a strong predilection for determinism and a reluctance for the
presence of randomness9. To illustrate what I take to be a generalized
attitude, read this fragment in which the first virtue mentioned of
the many-worlds interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (QM) is the
removal of randomness:
"The existence of the other worlds makes it possible to remove
randomness and action at a distance from quantum theory and
thus from all physics." [Vaidman, 2014, 1]
This attitude, worth is saying, makes much sense: it is grounded in
the highly reasonable principle of sufficient reason.
However, this affection for determinism notwithstanding, random-
ness has inevitably infiltrated in modern physics. It turns out that, atIndeterministic laws
"for a philosopher" the present day, genuine objective indeterministic laws are endorsed
by many (but not all) interpretations of the mathematical formal-
ism of QM10. Likewise, physics abounds of the term ’spontaneous’:
"spontaneous vacuum fluctuations", "spontaneous symmetry break-
ing", etc.11 This means that, if one really commits to an indetermin-
istic interpretation of QM, objective chance, that is, a certain degree of
randomness, is unavoidably introduced in the picture of the world. So,
already in the standard orthodox scientific worldview, the notion of
randomness is present.
8 "Philosophy is written in this grand book, the universe [...] It is written in the lan-
guage of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles, and other geometric
figures; [...]" [Galilei, 1623, ch. VI]
9 Why else there would be so many papers from philosophers of physics on whether
determinism is violated in this or that area of physics?
10 Though the issue is not straightforward, it can be roughly said that indeterminism
is endorsed in the following interpretations: Copenhagen, Von-Neumann, stochastic,
objective collapse theories (like GRW), and transactional interpretations.
11 In these cases, though, there can be the hope that such spontaneity is some day
explained otherwise.
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The objective of this observation is twofold. One is to bolster the
meaningfulness of scenarios involving a certain degree of random-
ness in their dynamics —given that the degree of randomness in the
dynamics is going to be extended in coming chapters.
In the second place, I want to remark that the commitment to inde-
terministic (or ’stochastic’) laws unavoidably suffers from both philo-
sophical worries: the lawful behavior of the probabilistic laws (cf. the
first of Einstein’s quotes), and the objective chance present in such laws
(cf. the second of Einstein’s quotes). This second observation allows
me to come back to the initial point regarding what should be ex-
plained, the laws or the lack of them. As said above, it is mostly held What is satisfactory
to postulate, laws, or
the lack of them?
among the scientific community that what is unsatisfactory is the
presence of randomness, not the existence of laws. But, to what ex-
tent is this preference justified? An underlying motivation of the next
chapters is that what is more natural is to take as primitive a state
of randomness, without a specific order dictated by some rules. This
thought is elaborated in Peirce’s metaphysics, whose central points I
summarize in the annex B; there the interested reader will find more
suggestive arguments for this alternative approach.
An analogous observation can be made from the point of view of
contemporary particle physics. Not in terms of determinism or inde- What is satisfactory
to postulate,
symmetry or
asymmetry?
terminism as to what is to be explained, but in terms of symmetry or
asymmetry. In fact, the widespread idea is that the more we approach
to more fundamental levels —which amounts to smaller scales or to
higher-energy regimes—, there is a bigger symmetry group which de-
scribes in a unified way all elementary interactions. That is, it is pre-
sumed a process of symmetry restoration in smaller scales / higher
energies. Then, much of the attention in physics and philosophy of
physics centers around the converse process, that of symmetry break-
ing towards lower energies. This standard picture is philosophically
motivated in [Brading and Castellani, 2013, 4.2]:
"there may exist symmetries of the laws of nature which are not
manifest to us because the physical world in which we live is
built on a vacuum state which is not invariant under them. In
other words, the physical world of our experience can appear to
us very asymmetric, but this does not necessarily mean that this
asymmetry belongs to the fundamental laws of nature. Sponta-
neous symmetry breaking offers a key for understanding (and
utilizing) this physical possibility. ( . . . ) Spontaneous symmetry
breaking allows symmetric theories to describe asymmetric re-
ality. In short, spontaneous symmetry breaking provides a way
of understanding the complexity of nature without renouncing
fundamental symmetries."
Like order and determinism before, what seems to be reasonable, ex-
pected, justified, is symmetry.
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Nevertheless, the complaint which I want to raise awareness of is
also stated in [Brading and Castellani, 2013, 4.2]:
"why should we prefer symmetric to asymmetric fundamental
laws? In other words, why assume that an observed asymme-
try requires a cause, which can be an explicit breaking of the
symmetry of the laws, asymmetric initial conditions, or sponta-
neous symmetry breaking?"
The rationale behind this observation connects with what [Wein-
berg, 1981] once illustrated. According to him, one can take two paths
regarding symmetries: it is a question whether or not you think the
job of physics is to explain symmetries or to explain their absence.
The conventional response to the successes of the Standard Model
and its symmetries corresponds to the second of Weinberg’s branches,
that is, physics has to explain their absence. It assumes that the most
fundamental laws of nature must have a large degree of symmetry
and many of these symmetries, as said before, would then be broken
as one descends to the present experimentally studied energy regime.
This is the point of view manifested by Grand Unified Theories and
by supersymmetry or supergravity models. As [Froggatt and Nielsen,
1991, 3] remarks:
“this philosophy amounts to postulating the observed gauge
symmetry group, since the symmetry is only explained by the
existence of an even bigger gauge symmetry group, which is
itself not explained”.
Next chapter 3 takes side with the first of Weinberg’s branches, that
in which symmetries are what requires explanation and what is plau-
sible, what is assumed, is an originally asymmetric, “chaotic”, state.
Let me insist that further reflections on this choice can be found in
my comments on Peirce’s metaphysics, in annex B.
mechanisms as an explanation in metaphysics This para-
graph is a critical argument against an alternative path not pursued
in this thesis. Namely, I argue for the insufficiency of mechanistic ex-
planations for a science or a metaphysics whose aim is to provide a
fundamental account of Nature. This argument becomes more attrac-
tive when one realizes the quantity of philosophical papers devoted
in recent years to the notion of mechanism. Specifically, the argument
is contrary to some literature that purports to vindicate mechanistic
explanations as a primitive metaphysical framework sufficient for ex-
plaining eveything else e.g. [Glennan, 2005] or [Machamer et al., 2000].
Within part of this literature, it is shared the central point of this the-
sis, i.e. providing an explanation of regularities without assuming
fundamental laws. However, this strategy is flawed, for one does not
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really gain much by substituting something puzzling —laws— by
something equally puzzling —mechanisms.
The reason for my claim is that a mechanism, while can be plausibly
considered the explanans of the phenomena that brings about, is itself
unexplained. As such, it does require explanation, for the particular
mechanism invoked as explanans will necessarily display two basic
features that must not be taken for granted: 1) it will be stable and
2) it will have a particular composition. How is the stability obtained
is not at all a trivial question, in spite of the lack of literature fac-
ing the issue12. This question is, indeed, the driving question of this
thesis. And how does it have the particular composition is not a triv-
ial question either. This is analogous to the worry raised in chapter
2 regarding the particular, "whimsical" features of symmetries (and
laws). As such, the description of a mechanism as the final answer
will always be an unsatisfactory explanans of a fundamental level.
the management of different possible laws The manage-
ment of different possible laws is a subtle matter, and this is one of the
things that this thesis has had to address (mostly in part II). Philoso-
phers have entertained clear cases in which, for instance, the law of
gravitation is inversely proportional to the distance cubed rather than
the distance squared: F = Gm1m2
r3
But, how to account for all the space of possibilities that such law
could take?
In this thesis I am going tackle this issue in three different ways. One
is taking advantage of the facilities that the abstraction of the phase
space gives to us. It will be by means of managing the corresponding
trajectories in phase space.
The second way is by taking advantage of what numerical simulations
allow us to do. I have programmed a model ruled by some laws,
newtonian laws, and then I have enabled a variation of those laws
in a way that covers all possible variations (they won’t be really all,
though). This corresponds to the numerical simulations that I include
in chapter 5, whose code is annexed in C.
Finally, a third way is to take advantage of the abstraction of the la-
grangian formalism, written it in its most generic form and analyze
possible general properties that are derived. The details of the last
strategy have been carried out by some physicists and I will briefly
reconstruct their arguments in chapter 3.
12 [Glennan, 1996] faces explicitly the issue but acknowledging that mechanisms (and
the notion of causation) rely on the existence of fundamental laws. This is stated at
the very beginning as well as in his definition of mechanism: "A mechanism underlying
a behavior is a complex system which produces that behavior by the interaction of a number
of parts according to direct causal laws" [Glennan, 1996, 5].
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concluding remarks Let me emphasize that the approach to
the metaphysics of laws carried along this dissertation rests on two
pillars:
1. contemporary physics; this means that I pay attention not only to
the laws of the form of differential equations, like for instance
F = ma (Newton’s second law), or ∇xE = −δBδt (Faraday’s law
of induction), but to the laws in the form they appear in our
most recent physics; and it turns out that nowadays they ex-
hibit particular features that might shed some light to the meta-
physics of laws. As said before, I refer to the predominant role
of (global and local) symmetry principles in the lagrangian of
the Standard Model of elementary fields/particles. This is done
in sec. 1.5, ch. 2 and ch. 3.
2. the insights coming from probabilistic explanations (basically
from the foundations of statistical mechanics) together with the
recent mathematical formalizations of the notion of randomness
(ch. 4, 5, and annex A) —with the aim of elaborating a study of
the emergence of stable behavior from a lawless scenario.
1.4 the lack of a satisfying explanation of physical necessity and why should be sought 17
1.4 the lack of a satisfying explanation of physical ne-
cessity and why should be sought
This section surveys the extant philosophical accounts of laws of
nature in order to show the lack of a satisfying explanation of physical
necessity, be it real or apparent. I focus on the present-day accounts;
for an historical evolution of the concept of natural law, see [Dorato,
2000, ch.1], [Ruby, 1986]; see also footnote 3.
Regarding the contemporary accounts, an initial overview is the
following. There is, on the one hand, a group of proposals, under the Overview of
present-day
accounts
label of ’necessitarians’, that have sought to account for the notion
of law in harmony with the common understanding of the term and
with the scientific preconceptions. Necessitarians believe in the exis-
tence of genuine physical necessities. Necessary behavior is explained
in virtue of necessity relations between universals [Armstrong, 1983],
[Dretske, 1977], [Tooley, 1977], or of dispositions [Swoyer, 1982], or of
essences [Bigelow et al., 1992], [Ellis, 2001], [Bird, 2005]. In the vicin-
ity of this group, there are the antireductionists [Maudlin, 2011, ch.2],
[Carroll, 1994], which just postulate laws as a genuine non reducible
primitive constituent of our ontology.
Then, a main alternative is that in tune with the empiricist tradition,
the so called ’humean’ account. Roughly, it relegates the notion of
’physical necessity’ as a mere human illusion, in the same vein of
understanding causation as a mere constant conjunction. Laws of Na-
ture are just statements describing the regularities of the world, they
are not prescriptions, but mere descriptions of the way the world is.
[Mill, 1884] and [Hume, 1896] are the pioneers, together with [Ram-
sey, 1978]13. A sophisticated development has been carried out by
David Lewis, in what has come to be known as Best System Account
of lawhood [Lewis, 1973, 72-77], [Lewis, 1999, 8-55,224-247]. It is also
known as Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account. Following [Lewis, 1973, 73],
suppose you knew everything about the past, present, and future,
and you organized your entire knowledge as simply as possible in
various systems (’systems’ are a set of statements, some of which are
the axioms, and then there are the theorems, which are logical deduc-
tions of the axioms). A contingent generalisation is a law of nature
if and only if it appears as an axiom or theorem in the system that
achieves a far better combination of simplicity, strength and fit than
any of the other competing systems14. Cf. also [Lewis, 1983], [Earman,
13 Though David Hume actually believed in laws as physical necessities, so he was
closer to the necessitarian point of view [Swartz], [Wright, 1983], [Beauchamp, 1981].
Hume was not ’humean’ as we understand it now; his skepticism was epistemologi-
cal, not metaphysical. I will maintain the received term ’humean’, even if ’regularist’
[Swartz] or ’neohumean’ [Dorato, 2000] would be more appropriate.
14 Where strength, simplicity and fitness are defined as follows. To have strength is to
bear a great deal of informational content about the world; to be simple is to state
everything in a concise way, not to be redundant, etc.; and to fit is to accord as much
as possible with the actual outcomes of world history.
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1984], [Lewis, 1994], [Loewer, 1996], [Beebee, 2006], and [Cohen and
Callender, 2009].
Finally, in the vicinity of the humean there is the antirealist stance,
that shares the deflationist spirit of the humean, and denies the exis-
tence of laws as we usually understand them; in a nutshell, they deny
not only the existence of physical necessity and of a set of governing
laws, but also deny the existence of universal or exceptionless reg-
ularities. [Cartwright, 1999] is a classic reference, and more recently
[Mumford, 2004]. Cf. also [Van Fraassen, 1989], [Cartwright, 1980],
[Cartwright, 1989], [Blackburn, 1984], [Blackburn, 1993], [Giere, 1999]
and [Ward, 2002].
levels of modality A clarification must precede the assessment
of the modal status of each view. There are two levels on which laws
can be contingent or necessary. One level regards whether there is phys-
ical necessity in the actual world. This is what I have been mostly talk-
ing about so far. Then, an orthogonal level is whether laws could
have been otherwise or are as they are necessarily. Being otherwise
means that the actual world could have been ruled by different laws
or, in terms of possible worlds, that there are metaphysically possible
worlds with different laws. That physical necessities are as they are
necessarily means that the laws could not have been different, or that,
in every metaphysically possible world, what is physically necessary
coincides (so the only differences between worlds would be due to
different initial conditions, and to the outcomes of the laws iff they
are stochastic).
The main objection to the view of laws as metaphysically necessary
points out that we are able of conceiving worlds with different laws.
Discussions regarding whether conceivability can be a reliable guide
to possibility are found in [Yablo, 1993], [Chalmers, 2002], [Fine, 2002],
[Sidelle, 2002] (for introductions see [Gendler and Hawthorne, 2002]
or [Vaidya, 2007]). Defenders of this stronger sense of necessity of
laws are [Kneale, 1949], [Harré and Madden, 1975], [Shoemaker, 1980],
[Swoyer, 1982], [Tweedale, 1984], [Fales, 1993], [Shoemaker, 1998].
In order to frame the diverse philosophical discussions existent in
the literature, let me notice that these two levels of modality mostly
correspond to the three questions on laws raised in 1.1 p.6: the first
level corresponds to questions ’1’ and ’2’ (’What are the laws’, and
’Why there are laws’), whereas the second level corresponds to ques-
tion ’3’ (’Why there are these laws and not others’). As said there in
terms of the 3 questions, here we can also acknowledge that probably
the two levels of modality are hardly separable, and an answer to one
will probably bear an influence on the other.
That said, let’s proceed to assess more in detail how the accounts
explain the subject of research of this thesis, i.e. the first of the levels:
whether there is physical necessity and, if so, what it is.
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1.4.1 Realist (i.e. non deflationist) attempts to explain physical necessity
1.4.1.1 Relations among universals
Since the rise of scientific realism in analytic philosophy in the 60’s,
efforts have been undertaken to provide an account of laws in accor-
dance with the scientific preconceptions, thereby aiming to account
for the existence of physical necessities. In this line, a summarized
answer to the question "What are laws of Nature?" is the following:
laws are relations among universals. Some maintain that these rela-
tions are contingent, others that are necessary —in the second level
of modality aforementioned. The former has been argued mainly by
Armstrong [1983], Dretske [1977] and Tooley [1977]. The latter by
Shoemaker [1980], Swoyer [1982] (and, as Swoyer remarks, it can be
traced back to Plato’s "Phaedo", Plato [4th c. B.C.]). The contingency
here means that the relations could have been different, so that there
are other possible worlds with different relations among universals,
hence with different laws. The metaphysical necessity instead means
that the relations could not have been otherwise, so that there cannot
be other possible worlds with different relations among universals.
As to the first degree of modality: How does the necessitarian spell
out the the notion of physical necessity? Armstrong defines a relation
of necessitation between universals that he labels as ’N’. That is, for
two universals F and G we may have that they stand in a necessitation
relation, so in that case we can ascribe to them the relation N(F,G).
This relation, whenever it holds, entails the obtaining of regularities
among the instantiated universals involved. Such a relation explains
the observed regularities given that N(F,G)⇒ ∀x(Fx→ Gx). Notably,
the other direction of the entailment does not hold, and this is just
the difference that distinguishes nomical regularities from accidental
ones.
However, the lack of explanatory power of this approach has been
notoriously criticized. The mere ascription of a label ’N’ to the physi-
cal necessities does not really provide an understanding of what they
are. David Lewis transmitted this worry with his usual wit:
"Whatever N may be, I cannot see how it could be absolutely
impossible to have N(F,G) and Fa without Ga. (Unless N just
is constant conjunction, or constant conjunction plus something
else, in which case Armstrong’s theory turns into a form of the
regularity theory he rejects.) The mystery is somewhat hidden
by Armstrong’s terminology. He uses ‘necessitates’ as a name
for the lawmaking universal N; and who would be surprised
to hear that if F ‘necessitates’ G and a has F, then a must have
G? But I say that N deserves the name of ‘necessitation’ only
if, somehow, it really can enter into the requisite necessary con-
nections. It can’t enter into them just by bearing a name, any
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more than one can have mighty biceps just by being called
‘Armstrong’ " [Lewis, 1983, 366].
The necessitarian solution is thus unsatisfactory, for the same rea-
son that Moliere’s ’virtus dormitiva’ is unsatisfactory as an explana-
tion of opium’s sleep inducing properties.
1.4.1.2 The antireductionist
Similarly uninformative seems to be the answer of the antireduction-
ist, which just postulates the explanandum as primitive.
The quality of his works notwithstanding, it is not unfair to summa-
rize the view of lawhood expressed in Carroll [2008a] with the concise
quote:
"Laws of nature are exactly those regularities that are caused by
nature. [...] They hold because of nature." [Carroll, 2008a]
In the case of [Maudlin, 2011], not only traditional deterministic
laws, but even stochastic laws, of which I have argued (p. 11) that their
need of explanation is twofold (one regarding the lawful element,
other regarding the objective probability involved), are taken to be
primitive. With respect to the probability at stake in stochastic laws,
Maudlin says:
"I cannot deny the possibility of a sort of cognitive blindness
that would make someone unable to comprehend the notion
of probability being used here, and I cannot offer a remedy
for such blindness, since the notion appears as an irreducible
posit. But still, on the one hand, such cognitive blindness ap-
pears to be rare: When the notion of a stochastic dynamics
is introduced to the uninitiated, the result is not blind incom-
prehension. Some, like Einstein, might not like the idea, but
they understand it. Furthermore, it is not at all clear what is
wanted to provide the needed clarification. It is clear how hy-
potheses about stochastic dynamics are to be formulated, used,
and tested. It is clear how to do experiments and draw con-
clusions. No reductive analysis is offered because the notion is
not a derivative one, and there surely have to be non-derivative
concepts. What more, exactly, could be wanted?"
The fragment cites a list of pragmatic virtues of stochastic laws,
from which an understanding of them presumably follows. You might
dislike the notion, but it can be comprehended. However, the strong
rhetoric notwithstanding, the fragment is not really providing any
substantial argument against the idea that stochastic laws contain
philosophically puzzling issues, and that further explanation should
be welcomed. To operate with something (’formulate’, ’use’, ’test’, ’do
experiments’, and ’draw conclusions’ is the partially redundant list
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stated) does not imply that you fully understand, not even that you
just understand, something. The foremost example is the quantity of
puzzling interpretational riddles of the most empirically tested phys-
ical theory, quantum mechanics.
So, in brief: as to "What more, exactly, could be wanted?", my previous
section, and likewise next sections, argue what should be wanted.
1.4.1.3 Do dispositions and powers explain physical necessity?
Eventually, within the necessitarian stance, a solution pursued is that
which associates universals to the discourse of natural kinds, dispo-
sitions and essential properties. The revival of these neglected meta-
physical categories was posed in order to ground the notion of physi-
cal necessity15. This move was proposed e.g. by Swoyer [1982], Bigelow
et al. [1992], [Ellis, 2001], [Bird, 2007]. The idea is that an electron, for
instance, has as part of its essence the causal power to repel other
electrons. Likewise, the salt has the disposition to get dissolved or, in
other words, the solubility is an essential property of salt. Thus, we
are able to assert that laws are entailed by the dispositions of entities
Bird [2005].
The discourse on essences was historically repudiated since british
empiricism (and even before, since medieval nominalism), but re-
cently it is much more tolerated (perhaps even widely accepted among
philosophers) after the striking influence of Saul Kripke’s work (Kripke
[1971], Kripke [1980]). This discourse of essences takes back the par-
lance about essences and substances. Roughly, substances are what
they are given the essential properties that define them. So this dis-
course takes back questions as to what is for something to be what it
is, what is to be identical with another thing, and so on. In that way,
it introduces famous insights about metaphysical necessity in terms
of essences, as well as the alleged necessities a posteriori, of which I
will refer later.
the same worries in a different framework Thus, a strat-
egy in order to ground the relation ’N’ —which, in turn, amounts to
ground physical necessity— is to admit the existence of essences, dis-
positions and/or powers, responsibles of the things being as they are,
and responsibles for the relations among properties obtaining as they
obtain, given the essence —the "intrinsic nature"— of these properties.
[Dorato, 2000, ch.4], for instance, defends a dispositional account of
laws:
"In what respects the character of necessity of laws, we have
seen how that is inherited either by the properties that charac-
terize a natural kind or a type, or by its causal powers".
15 As I will comment later, also the antirealist side is complemented by a discourse
on Nature’s capacities and causal powers, though that is not strictly a necessary
condition for antirealism [Cartwright, 1999], [Mumford and Anjum, 2011].
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The move of appealing to dispositions, at least prima facie, is not as the
case of ’virtus dormitiva’, given that it makes a step in some direction;
however, it is in the vicinity: the burden of proof has now shifted to
another equally unclear place. The dispositionalist faces the worry as
to what are supposed to be these dispositions —something that seek
to treat books like [Molnar, 2003] or [Marmodoro, 2010].
Even so, to know what are intrinsic dispositions in Nature, without
further ado, still says nothing about why it is the case that actually there
are regularly repeated dispositions in Nature (and this is not the job of
scientific discovery), and why there are these dispositions and not others.
That is, I am rephrasing the same three questions stated at the begin-
ning (p. 6), now in the language of the dispositionalist.
Moreover, one could pose the question: Are there not such intrinsic
dispositions because of an underlying stochastic law? In that case, all
the role of dispositions could be interchanged by stochastic laws and
then explained (as usually) only in terms of the latter.
John Earman was also counting with laws as partial responsibles of
dispositions; e.g. for the case of the disposition to dissolve:
"We are confident that the secrets of dispositions to dissolve
are to be found jointly in (a) ocurrent facts about the micro-
structure of salts and crystals and (b) laws couched purely in
terms of ocurrent properties" [Earman, 1986, 95].
If that were the case, he can reaffirm the humean deflationist stance,
according to which (being W1 and W2 possible worlds):
"For any W1, W2, if W1 and W2 agree on all ocurrent facts, then
W1 and W2 agree on dispositional facts regarding solubility
(and other garden variety pure dispositions)" [ibidem]
If those questions are not properly answered, the dispositionalist
framework can be hardly considered a complete metaphysical ac-
count of physical necessity and laws of nature.
Likewise, as it rests on essential properties, the next objection also
threatens to undermine this type of account.
the irrelevance of the metaphysical necessity of sub-
stances Related to the discourse of dispositions there is abundant
literature arguing for the metaphysical necessity conveyed by essen-
tial properties. Kripke emphasized the metaphysical character of this
necessity, in contraposition to the epistemic necessity, so it seemed
that it was really stating something substantial about the world. Here,
though, I will show why it is not a substantial type of necessity, not
relevant for any of the two levels of modality of laws laid down above.
Specifically, the necessity that comes from [Kripke, 1980]16 is more
16 And [Putnam, 1975], [Kripke, 1971], and all the abundant literature that followed
ever since; some representative references being [Fine, 1994], [Fine, 2002], [Leeds,
2007], or [Nolan, 2011].
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tied to our language conventions than what it intends to be. If this
critique is correct, the sort of necessity involved will be true, but triv-
ial and of little utility. At the very least, while accepting that there
are necessary a posteriori truths, they do not bear any influence on
whether laws could have been otherwise or not.
Let’s unfold the argument, which coincides with what is more thor-
oughly developed in [Sidelle, 2002], [Sidelle, 1989], and similar to
what is said in [Jackson, 1998], or [Chalmers, 1996, ch.3]. It is im-
portant to make the critical argument explicit, because nowadays
metaphysical necessities of this sort are still considered a valuable
stronghold of analytic philosophy (actually, when I was starting the
PhD, four years ago, it was assumed to be a sophisticated substantial
subject, an insight allegedly useful for the resolution of philosophical
puzzles).
Many elements made especially attractive Kripke’s proposal. Among Laws as
metaphysically
necessary
them, that a class of necessary a posteriori truths was the class of (a
subset of) scientific empirical discoveries. For instance, ’Water isH2O’,
’killer whales are mammals’, or ’Tilikum is a killer whale’ (Tilikum is
the killer whale of San Diego’s "Sea World"). Now, we can perfectly
conceive that Tilikum was a dolphin, or that killer whales are not
mammals. But this, Kripke argues at length, is a case of false con-
ceivability: to conceive is not a reliable guide to a real metaphysical
possibility; it is only an epistemic possibility, and it is crucial not to
get confused and differentiate them. The same train of thought might
be extended to laws of nature in general, thus becoming paradigmatic
examples of necessary a posteriori truths. Here ’necessary’ is meant
in the stronger sense of metaphysical necessity; this is to say that the
laws are physically necessary in the actual world and any other meta-
physically possible world.
More in detail, we have found out some laws of nature are in a cer-
tain way —think of a simple case: Newton’s law of universal gravi-
tation: F = Gm1m2
r2
. The immediate thought is that those laws, fruit
of empirical, hence a posteriori, discovery, could have been otherwise;
therefore the laws are contingent. In fact, we can conceive those laws
having a different mathematical expression, or different values for
those constants —I put before the law of universal gravitation having
the distance cubed: F = Gm1m2
r3
; or you can easily conceive that the
value of the gravitational constant G = 6.67384× 10−11[m3kg−1s−2]
is just another.
But again, contrary to this standard view, Kripke argues that we must
not confuse the possibility of having found out otherwise with the pos-
sibility of things having been otherwise. That is, those empirical dis-
coveries are metaphysically necessary.
So it is essential for an electron to repel charges as it does (or in terms
of dispositions: to have the disposition, or tendency, or capacity, to re-
pel charges); otherwise it would not be an electron. Therefore, in all
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metaphysically possible worlds, electrons behave as they do in the
actual world, they repel like charges, have spin 1/2, and so on; it is
a metaphysically necessary (and discovered a posteriori) truth. Like-
wise, any other elementary behavior of Nature discovered and stated
in the laws could not have been otherwise: the law of universal gravi-
tation cannot have the distance cubed. It would not have been the law
of gravitation anymore.
Appealing as this might seem, it can be flatly asserted that it is in-
correct. Rather than unveiling metaphysical features of reality, the
necessari a posteriori truths rest on a linguistic convention, so the nec-
essary truth is necessary only in virtue of the meaning of the terms
employed. What is made is an individuation of a certain empirical
finding with a certain name, so the necessity involved is analytic.
Take any example of the above. In the case of water’s being neces-
sarily H2O, there is an assumption made that is that nothing counts as
water unless it has the same explanatory features as the stuff we call ’water’
[Sidelle, 2002, 319]. Then, there is a discovered empirical fact, namely
that the explanatory feature of the stuff we call ’water’ turns out to
be composed of H2O. The modal force in this process is only coming
from the analytic individuation made in that assumption. Therefore
it can hardly reveal anything at all about reality17.
The conclusion exposed is of importance because it bears upon dis-
cussions in the nature of laws, as well as in other fields, like philos-
ophy of mind (blatant examples are [Chalmers, 1996], or [Chalmers,
2009]18). Namely, it bears upon the notions of the ’essences’ and the
’natures’ of things. [Sidelle, 2002, 321] expresses exactly what I want
to convey:
"If I am right, much of the rhetoric that has gone with, and fol-
lowed upon, the acceptance of such truths involves misinterpre-
tation. Metaphysically, it is misleading to speak of essences and
natures, as if they were more than semantically determined; by
the same token, it is at best misleading to say—as many philoso-
phers often do— ’well, of course you can imagine that a is F, or
some F is G—but perhaps the very nature of a, or G, makes this
really impossible’. This is especially important, because the sort
of ’real natures’ talk is often what underwrites the sense that
considerations of what we can imagine should not be expected
to shed any light on what is genuinely possible."
17 This argument is elaborated at length in [Sidelle, 2002, sec.2]. Cf. also the aforemen-
tioned references. I leave aside many subtleties to focus in the central point stated.
18 In the abstract of this book we can explicitly find what is here criticized: "My view
is that one can legitimately infer ontological conclusions from epistemic premises, if one is
very careful about how one reasons. To do so, the best way is to reason first from epistemic
premises to modal conclusions (about necessity and possibility), and from there to ontological
conclusions". And I have argued that the sort of modal conclusions at stake does not
allow the step to any ontological conclusion.
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In sum, the conclusion of this subsection is that none of the afore-
mentioned accounts, all of them realist about laws —the necessitar-
ian, the antireductionist, and the realist dispositionalist—, exhibit the
sufficient explanatory power to account for the notion of physical ne-
cessity. Now I move to two antirealist accounts, the humean and the
antirealist, where the conclusion will be the same.
1.4.2 Deflationist attempts and the humean acceptance of contingency
fundamental governing laws? Besides the specific objections
raised, there is an objection common to all previous realist accounts
that drives much of the deflationist proposals. The objection regards
the highly mysterious status of laws understood as a set of pre-existent,
guiding, governing rules. While this governing view of laws is the de-
fault pre-theoretic stance, both philosophers and, as I will show in
chapter 3, some physicists, have disputed this viewpoint. Among
philosophers, the critiques can be found in different forms in [Cartwright,
1980], [Lewis, 1983, 23], [Van Fraassen, 1989], [Giere, 1999], [Beebee,
2000], [Mumford, 2004], or [Schaffer, 2008].
For instance, [Beebee, 2000, 580-1] traces the governing view to a the-
ological conception of laws, while [Schaffer, 2008, 16] underlines how
"the notion of lawhood in use is a direct descendant of the the-
ological views of Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz, who viewed
laws as divine decrees concerning the clockwork of the world"
concluding that the intuitions involved in such understanding are
remnants of a dubious theology. This thesis shares this critical stance,
and aims to enhance it in upcoming chapters. Especially in the next
chapter 2, where I remark how especially puzzling is the notion of
governing laws when carefully looking at the particular, contrived
form displayed by our current physical laws.
the lack of physical necessity However, the alternative philo-
sophical accounts, within the deflationist non-governing side, also fail
in providing convincing answers to physical necessity: they deny its
existence, but there is still an appearance of physical necessities and
the subsequent apparent "non-accidental" regularities. An explanation
of this appearance has to be provided.
I phrased this flaw in the very first paragraph of this chapter in
terms of the "cosmic coincidence" of "ordered behavior". Let me phrase
it from a complementary point of view: the humean laws lack any The cosmic
coincidences that the
BSA describes
explanation of the counterfactual predictive power of laws [Swoyer,
1982, 209], [Fales, 1990, 85]. In a nutshell: if laws are only the best
summary we can make of the history of the universe —of the humean
mosaic—, then how can we be so confidents (as we are, even if we de-
clare ourselves as convinced humeans) that the current laws are also
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predicting what is going to happen in the future? Similarly, how is itHow is it that laws
support
counterfactuals?
that (humean) laws support counterfactuals? The humean, however,
says nothing about this. Papers abound in the philosophical literature
dealing with sophisticated issues around the humean account. How-
ever, little or none attention is paid to the central flaw I am recalling,
which I take to be the most pressing threat to such account (cf. [Car-
roll, 2008b, sec.8], [Swartz, sec.7])19.
Let me remark a neglected feature that arguably follows from the
humean framework that bolsters this central objection. Leaving asideHow to expect a
humean mosaic? how the world actually is, and focusing on what the humean frame-
work says, how one should expect a humean mosaic to be? My answer
is that one should expect that a humean mosaic, which lacks any gen-
uine necessary connection, would look like chaotic, random-looking.
A random-looking humean mosaic is what one should expect, given
the barely restricted space of possibilities that the humean mosaic can
take. The unconstrained space of possibilities —not constrained by
any necessary connection— entails that there are overwhelmingly more
ways in which the humean mosaic is random-looking than highly regular, as
it actually is.
If (temporal) patterns appear, this is due to a coincidence —there
are no necessary connections, there are only accidental regularities—;
thus is much more likely that such regularities last not "much time"
—which is to say: there are much more scenarios in which temporal
patters just do not hold across all time and space. This is contrary to
the highly stable regularities we daily experience, and even more at
odds with the standard scientific image according to which laws of
physics never change across time and space.
So, assuming the stability acknowledged in our actual world (from
our daily experience and from the scientific image) but, crucially, not
assuming the existence of physical necessity, should not we demand
some explanation of this stability, of this highly special actual humean
mosaic? Yes, we should.
This is, I argue, a very prominent problem of deflationist accounts on
laws. So, later on, this dissertations studies whether is possible in this
lawless scenario, adding hopefully plausible assumptions, the emer-
gence in higher levels of stable regularities, that would correspond to
what we would label as ’non-accidental’. That is, I will seek to answer
the question: What assumptions are needed in order to have stable regular-
19 For instance, a sample of the topics dealt in current literature about humean laws
revolves around: how to spell out the balance of simplicity and strength of the "best
system account" [Woodward, 2014]; counterexamples of laws that do not show the
presumed balance [Maudlin, 2011, 16], [Roberts, 2008, 23]; how to incorporate inde-
terministic laws and the notion of chance [Briggs, 2009]; or whether a best system
account can be provided for special-level sciences [Schrenk, forthcoming]; among
other topics, as e.g. [Lange, 2011], or [Cohen and Callender, 2009].
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ities in a lawless scenario?
Nonetheless, the humean might not feel the urge to find an answer:
he has a previous response20. To begin with, the humean is satisfied A reply of the
humean: accepting
the humean mosaic...
however it shows up
with taking as a brute fact the whole humean mosaic. This leads him
to accept as primitive the overwhelmingly stable regularities that the
mosaic displays.
Here it is, however, where I want to argue that the humean, in his
apparently natural acceptance of the humean mosaic as a brute fact,
has been taking far too much for granted. It does not sound wrong to
say that "at some point explanations must come to an end. Regularists place
that stopping point at the way-the-world-is" [Swartz, sec.7]. But it is prob-
ably wrong when a layperson with curiosity realizes that many of
his age-old philosophical worries are suddendly "dissolved" by their
mere assumption. A dissolution would be of course welcomed, if it
were not because the worries are just postulated as primitive brute
facts. The massive postulation of the whole humean mosaic carries im-
plicit in itself the postulation of any specific behavior that could have
been displayed —so, not only the very existence of overwhelmingly
stable regularities is "dissolved" but plausibly also any other sort of
philosophical worry, as the time-asymmetry, the beginning and end
of spacetime, and so on.
2nd humean reply:
ascribing
probabilities to the
humean mosaic
makes no sense
There is, yet, a second reply: it is not more likely for the humean
mosaic to be in one way or another; it is meaningless to talk of prob-
abilities as applied to the whole humean mosaic. Thus, the humean
does not take as meaningful to say that the world displays "cosmic
coincidences".
This reply is disputable too. There certainly are problems in the in-
terpretation of probability, in the axioms of probability calculus, and
especially in the assignation of real numbers (representing a probabil-
ity) to single events, as in this sort of cosmological contexts. However,
this does not entail that a prior landscape of possibilities does not ex-
ist, and that something substantial cannot be said about it —as in fact
our intuition does. In this landscape of conceivable possibilities the
scenarios in which the temporal patterns are so extremely ordered
as in the actual world sum an overwhelmingly inferior number over
the whole set of possible scenarios; they are far from being the most
typical case. Typicality is a notion that does not recur to probabilities.
Therefore, it does not assign any problematic value to any possibility.
Typicality refers to a measure of the number of elements that share
a property. The ’typicality’ approach in Statistical Mechanics exploits
this idea, and it is precisely defined in meature-theoretic terms. I spell
20 I thank here the humeans Craig Callender, Jonathan Schaffer, and David Albert for
the advices given in personal conversations. While Callender acknowledged this as a
problem of the humean account, the following reply is based on Albert’s comments.
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out this approach in chapter 5.
This thought is expressed in [Swartz, sec.7]:
"there has to be some reason, some explanation, why the world
is as it is and is not some other way. It can’t simply be, for
example, that all electrons, the trillions upon trillions of them,
just happen to all bear the identical electrical charge as one an-
other – that would be a cosmic coincidence of an unimaginable
improbability"21.
Without having to necessarily commit to problematic interpreta-
tions of probability, it is meaningful to wonder and ask for a reason
behind such highly ordered, stable humean mosaic. It is reasonable
to expect that there is an explanation behind such highly-ordered and
frequent patterns. And this is something the humean account misses.
This thesis aims to suggest a possible resolution, and (hopefully) be-
gin to fill the gap. This thesis is thus perfectly compatible with the
humean; indeed, it can be seen as a complement to any other defla-
tionist account.
antirealist dispositions Some dispositionalist accounts that
are antirealist on laws, like [Cartwright, 1989] or, more recently, [Mum-
ford and Anjum, 2011], recur to a discourse about causation, which is
accounted in terms of capacities, dispositions, or powers. So, like the
Best System Account, there are no genuine laws; there are, at most,
the best descriptions of the patterns of the world. But even so, for
the antirealist these description are hardly achievable. Because the
regularities that arise are local, context-sensitive, and intrinsically not
exceptionless22.
In [Mumford and Anjum, 2011] this situation is cashed out in terms
of the aforementioned dispositions. Causation and the appearance of
lawful behavior, then, are explained in terms of fundamental dispo-
sitional properties. In this sense, they do provide an account of what
is physical necessity [Mumford and Anjum, 2011, ch.3 and 8], and
give an answer about the other two explananda —laws and causa-
tion. As such, this would be a great candidate, if it were not for the
obvious objection, raised before when referring to the realist dispo-
sitions: what are supposed to be these dispositions? The burden of
proof has moved somewhere equally mysterious. Perhaps it has not
even moved, if according to the case suggested before, probabilistic
laws is what dispositions really are. Furthermore, the other objections
directed before towards the dispositionalist hold for the antirealist
versions too.
21 Of course it could be the case that this apparently unlikely possibility was the nec-
essary inevitable way the world had to be. This, anyway, does not preclude the
legitimacy of the reasoning above, involving a landscape of possibilities.
22 For arguments against, see [Hoefer, 2003].
1.4 the lack of a satisfying explanation of physical necessity and why should be sought 29
I have recovered the discussion around the dispositional account, this
time within the antirealist side, for a specific reason. As well as I
have claimed that this dissertation can be seen as a complement to a
humean account of laws, likewise it can be a complement to a disposi-
tional antirealist. This can be so since my project might, if correct, pro-
vide an answer as to why there are stable dispositions. In fact, in chapter
4 is studied how, under certain conditions, probabilistic outcomes of
a system —i.e. what we could think of as propensities/dispositions—
are obtained from a chaotic or random input. This thesis, then, can
be understood as a possible complement to ground the ontology of
dispositions.
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1.5 could symmetries let us dispense with fundamental
laws?
This final section takes an initial look at our most fundamental
physics and the laws therein expressed. Specifically, given the promi-
nent and ubiquitous role of global and local symmetry principles,
this section formulates the following question: Could symmetry prin-
ciples constrain the space of possibilities (of possible time evolutions
of a system) in a way so as to dispense, when accounting for lawful be-
havior, with fundamental laws? After motivating in section 1.5.2 the
explanatory virtues of a positive answer to the question, I set forth
in 1.5.3 objections made to such project. However, in section 1.5.4 I
cite some contemporary candidates that might fill the desired role.
Namely, the so called renormalizable local gauge theories of Quan-
tum Field Theory. The investigation on the relation of symmetries
with laws will continue in chapter 2.
1.5.1 Introduction
Could symmetries let us dispense with fundamental laws? This sec-
tion suggests that this can be a plausible scenario; yet, in the way it
also raises several flaws that should be fulfilled. As can be guessed,
the motivation behind such question comes from the spirit of the
whole dissertation of accounting for regular behavior without the as-
sumption of a pre-existent set of governing laws. Section 1.5.2 states
the virtues of the move of recurring to symmetries as an alternative
to a traditional view of laws. In 1.5.3 I put forward a first negative
answer to the project, citing John Earman’s reply [Earman, 1993] to
Van Fraassen’s "Laws and symmetry" [Van Fraassen, 1989]. However,
in section 1.5.4 I propose what could be a positive answer: I cite a can-
didate that (somehow surprisingly) might fill the desired role. That
is, the role of a theory constituted exclusively by symmetry princi-
ples that determines the time evolution of the system23. With such
a theory it would be redundant to postulate genuine fundamental
laws in order to account for regular behavior. Notably, the candidate
proposed in 1.5.4 is found among our best physical theories with em-
pirical support. Namely, among renormalizable local gauge theories
of Quantum Field Theory (QFT). However, appealing as this project
might be, in chapter 2 I turn again with a negative upshot: roughly, I
highlight that the symmetry principles at stake are already too many,
too complex and too unnatural as to be taken as any sort of a priori
23 That the determination is univocal or not —hence deterministic or not— is indiffer-
ent for our purposes. So it is legitimate if the constraint of degrees of freedom by the
symmetry principles does not univocally determine one time evolution —so that the
resulting dynamical evolution is indeterministic.
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"superprinciples" —the ontological interpretation originally advocated
by Eugene Wigner [Wigner, 1980].
1.5.2 Preferability of symmetry principles over governing laws?
"As far as I see, all a priori statements have their origin in symmetry".
H. Weyl — [Weyl, 1952, 126]
Decades ago, symmetry principles could have been plausibly con-
sidered as some sort of "superprinciples", in the sense of a priori truths
of our world. Some of the foremost examples are the invariances un-
der time and space translation. As is known, these two global con-
tinuous symmetries correspond to two principles of conservation, of
energy and linear momentum respectively. Furthermore, the relation Symmetries as
super-principles or
meta-laws
of symmetry principles with principles of conservation is generalized
by Noether’s theorem: for every continuous global symmetry of the
Lagrangian there is a conservation law (and vice versa). If some prin-
ciples at all could be assumed as necessary or a priori, these could be
reasonable candidates24. Whoever was puzzled by the mere existence
of laws of nature might find a candidate explanation in symmetry
principles. One finds mathematical truths stated in those principles
—therefore metaphysically necessary truths— grounding the very ex-
istence of laws and their stability. This point of view is expressed in
[Wigner, 1980] and [Weyl, 1952].
So, at least prima facie, it seems that symmetry principles are deep-
est principles that cannot be violated in any metaphysically, or even
logically, possible world. Under this point of view, symmetry princi- Finally in the way
for the logical
inevitability of
laws?
ples could represent the long-sought explanation of the mysterious
nature of laws as logically necessary. This is a point of view that al-
ways lacked satisfactory arguments in its support, but that has been
cherished by many physicists and contemplated since modern philos-
ophy by Leibniz, Spinoza, or Kant, with roots in Plato. Resting on the
mathematical foundation of the symmetry principles, an argument
seems to be finally glimpsed in support of the necessary logical/-
mathematical inevitability of the laws. In spite of the conceivability of
different laws —the main argument against the view of laws as logi-
cally (or metaphysically) necessary—, the mathematics discovered by
modern physics seems to lead us to such metaphysical approach. Fur-
thermore, the advent of more symmetries of a new type, local (also
called ’internal’) and following the so called gauge principle, has been
taken as a sign of the "elegance of nature" [Wilczek, 2008, 63]25. [Martin,
2003, 41] describes this point of view:
24 For a clear survey of the notion of symmetry in the history of physics, see [Lederman
and Hill, 2004]. Excellent overviews from philosophers are [Brading and Castellani,
2013] or [Bangu, 2013].
25 The gauge principle specifies a procedure for obtaining an interaction term in the
Lagrangian which is symmetric with respect to a continuous symmetry. The results
of localizing (or ’gauging’) the global symmetry group involves the introduction of
32 non-accidental regularities without physical necessity
"the ‘gauge philosophy’ is often elevated and local gauge sym-
metry principles enshrined. Gauge symmetry principles are reg-
ularly invoked in the context of justification, as deep physical
principles, fundamental starting points in thinking about why
physical theories are the way they are, so to speak. This finds
expression, for example, in the prominent current view of sym-
metry as undergirding our physical worldview in some strong
sense"
and [ibidem, p.52]:
"gauge invariance is often invoked as a supremely powerful,
beautiful, deeply physical, even undeniably necessary feature
of current fundamental physical theory".
Thus, sophisticated "elegant" mathematics provide a foremost unified
account of the fundamental interactions. Further, they have proudly
achieved so as a result of conceptual (mathematical) work much be-
fore the posterior (solid) experimental support26. Moreover, the gauge
paradigm exhibits an appealing simplicity in that few inputs are re-
quired to specify full theories [Martin, 2003, 53]. This leads to one of
the most attractive features of this new physics: its unificatory role.
All elementary interactions (though gravitation only in theory) are
described in terms of local gauge symmetries.
Interpretations of
symmetries It must be remarked that I am assuming an ontological interpre-
tation of local gauge symmetries, not representing a mathematical
redundancy in our description of the world. While my assumption
is widespread, the issue is nevertheless unsettled and the alternative
interpretations exist since long ago (e.g. in [Wigner, 1967], [Redhead,
1975], or [Redhead, 2003]).
1.5.3 Symmetries were not enough
Roughly, part of [Van Fraassen, 1989]’s account can be taken to be
representative of the project I have put forth, of symmetries letting
us dispense with laws. It can be labeled as a deflationist account:
the notion of law is to be substituted by higher, more fundamental,
principles of symmetry that can account for lawful behavior.
There is, though, an immediate critique to the completeness of this
type of project. [Earman, 1993] attenuated Van Frassen’s enthusiasm
about the role of symmetries by pointing out that the form of the
additional fields so that the Lagrangian is extended to a new one that is covariant
with respect to the group of local transformations. Remarkably, it turns out that
nowadays all the fundamental interactions of the Standard Model can be described
according to this procedure. This is shown in detail in 2.3.
26 See [Bangu, 2013] or more thoroughly [Bangu, 2008] for the study of impressive
historical cases, like the prediction of the Ω− boson.
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laws of motion might follow from symmetry considerations, but the
content of the laws does not:
“Symmetry considerations allow us to deduce important results
without knowing the details of the dynamical laws” [Earman,
1993, 5].
But then:
“The form of the law of motion follows from symmetry con-
siderations; but the content of the law, which is specified by the
Hamiltonian, does not. The content may, perhaps, be further de-
limited by symmetry properties –such as invariance under time
reversal and parity” [ibidem].
In sum, the details of the dynamics cannot be deduced from sym-
metry considerations alone. In general, Earman’s observation is true,
and not only in classical and relativistic physics but also in particle
physics: a law is not uniquely determined by the symmetries asso-
ciated with it. Still, in the two decades that followed Earman’s ob-
servation, relevant advances within particle physics have taken place.
Some, perhaps, might overcome his claim. This is what the next sec-
tion explores.
1.5.4 Univocal determination in QFT: Will symmetries be enough?
As I have said, one of the most salient features of the new physics is
the increasing role of symmetry principles in the constitution of the
theories. This section puts forward a physical theory that, arguably,
overcomes Earman’s previous statement recovering the legitimacy of
Van Fraassen’s original “radical” claim27. That is: a theory whose sym-
metries univocally determine which laws there will be. Arguably, this is
the case in one of our fundamental most empirically tested physical
frameworks, QFT. Specifically, in renormalizable local gauge theories.
There it turns out that, once we have specified the relevant symmetry,
the theories are uniquely specified for a given matter content [McKen-
zie, 2013]28. In fact,
“on the assumption that the fields concerned are specified, the
laws are thereby also uniquely specified but for the values of
the constants appearing in them. Determination of these con-
stants is therefore a matter of matching them to experiment”
[McKenzie, 2013, p.13].
It is thus remarked an essential link between particle types and sym-
metries.
27 ’Radical’, I would say, only because we are used to other radical version, that of the
existence of a finite set of (governing) fundamental laws (no matter if expressed in
the lagrangian formalism or in any other formalism).
28 For further details see [Wilczek, 2000] or [Griffiths, 2008, ch.10].
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Behind this procedure there is a Lie algebra that determines certain
symmetry groups that correspond to the known fundamental interac-
tions. Specifically, the groups are U(1), SU(2) and SU(3) for the elec-
trodynamic, weak and strong interaction respectively. The elements
of the groups are embedded in a certain structure, the ’multiplets’.
From these multiplets the possible types of particles are univocally
determined (see how the particles are graphically represented within
the multiplet in figure 1, p. 55).
Crucially, this implies that if we reverse the usual direction of expla-
nation and start by assuming a certain set of particle types, this yields
to certain symmetries, and this, in turn, yields to a unique set of cor-
responding laws. Therefore, it turns out that if the fields are specified,
the laws are also uniquely specified.
Thus, fundamental laws can be seen as exclusively constituted by
symmetry principles29. So the former can be accounted exhaustively
in terms of the latter. Following this interpretation, laws of nature
need not be understood as a set of genuinely fundamental, "pre-
existing", "governing" laws. What we have now are mathematically
grounded principles, so logically necessary truths, that suffice to con-
strain the time evolution of every elementary field or entity.
Given the ubiquitous far-reaching role of symmetries, we could now
explain what grounds the non-accidental regularities and the very
notion of law.
The plausibility of the assumption of symmetries, though, is what
is going to be discussed and criticized in the next chapter.
29 There is the non-trivial exception of the values of constants appearing in them. This
can be interpreted as a threat against the upshot I am defending (the unique deter-
mination of laws and symmetries by a set of particle types).
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Abstract
This chapter reflects upon which requirements, if any, should be met by a
theory to be considered as fundamental. Some traditional criteria for
fundamentality, naturalness and simplicity, are shown to be inconsistent
with certain aspects of our best physics. The argument rests on features of
local gauge symmetries that constitute the core of the Standard Model and,
crucially, of its candidate successors. It concludes that local gauge
symmetries, in spite of their elegance and unificatory power, are
non-natural, complex, and far from anything like a priori "super-principles",
as firstly proposed by Wigner. Then, the chapter assesses how this
conclusion bears on the metaphysics of fundamentality. On the one hand,
criteria of naturalness and simplicity ought to be abandoned if the
fundamental level is structurally similar to our best physics. On the other
hand, if no assumption is made about the fundamental level, an alternative
metaphysical picture gains plausibility alongside the existing ones, one
that would better preserve the criteria of naturalness and simplicity.
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2.1 introduction
In order to properly engage with a metaphysics of fundamental laws,
this chapter reflects upon which requirements, if any, ought to be
met by a theory to be considered as fundamental. This chapter, then,Framing the chapter
in the literature is about metaphysics of fundamentality; as such, it can be framed
along with recent literature on this area, e.g. [Sider, 2011], [Schaffer,
2003], [Fine, 2012], or [McKenzie, 2011]. It can alternatively be framed
along with the literature that has been reflecting upon the state of the-
oretical physics, e.g. [Cao and Schweber, 1993], [Maudlin, 1996] [Cat,
1998], [Castellani, 2002], [Shifman, 2012], [Feng, 2013], or [Morrison,
2013].
Of course, an answer sympathetic to some physicists as to what should
be required for a (scientific) theory to be fundamental is ’nothing
besides empirical adequacy and self-consistency’, the guiding idea
being that empirical research will provide us with the fundamental
theory1. Naturalistic metaphysics is supposed to adhere to this atti-
tude. Another common option, however, involves certain metaphysi-
cal criteria —whose endorsement is not always explicit— that guide
the interpretation of the data and the mathematical structure with
which the data is organized: some well known criteria are simplicity
or naturalness. In sec. 2.3 I will point out the inconsistency of such
traditional criteria with our current best physics. Crucially, the incon-
sistency also appears in any future candidate that will share certain
structural characteristics of the current theories. Specifically, the focus
revolves around the local gauge symmetries that essentially constitute
the Standard Model and its candidate successors. The conclusion isFirst conclusion of
the chapter that, focusing on the form of gauge symmetries, even the allegedly
most natural fundamental candidate theories in modern physics are
not natural.
The argument is independent of, and complementary with, other ar-
guments, laid out on other grounds, that point out the lack of nat-
uralness of certain physical theories. The most salient cases are the
fine-tuned values of the constants [Ellis, 2006, sec. G] and the gauge
hierarchy problem [Morrison, 2013, 404]2. Notably, while certain the-
ories solve such critiques to naturalness (for instance, supersymme-
try solves the gauge hierarchy problem [Feng, 2013]), all theories are
threatened by the arguments put forth in this chapter.
Then, resting on such conclusion, a second goal of the chapter is toSecond conclusion
advocate for the plausibility of an alternative metaphysical picture
alongside the existing ones. That is, advocate for the legitimacy and
1 Later, when in touch with the current quantum field theories, this viewpoint is
more faithfully represented by including the requirement of the so called ’asymp-
totic safety’.
2 The gauge hierarchy problem concerns the different order of magnitude between the
weak scale (0.1− 1TeV) and the (reduced) Planck scale (2.4 · 1018GeV). More on this
later.
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plausibility of an alternative of the fundamental level and, addition-
ally, support a specific alternative, which is developed and critically
assessed in the next chapter. Drawing an initial landscape of possi-
bilities, the proposal amounts to a third scenario besides other two,
which roughly stated are 1) the picture of a unified set of few and simple
guiding principles —in the line of Grand Unified Theories (GUT’s)—,
and 2) the picture directly derived from what the current best phys-
ical theories say (leaving aside the vexed philosophical issue about
what they say, i.e. what is the interpretation of a physical theory, as
well as what is the best of the candidate physical theories) 3.
The specific alternative proposal, in brief, is one that takes at face
value the complexity and unnaturalness unveiled in section 2.3 and
induces that the dynamics of the fundamental level is highly more
complex. This alternative metaphysics of the fundamental has been
defended and studied by some physicists ([Wheeler, 1983b], [Wein-
berg, 1981], [Froggatt and Nielsen, 1991], among others cited in ch. 3)
whose results I critically assess in the next chapter. There I also de-
fend the virtues of such alternative for metaphysical accounts of laws
of a deflationist sort, like the humean or the antirealist.
A third conclusion from this chapter regards the modality of laws; it Third conclusion
consists in the support to the contingent view rather than the neces-
sitarian, given the link (fleshed out later) between unnaturalness and
contingency.
Lastly, a fourth conclusion concerns the philosophical accounts of
laws on the market: the presumably unnatural (contrived, whimsi- Fourth conclusion
cal) aspect of the current laws puts pressure on most extant accounts.
In a nutshell, what the philosopher has to postulate in his ontology
(especially if he is realist about laws, as the necessitarian, the antire-
ductionist, and certain dispositionalists are) is more puzzling and less
economical, now that we look at the (complex and unnatural) details.
All in all, the ultimate goal of the chapter is to offer a particular
metaphysical landscape of possibilities about the fundamental level,
drawing special attention to the dynamics, informed by and consis-
tent with our best physics. In the resulting landscape, one possibility
is refuted (i.e. the first scenario above), one is added (the third sce-
nario) and one is maintained though criticized (the second scenario).
Before this, the present introductory section and the next section 2.2,
characterizing the notions at play, pave the way for a precise discus-
sion.
pseudo-problem? Let me note in this introduction a general ob-
jection that could be raised. It can be easily conceived a working
3 A rough overview of some of the main candidate physical theories comprehends:
supersymmetry, in its many variants [Feng, 2013], string theory [Becker et al., 2006]
(also abundant of different versions, and optionally linked with the multiverse the-
ory [Susskind, 2006]), loop quantum gravity (the canonical and the covariant "spin
foam" version) [Rovelli, 2004], and causal sets [Reid, 2001], among others.
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physicist reluctant of the pertinency of the metaphysical considera-
tions I am putting forward. The attitude I refer to is represented inPhysics without
metaphysics? its extreme version by the quantum physicists that refuse to appraise
any interpretation of the (highly puzzling) mathematical and empiri-
cal formalism. Not only some physicists but also some philosophers
defend not to worry about what they say are only pseudo-problems
(Ludwig Wittgenstein being a famous example of this attitude). They
could think so for the philosophical questions here raised regarding
the nature of laws and symmetries. While I sympathize with an atti-
tude of not creating problems where there are not, there is not a recipe
to know where is good or wrong to have this attitude. For instance,
it cannot strike me as more unsatisfactory the attitude of giving for
granted, without further explanation, what are laws [Maudlin, 2007,
ch.2], or what is the objective probability of a stochastic dynamics
[Maudlin, 2011, p.2]. I have argued in 1.4.1.2 why these two issues
are objectively puzzling and an explanation should be welcomed.
2.1.1 Fundamentality metaphysics for a scientific realist and an antirealist
First of all, as to the meaning of the term ’fundamental’, I refer to
a final physical theory of a bottom level; I assume an ordered hier-
archy of ontological levels in which each of them ultimately super-
venes on the lowest, called ’fundamental’. Notably, I refer not onlyTerminological
clarifications to the matter or stuff of the fundamental level of reality without ref-
erence to its dynamical evolution —as some recent philosophical lit-
erature does, e.g. [Fine, 2012], [Schaffer, 2003]—, but also to its time
evolution. Mine is the usual meaning among physicists4 and so it
should be among philosophers, especially after the tight interconnec-
tion of matter-content with its possible interactions –and so, its time
evolution– revealed by our most fundamental scientific research (i.e.
by General Relativity and by QFT, as remarked in 1.5).
When I talk about a ’metaphysical picture’ (or ’metaphysical image’,
or ’worldview’, or ’scenario’), I will be meaning the ontology and dy-
namics of the fundamental level of reality (what can also be dubbed
as the physics of the fundamental level)5.
Let me also dispel any doubt as to the fact that my concern is on-
tological, not epistemological, although my parlance is about ’how
a fundamental theory should be’, for the theory is aimed to describe
how Nature should be.
4 So[Castellani, 2002, 1] characterizes their meaning, too.
5 Interestingly, there is a link always assumed among physicists and naturalistic meta-
physicians between high-energies and fundamentality. I am also going to follow such
a link; however, worth is remarking that this link is not a (metaphysically) necessary
truth (as probably a non-naturalistic metaphysician, say a scholastic, would have
rapidly noted).
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This being said, I want to start by raising the following question:
How does the debate of scientific realism/antirealism bear upon the
metaphysics of fundamentality?
The discussion among scientific realists and antirealists is not di- A realist and an
antirealist on the
fundamental level
rectly addressed as to how the fundamental level is or should be.
The main point in their debate is epistemological, addressed towards
the faithfulness and reliability of scientific knowledge. The scientific
antirealist is clearly in tune with the idea that the latest scientific theo-
ries are not necessarily close nor closer to the final truth; therefore, he
is agnostic about the fundamental as long as there is no inconsistency
with empirical evidence. As to the realist, it is not so clear that he
is independent of fundamentality commitments. For he believes that
the current best physics is tracking truth with an increasing accuracy
and that the true final theory will somehow resemble the best candi-
dates developed so far. Thus, the standard position of the realist is to
endorse "literally" what our best physics states (again, leaving aside
the quantity of complications involved in this process). This coincides
with the second of the metaphysical pictures laid down before.
Still, within the realist framework, is there room for alternative meta-
physical pictures as long as they are consistent with current scientific
knowledge? Yes; nothing in the realist doctrine prevents these alter-
natives. Next chapter considers one of these alternative metaphysical
pictures, that of a highly complex underlying dynamics. Here I will
argue that it is a reasonable candidate for the fundamental level when
the best physical theories display a lack of naturalness and simplicity.
In such case it could be said that the empirical evidence suggests the
overcoming of reading the theory as being exhaustive on what there
is; that is, another metaphysical picture stems from the features of
current physical theories along with the usual picture based on their
literal reading. Crucial for the plausibility of this additional option is
that we are referring to fundamental theories, and that the interpreta-
tion of the current physics is taken to be not fundamental. The idea
behind is that the unnatural and the complex features of the current
theories suggest that the fundamental level is qualitatively different
from what the theories themselves state and, in particular, that the
fundamental level can be best described by a highly complex dynam-
ics. Equally valid is a weaker version of both claims, which is to state
that current scientific theories just do not rule out such possible fun-
damental scenario6.
However, a tension shows up in the case that the realist position
is understood as strictly following what the physicist states and the
6 On the contrary, some physicists defend that the final theory has to be very similar
to what has been proposed so far, given the astonishing empirical success of the
Standard Model. This is another possibility, and I will explicitly take it into account.
Let me underline that the alternative defended is also consistent with such empirical
success.
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physicist states that such scientific theory purports to be fundamen-
tal. In such a case the realist presumably has to stick with the defaultProblems for the
realist? option (the second scenario of p. 37), not seriously considering other
alternatives.
This tension can be phrased through the following question: Does the
realist have to commit to the allegedly fundamental physical theory
qua fundamental, or is he entitled to allow other possibilities, as long
as they are compatible with the empirical content of such a theory?
Let me note, before facing the question, that the pressure that the
question raises does not really apply nowadays, because there is, ar-
guably, not any actual physical theory that the scientist flatly consid-
ers fundamental. Therefore my forthcoming dicussion is unaffected.
Let me answer the question, though, in order to gain some insight
into the relation of fundamentality with scientific realism.
The answer can be plausibly said to be that the authority in settling
the fundamentality of a theory will be physics itself; likewise, though,
scientific arguments can be put forth against some candidate(s) 7. InThe detachment
from science of the
realist
sum: from the point of view of the antirealist the legitimacy of any
fundamental proposal is not controversial, as long as it is empirically
adequate: it is a valid metaphysical possibility since the antirealist
is barely committing to what there fundamentally exists. The realist
will have at his disposal any metaphysical picture that commits to
the ontology of the best scientific theory (i.e. the observed and the
unobserved theoretical entities, as well as the structures unveiled).
Then, regarding the alleged fundamentality, there can be scientific
arguments (or philosophical arguments informed by science, as you
prefer) that entitle the scientific realist to believe that what a scien-
tific theory says does not correspond to what there fundamentally
exists. To make this point clearer, think of one specific argument that
in fact will be raised later: there is a large order of magnitude be-
tween the Planck scale (arguably assumed to be the lowest possible
scale) and the scales probed in high-energy particle physics. From the
electroweak W±, Z0 scale of 10−18m to the presumably fundamental
Planck scale of 10−35m there are 17 orders of magnitude, a change
in scale similar to that in passing from macroscopic physics, at the
1m scale, to the electroweak scale [Froggatt and Nielsen, 1991, 12].
This is in fact labeled as the ’big desert’. Current fundamental theo-
ries are silent about what happens in such energy levels. Notably, it
is rather uncontroversial among physicists that is implausible "(...) to
believe that there is no new physics and we completely understand every-
thing exactly up to scales like the GUT or Planck scale. Fan of the Standard
Model that I am, that’s too much for even me to swallow as plausible" [Woit,
7 It becomes somewhat obscure whether these sort of arguments, appealing to scien-
tific facts, pondering one choice or other, are philosophical or scientific.
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2013]8. In conclusion, the realist is entitled to believe that there are
more fundamental phenomena lying in such a ’big desert’ range scale.
2.1.2 Naturalness
An aim of the present chapter is to bring to the fore of metaphysical
discussions the notion of naturalness, mostly discussed in theoretical
physics. Such notion can shed some light on issues of fundamentality
and, as argued later, on the modality of laws.
During the last decades until the present day there is a discussion in
physics regarding the naturalness of candidate fundamental theories.
This is mainly related with the apparently ad hoc and fine-tuned val-
ues of many parameters. A constant is usually settled to a value ad The several
definitions of the
term
hoc because of what has been measured experimentally, ignoring why
it is that it has such value. Most theories in history of physics contain
such constants, basically enabling the model of the theory to fit with
the empirical data.
In intermediate levels, an explanation of their values can be provided
(by appeal to lower levels), but the issue becomes more puzzling
when dealing with fundamental theories.
The fine-tuning, on the other hand, refers to the fact that the spe-
cific value of some of those constants cannot slightly change with-
out dramatically contradicting the way the universe actually is9. Both
characteristics are considered unnatural for a fundamental theory (cf.
[Susskind, 2006]). Here I will leave aside the fine-tuning sense to cen-
ter around the first sense, related with contingency10.
Unnatural, in general, is often related with being very unlikely [El-
lis, 2006, sec.G], [Penrose, 1989, 343]. However, whether it makes
sense to talk of ’likely values’ of fundamental constants is (also) a
disputed matter (e.g. [Smeenk, 2013, 27], [Albert, 2012, 28], [Myrvold,
7]). Thus I will be neutral on this link, for one can arguably recur to
non-naturalness without committing to unlikeliness.
Once the fine-tuning sense is excluded, there is still not a straight-
forward officially accepted definition of ’naturalness’. Not the least,
the loose meaning of the term in natural language allows for a wide
variety of uses.
All in all, the idea behind is, as said above in other terms, that of not
putting in by hand the parameter [Borrelli, 2011]. Not putting in by
hand the parameterIn the context of particle physics, some have tried to flesh out the idea
8 On the opposite side, one can extend the validity of the Standard Model to such a
domain by an inductive reasoning, based in the fact that the tested validity of the
model is of 30 orders of magnitude on the energy scale (from 10−18eV of the upper
limit of the photon mass, to the 10+12eV tested at LHC) and so an induction to the
remaining 17 orders of magnitude might be justified.
9 It can be said that the universe seems to sensitively supervene on the values of those
constants.
10 It is disputed whether the fine-tuning is not really a mislead criterion (see e.g.
[Mosterín, 2004]).
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with precision. To begin with, some take naturalness to hold when the
free parameters or physical constants take values of order 1. More pre-
cisely, all the terms in the effective action that preserve the required
symmetries must appear with coefficients of order 1 [Seiberg, 1993].
A weaker version is to maintain that the values of the different pa-
rameters ought be of the same order of magnitude. [Borrelli, 2011]
overviews the different definitions in recent physical literature. Ac-
cording to her, the origins of the definition of ’natural’ date back to
[Georgi and Pais, 1974]:
"In a theory with spontaneously broken symmetry (...) the masses
and coupling constants appearing in the Lagrangian will not be
independent phenomenological parameters. Rather there will
be zeroth-order relations between these quantities, the correc-
tions to which are finite. We will call such relations ’natural’".
Another sense is that defined by Gerhard ’t Hooft in [Farhi et al., 1982,
ch.24], the idea being that a parameter is natural as long as it can be
reduced to 0 by the introduction of a symmetry [Wilczek, 2000, 6] (for
example, the parameter labeled θ in a simplified version of QCD is
set to 0 and this is "tantamount to assuming the discrete symmetries P or
Q" [ibidem]).
From the latter definition follows the widespread idea that the intro-
duction of a symmetry is not unnatural. The rationale motivating thisThe specific sense of
the term in this
chapter
move is based on the fact that it removes an unnatural parameter by
means of the introduction of a dynamical principle. However, a fur-
ther step characteristic of my analysis is that I will focus on the unnat-
uralness not of parameters but of the structures of the theory, that is,
of the terms constituting the Lagrangian corresponding to fundamen-
tal interactions, which turn out to be expressed in the mathematics
of Lie groups and algebras. Specifically, in this chapter ’non-natural’
will refer to a puzzling ad hoc contingency. Puzzling because no reason
is provided as to the choice of a feature of a theory, among a large
space of possibilities, other than the match with experiment. And the
features scrutinized, as I said, will be the symmetries that constitute
the mathematical formulation of the theory.
Hence, worth is remarking that this is a new stronger sense, in the
vicinity of the previous ones, but not to be necessarily endorsed by
those who endorsed them. There is a specific goal in this new sense;
the goal is to underline that the Standard Model and all candidate
theories on the market, are messy and contrived, and therefore they
all turn out to be far from any of the traditional metaphysical cri-
teria for fundamentality (namely: naturalness, simplicity, unification,
aprioricity, or necessity). How to deal with this tension constitutes
another argument of this chapter.
One might find more, or only, problematic the unnaturalness of pa-
rameters, accepting the ad hoc contingency of symmetries. According
to what is argued in this chapter, the resolution of an unnatural pa-
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rameter leaves us with a still puzzling situation —because its resolu-
tion leaves us with new unnatural symmetries (following ’t Hooft’s
characterization). While it is appropriate to bear in mind that there is
also the unnaturalness of parameters, the new focus is important be-
cause, unlike the unnaturalness of parameters, that referred to gauge
symmetries will be shared by any future account exhibiting such sym-
metries (e.g. any one that solves the unnaturalness of parameters by
the introduction of symmetries and, in general, any future account
resting on the gauge principle).
The argument applies to all current fundamental physical theories,
notably also those allegedly most natural, like the Minimal Super-
symmetric Standard Model (MSSM).
There is, thus, an argument directed towards the very idea of gauge
symmetry, to be understood as something far from anything like a pri-
ori or necessary superprinciples, its elegance and unificatory power
notwithstanding.
Regarding my specific use, this fragment from [Hossenfelder, 2013]
conveys its "raison d’etre" (she uses the term ’finetuned’ in the sense
I talk of ’unnatural’):
"the definition of finetuning itself is unnatural in its focus on nu-
merical parameters. (...) the theories that we use are finetuned
to describe our universe in many other ways. It’s just that physi-
cists tend to forget how weird mathematics can be (...) We work
with manifolds of integer dimension that allow for a metric
and a causal structure, we work with smooth and differentiable
functions, we work with bounded Hamiltonians and hermitian
operators and our fibre bundles are principal bundles. There
is absolutely no reason why this has to be, other than that evi-
dence shows it describes nature. That’s the difference between
math and physics: In physics you take that part of math that
is useful to explain what you observe. Differentiable functions,
to pick my favorite example because it can be quantified, have
measure zero in the space of all functions. That’s infinite fine-
tuning. It’s just that nobody ever talks about it".
Last, but not least, the fact that recent experiments in LHC are dis-
carding the most natural versions like MSSM bolsters my point. At
the end of the chapter I will return to this.
At this stage, one might raise an objection: given that most, if not An objection
all, scientific theories have displayed such a non-natural structure,
one might wonder how a theory, even if fundamental, could ever pos-
sibly be no non-natural. That is, in a sort of (too optimistic, I would
say) induction, one concludes that any fundamental physical theory
will be non-natural as defined above. Is this a compelling reason to
neglect such criterion as here idiosyncratically defined? No, this in-
duction does not imply that this criterion should be neglected; one
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could perfectly maintain that unnatural scientific theories have been
perfectly accepted so far because they were not thought to be funda-
mental. An indisputable testimony of this thought is the widespread
endorsement of Grand Unified Theories. It is implicit in the very mo-
tivation for a unified theory the dissatisfaction with the current form
of laws. I am on the one hand spelling out this dissatisfaction, and on
the other hand I am pressing towards a direction different from that
of the unified picture.
local gauge symmetries In front of this initial overview, a
skeptic reader might properly raise another objection: how could oneAnother objection
say that current particle physics is ad hoc while some of its most
salient characteristics are the theoretical prediction of new particles
much before any experimental evidence and a unificatory strength
resulting from (almost) all interactions being under the sway of the
same principle (the local gauge principle)? Not to say the beauty of
the sophisticated mathematics describing the elementary fields/parti-
cles and their interactions (the Lie groups and algebras). Furthermore,
the gauge paradigm exhibits an appealing simplicity in that few in-
puts are required to specify full theories [Martin, 2003, 53], and "the
fact that all non-gravitational interactions fit into the gauge framework then
lends this simplicity to a large part of fundamental physics" [ibidem]. All
these have been central reasons for the enthusiasm towards this new
physics and, more specifically, for the judgments of elegance and of
(a vaguely stated) necessity. This attitude has been described already
in 1.5.2 p. 31.
Contrary to this positive attitude towards the symmetry principles, I
will point out that, in spite of their astonishing theoretical and em-
pirical success, their resulting quantity and form should induce in us
a suspicion of such theories qua fundamental theories, due to their
puzzling ad hoc contingency, i.e. due to their non-naturalness. This is
one of the reasons to advocate in 2.4 for a consistent but qualitatively
different physics at the fundamental scale. Among the possibilities, an
option that would preserve the naturalness requirement is that of a
fundamental highly complex dynamics, as argued in 2.4.
Additionally, two other points follow from this tension. One —the
third conclusion of 2.4— regards the higher pressure onto philosoph-
ical accounts of laws, since the postulation of such laws in their on-
tology now becomes more mysterious, due to their contrived form.
The fourth conclusion of 2.4, regarding the modality of laws, is the
support for a contingent account rather than a necessitarian. This last
observation threatens something defended in the previous chapter,
i.e. the necessary character of an account of laws in terms of symme-
try principles. Conversely, many layers of contingency in QFT will be
highlighted.
2.2 some criteria for evaluating a fundamental theory 45
Regarding the ontological interpretation of symmetries, if one takes
local gauge symmetries to be mere mathematical redescriptions void
of physical content, as it is contended in the references cited in 1.5.2
p. 31, makes the first of the conclusions irrelevant for the rest. That is: The interpretation of
the symmetriesit does not matter whether gauge symmetries are neither natural nor
simple (the first conclusion), given their lack of physical significance.
The second conclusion, the proposal of an alternative metaphysical
picture, was made in reaction to the unnaturalness of gauge symme-
tries together with the preservation of such criteria. So the second
conclusion also loses steam. Likewise the third and the fourth afore-
mentioned. Thus, the present chapter defends the conclusions under
the scenario in which local gauge symmetries do have an ontological
"active" role (paraphrasing Wigner) and do provide physically signif-
icant claims about the carvings of Nature (which, I would say, is the
standard interpretation).
2.2 some criteria for evaluating a fundamental the-
ory
In this subsection, certain criteria about what should count as a proper
fundamental theory are made explicit.
There are criteria narrowed to the domain of contemporary physics.
For instance, since the advent of the interpretation of physical theo-
ries as effective (field) theories (something I will talk about in next
chapter), a quantum field theory can be fundamental only if displays
what is called as ’asymptotic safety’. It means that in the ultraviolet
regime all the coupling constants that appear must possess a finite
value; that is, the quantum field theory has to be well defined at
all energies without being perturbatively non-renormalizable. This is
tantamount to saying that a quantum field theory is asymptotically
safe if it corresponds to a trajectory of the renormalization group that
ends at a fixed point in the UV regime. This is, arguably, not really a
metaphysical criterion but a technical one; either way, it is one of the
few criteria that has to be respected also by those within the second
scenario drawn in 2.1 (p. 37).
unification and simplicity Yet, other criteria are at stake. For
instance, for those who defend the first of the metaphysical pictures
of p. 37, i.e. those who advocate for a unified metaphysics11. Especially Unification
in the last decades there has been a search for grand unified theories,
labeled as ’GUT’ (’Grand Unified Theories’) or ’ToE’ (’Theories of Ev-
erything’) depending on the scope. The drive that guided this search
is explained e.g. in [Weinberg, 1992] or [Greene, 2011]. Some of the
11 My discussion is obviously not exhaustive of all the possible criteria. Basically, my
attention revolves around naturalness and simplicity, with mention of the related
necessity/aprioricity and of unification.
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recent precursors can be traced back to Felix Klein, Sophus Lie, Her-
mann Minkowski, Hermann Weyl, Henri Cartan, Albert Einstein and
Werner Heisenberg12. This metaphysical view is nurtured by "the un-
reasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences" [Wigner,
1980]. The target of this chapter is a subset of those who believe in
a final simple unified theory of everything; namely, those who, "too
much" nurtured by current mathematics, find hints that we are ap-
proaching a fundamental theory because of the virtues displayed by
symmetry principles.
Related but different to unification there is the criterion of simplicity,
not to be confused either with naturalness. The latter has been spelledSimplicity
out before, and I will come back to it later. The former, simplicity, is
the well known criterion secularly followed in scientific theory choice,
in line with Ockham’s spirit. It is fair to say that most metaphysics
across the history of science and philosophy have entertained a world
ruled by few and simple rules or principles. Take, for instance, Kant’s
metaphysics [Kant, 1786] according to which two opposite forces are
ultimate responsibles of all motion. Likewise, scientific research has
been historically inspired by the criterion of simplicity. This can be
translated both to the expectation of few guiding principles and of
simplicity in the principles themselves; this amounts to a few num-
ber of equations of motion and each involving few degrees of freedom
(the simplicity thus refers to the equations, not to the solutions of the
equations)13.
It is well known the vagueness and relativity of ’simple’ when com-
paring certain competing theories. Likewise, it is disputable that this
is a reliable criterion, insofar as the real world need not be simple
at all nor, especially, describable by a simple theory. The latter is, in
fact, a moral drawn in this chapter (i.e. it makes sense to believe that
the world is not guided by few simple principles, but rather by a
highly complex dynamics). In fact, while sec. 2.3 argues that the cur-
rent theories are not simple nor natural, ch. 3 considers that this is
so because the true fundamental dynamics is not simple nor natural. Thus
this chapter motivates the rest of chapters of the dissertation, all of
them assessing scenarios of a fundamental highly complex underly-
ing dynamics —as elaborated later, this high complexity, in the limit,
12 I follow here [Cao and Schweber, 1993, 74].
13 Aside from this trend, a less frequent metaphysics is that of a cosmos subject to
chaotic, random behavior. This "opposite" option is in clear minority —cf. [Bohm,
1957]. An exponent of this is C.S. Peirce’s evolutionary cosmology (see annex B), or
any theory that argues for the emergence of order from "chaos". Yet, few literature
seems to have provided substantial arguments in its support. Most if not all of the
new attempts resting on the insights of ’chaos theory’ do not get rid of an implicit
(deterministic) dynamics; theirs is an account of order from deterministic chaos, not
from randomness (e.g. [Wolfram, 2002], [Prigogine and Stengers, 1984]). The refer-
ences cited later and the specific arguments along the dissertation aim to hopefully
begin to fill this gap.
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is more reasonable to associate it with a truly random dynamics, i.e.
with the lack of guiding laws.
necessity and naturalness Independent of the criteria of uni-
fication and simplicity, another desideratum, probably too strong, is
that a fundamental theory (or at least, part of it) be a priori true. The Aprioricity /
necessityextent to which this is a meaningful demand is critically discussed in
3.2, following a discussion between John Wheeler and David Deutsch.
It could be less controversial if there could be informative a priori
truths. While aprioricity belongs to the field of the epistemology,
the motivation of its demand comes from its alleged relation with
the metaphysical notion of (logical or metaphysical) necessity14. The
philosophical accounts of fundamental laws as necessary in some
sense (logical or metaphysical) have been discussed in ch. 1. Thus,
another (strong) criterion is that the theory be necessary, irrespective
of whether its discovery is a priori or a posteriori (a possibility also
brought to light by [Kripke, 1980]).
Then, there is in the vicinity another desideratum, the already intro-
duced notion of naturalness. Among all the senses spelled out before
there is a common trait: some feature of a theory is required to be nat-
ural because it is assumed the existence of a reason underlying such
feature. Thus, it is taken to be unnatural the choice of a certain fea- Relation between
’necessary’ and
’natural’
ture, among a large space of possibilities, with no more reason than
empirical adequacy. In brief, naturalness, for all the senses spelled
out before (p. 41) can be arguably considered a weaker version of the
demand of necessity15. I already introduced a specific definition of
unnaturalness in terms of ad hoc contingencies, the opposite of neces-
sity, which renders more evident the previous link.
recapitulation A recapitulation of the criteria at stake in this
chapter is the following. To begin with, a requirement in a joint ver-
sion could be:
(A): ’A candidate fundamental theory requires further explanation
if it is not natural nor simple’
When it is said that further explanation is required it is meant that
the theory does not possess the expected properties of a fundamen-
tal theory, so it is not really a proper candidate, and a better theory
ought to be sought. It is appropriate to divide (A) in two different
14 Pace the distinctions famously brought to light since [Kripke, 1980]. The idea is that
a scientific theory knowable a priori would be necessary —true in this and any other
possible world—, in spite of the meter bar postulated in Paris being a contingent
a priori truth. Anyway, whether this link is correct or not will not affect the central
discussion.
15 The primary sense employed in this chapter can be thought to be idiosyncratic (even
if meaningful, clearly defined, and in the vicinity of the usual senses). This is why I
remark that the present observation applies to all senses.
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claims, one for naturalness and one for simplicity, so:
(A1) : ’A candidate fundamental theory requires further explanation
if it is not natural’
And:
(A2) : ’A candidate fundamental theory requires further explanation
if it is not simple’
Finally, another criterion, more disputable:
(B) : ’A fundamental theory suggests further explanation if it is not a
priori true’.
Arguably, [Wigner, 1980] endorsed something like (B). As said before,
given the definition of naturalness, there is a connection between (A1)
and (B), being the former a less demanding version of the latter16.
While these ancient criteria are reasonable, at least intuitively, the
aim of the next section is to highlight the inconsistency of all of them
with current physics. This is done by focusing the attention to the un-
natural structural characteristics of the current type of physical theo-
ries, essentially grounded on the gauge invariance principle; thus one
is lead to conclude the inconsistency of the fundamentality of such
theories with (A1) (therefore with (A) and (B)). It is also claimed the
inconsistency with (A2)17. A resolution of the inconsistencies faces al-
ternative possibilities. One is to hope that future theories will achieve
more simplicity and naturalness. But crucially, given the sense of non-
naturalness at stake, also future theories sharing the same structural
characteristics will lack the criteria of fundamentality of (A1). Re-
16 It might help to schematize the statements in first order logic. They correspond to:
(A): ∀x(¬(Nx∧ Sx)→ ¬Fx)
Or a weaker version of (A) (I think that both are reasonable) would be:
(A’): ∀x((¬Nx∧¬Sx)→ ¬Fx)
where the domain of variable ’x’ ranges over theories (I am remaining neutral as
to how to characterize theories), F is the property of being fundamental, N is the
property of being natural, S is the property of being simple.
As to (B), let’s assume that something knowable a priori entails that it is independent
of the actual world and holds in every possible world, therefore it is metaphysically
necessary, defined with . Thus, we could state a variant of (B) like:
(B’): ∀x(Fx→ x)
So aprioricity, here conflated with necessity, implies that the fundamental theory
will be the same in every possible world, as something like the logically unique
self-consistent possibility. It does not imply the existence of a unique possible world,
since laws need not be deterministic, and the initial conditions can also vary. Anyway,
it is obviously not a trivial demand. Regardless of whether it is or not a path worth
pursuing, I will not discuss such a strong requirement. Still, remember that a defense
of a substantive degree necessity (but not of aprioricity) of current physical laws has
been elaborated in the previous chapter.
17 As can be noticed, I am assuming as meaningful the idea of simplicity in absolute
terms, not only in relative terms.
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garding the belief about the structural similarity of future candidate
fundamental physical theories, cf. [Weinberg, 1992, 242] describing a
widespread attitude:
"Although the standard model was clearly not the whole story
(since it left out gravity, and also relied on a number of arbitrary
parameters), its theoretical success and many empirical confir-
mations made it quite natural to expect fundamental physical
theories to have the shape of a renormalizable quantum field
theory".
If this is the case, the compatibility with such criteria is undermined.
To frame the discussion remember that, on the opposite direction,
the previous chapter argued that there are some reasons to think that
QFT displays especially natural and even necessary features. How-
ever, the goal of this chapter is to show that QFT exhibits a high
degree of unnaturalness. This means that there are two different di-
mensions in the analysis of QFT that suggest opposite conclusions
regarding the modality of its laws. Does this new dimension of con-
tingency trumps or supersedes the previous one, undermining any
necessity of such laws? This will depend on what is assumed, as will
be assessed in chapter 3.
This inconsistency is the first of the conclusions stemming from 2.3.
It is uncontroversial to those who have never endorsed (A), (A1), (A2)
or (B), but there have been good reasons to believe in them and many
(if not most) scientists and philosophers have been on this side, as
previously remarked (p. 45).
Parallel to my argument, some physicists press on the non-natural
values of the fundamental constants (e.g. [Susskind, 2006] or [Kawai
and Okada, 2012]). Hence, this chapter is in tune with them while
the arguments for the non-naturalness are of another kind. Here the
attention is driven to properties of gauge symmetries, whereas they
focus in the unnaturalness and fine-tuning of parameters. Not least,
the proposals of solution differ; roughly, they appeal to a multiverse
whereas I will not18.
The second conclusion stemming from the state of affairs described
in 2.3 has to do with the resulting landscape of metaphysical pictures
that can be considered after abandoning one of the most noteworthy,
i.e. the option (1) of p. 37, inspired by the criterion (A). In particular,
it is defended the addition to the landscape of a new possibility along
with the remaining ones, a possibility plausible and consistent with
current physics, indeed a reasonable continuation. A remaining op-
tion (number (2) of p. 37) was that of those who do not appraise this
sort of metaphysical considerations and take at face value what the
18 Strictly, they do so because they are also concerned with the problem of fine-tuning
of constants. I am leaving it aside, so if this is a substantial problem their strategy is
better in this respect.
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best physical theory is currently saying (an option widely extended
in the philosophical community 19). Other extant options in the sci-
entific literature that instead react to the unnaturalness are the afore-
mentioned multiverse or the cosmology of an eternal chain of big
bangs and big crunchs (a la Whitehead’s epochs).
The legitimacy of a new possibility in the landscape is appealing for
those forced to avoid options that coincided with criteria like (A1)
(due to the unnaturalness described in 2.3), but also not content with
the unnaturalness (unlike option (2)). In addition to the general de-
fense of a new possibility, a specific characteristic is proposed. Essen-
tially, as already advanced, this option goes in the opposite direction
of (A1) and (A2) to its ultimate consequences, postulating a scenario
of high dynamical complexity (being neutral about the fundamental
entities, if any). From this fundamental level the simpler stable ac-
tual laws and symmetries presumably emerge in higher levels. As
has been said, the next chapter critically assesses how this scenario
has been entertained by certain physicists, and the rest of chapters as-
sume this complex underlying level and study to what extent simpler
stable regular behavior could in fact emerge.
2.3 elegant but non-natural local gauge symmetry
2.3.1 Widening the frame
The present section argues for the contingent and ad hoc character
of local gauge symmetries. To frame the discussion with the dialectics
of the end of the previous chapter, consider the scenario entertained
in 1.5.4 : our universe is not genuinely constituted by any mysteri-
ous set of fundamental laws. Yet, the scenario is able to account for
lawful, regular behavior, given that symmetry principles determine
the fundamental interactions and so constrain the time evolution of
every elementary entity. Renormalizable local gauge theories of QFT
have been shown to be a real example of this scenario —an example
from one of our best empirically tested physical theories. Appealing
as this might be, the description of the symmetries carried out along
this section threatens such a view.
The univocity between matter-content and symmetry principles —
hence laws— hinted that the account was of a necessitarian sort, that
is, the necessity of actual laws was justified because of the inevitable
univocal determination of the specific gauge symmetries, given a cer-
tain matter-content. This necessary character is especially appropri-
ate for the completeness of such scenario as a philosophical account of
laws, for if symmetries are neither necessary nor a priori, their lack of
explanatory power is unveiled: neither necessary nor a priori symme-
19 The problems of interpreting what theories say, underdetermination, etc. are, of
course, other independent (philosophical) problems.
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tries can be hardly considered as undisputable irreducible primitives
of an ontology. So it becomes pressing to answer questions about the
nature of the explanans, i.e. about the nature of symmetries. In such
a case, then, it turns out that symmetries also demand explanation. This
section threatens such a "necessitarian" interpretation and therefore
its associated virtues as a metaphysical account of laws. Whether this
obstacle can be dealt with is a matter for the next chapter. I advance
that two options will be proposed: one that posits the matter con-
tent as a brute fact from which the symmetries might be derived, and
other that aims to explain the contingency of symmetries as emergent
from a more fundamental non-symmetric, highly complex, level.
To show this prior general need of explanation is a main goal of this
section. It is an important goal because nowadays the widespread atti-
tude in physics and philosophy of physics is to assume bigger symme-
try groups in higher energy scales, without any worry as to their ex-
planation. Roughly, the worries revolve around the process of (sponta-
neous) symmetry breaking towards lower energies, whereas the other
way around, towards higher energies, symmetries are assumed to be
restored. In fact, in the compendium [Brading and Castellani, 2003],
in the encyclopedia entry [Brading and Castellani, 2013], or in the
handbook chapter [Bangu, 2013] any demand of explanation of the
highly symmetric picture assumed at high energies is barely cited.
The underlying rationale connects with what [Weinberg, 1981] once
illustrated, which I already introduced in 1.3. He envisaged two paths
that scientific inquiry could take: explain symmetries or explain their What is to be
explained, symmetry
or asymmetry
absence. The conventional attitude laid out above corresponds to
the second of Weinberg’s branches, i.e. physics has to explain their
absence. Quoted already in 1.3, [Froggatt and Nielsen, 1991, 3] re-
marked:
“this philosophy amounts to postulating the observed gauge
symmetry group, since the symmetry is only explained by the
existence of an even bigger gauge symmetry groups, which is
itself not explained”.
Next chapter 3 takes side with the first of Weinberg’s branches, that in
which symmetries are what requires explanation and what is natural,
what is assumed, is an originally asymmetric, “chaotic”, state (cf. the
same attitude in Peirce’s words in annex A).
Regardless of the particular success of the next chapter I think that,
in general, it is worth pursuing this appealing strategy of understand-
ing laws through symmetries, especially after the hardly disputable
lack of answers in the extant philosophical accounts, as argued in
chapter 1.
That said, let’s proceed to a specific case study of one of the several
local gauge symmetries, and then generalize the conclusions to the
whole picture.
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2.3.2 Non-naturalness of color strong interaction
Take this specific case: the color local gauge invariance of quarks. This
corresponds to the symmetry group SU(3) (the Special Unitary group
of degree 3)20. This group is the mathematical description which rep-
resents one of the fundamental interactions, the color strong interac-
tion21. Let me stress, through the description of how this force works,
the whimsical aspect of both the force itself and the mathematical
structure that describes it. More precisely, with ’whimsical’ I mean its
non-naturalness as defined in 2.1.
The background is this: the mathematical description SU(3) has been
chosen following empirical adequacy and consistency with the rest of
theories of particle physics, constituting a highly unified model of the
fundamental interactions. Unified mainly because the same principle,
the local gauge principle, is shared by every model of each type of
field/particle 22 23. More in detail, the theory of Quantum Chromo
Dynamics (QCD) successfully describes the color strong interaction:
the property of color is conserved due to a certain type of bosons
(force carrier particles) called gluons, exchanged in the interactions24.
Each of them carries one unit of color and one unit of anticolor. Thus
they guarantee the conservation of the initial color that changes in
the quark in a ’strong’ interaction with another quark. To preserve
the color eight gluons do the work. The structural representation of
(the properties of) those eight gluons is the symmetry group SU(3).
The gauge fields/particles are associated with a set of vectors that
are the so called ’generators’ of the group. All this representation is
translated into a new term in the lagrangian so that the lagrangian be-
comes invariant under the operations of the group. Later I will write
down the specific generators of SU(3), correspondent with the gluons.
whimsical nature The first observation regards the eight glu-
ons that appear to exist in Nature. It is not a number so specific as
the fine-structure constant α = 7.29735257 · 10−3 nor it is fine-tuned
but, even so, it is the first of the features I want to remark regarding
the non-natural aspect of this fundamental interaction. An immediate
20 For a more detailed presentation of the mathematical machinery behind see [Grif-
fiths, 2008, ch. 8] and [Robinson et al., 2008, Part II - Algebraic foundations (esp.
2.2.15)]. A more comprehensive guide is [Cottingham and Greenwood, 2007, ch. 16].
I will introduce only the essential technicalities in due course through the presenta-
tion of this particular case.
21 Formally, SU(3) is a real group in complex dimensions of degree N=3 of the classical
Lie groups. The dimension of SU(N) groups, as real manifolds, is N2 − 1. Therefore
for SU(3) the dimension is 8.
22 See footnote 25 of ch. 1.5.2 for a definition of the principle.
23 More precisely, some global models have solid empirical support but are not so
unified as to, for instance, incorporate gravity, while others are more unified but
lack empirical evidence. The Standard Model and Supersymmetry are the respective
examples.
24 Whether I refer to fields or particles is irrelevant for our purposes.
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reply is just to flatly deny any specialness or non-naturalness: eight
is a number as any other, and this observation should be no more
than a marginal worry, probably solved in the future by a better the-
ory. Those who accept the contingency of laws would be in this side,
without the need of any future solution. Further, a bit of basic (and
I would say, acceptable) numerology attenuates any worry, as ’8’ is
not any special number —as a high prime number might be— but is
a power of 2. This reply can be perfectly the case, and further argu-
ments will be added to consider the strong interaction as non-natural,
but the observation is perfectly legitimate and is a frequent rationale
in theoretical physics25. In fact, one can start to be suspicious of this
immediate reply when bears in mind that the discussion is about fun-
damental theories —the criteria (A2) and (A1) above were in fact only
referred to fundamental theories— and then one compares with the
sort of simple unified metaphysical pictures drawn by scientists, as
cited before (2.2 p. 45). Likewise, philosophers have never in history
drawn a metaphysics minimally similar to eight particles accounting
for one of three fundamental interactions. And less clear appears such
a reply when we will take into account the global picture, with the
"zoo" (as it is sometimes dubbed) of types of elementary particles
plus force carriers of the Standard Model. So, according to principles
like (A1) or (A2), as a part of a fundamental theory the eight gluons
do not look like part of the expected type of story. This observation
purports to be the first to bolster the case that, even if elegantly de-
scribed within a unified symmetric pattern, the theory hypothesizing
eight gluons to describe one of the three fundamental interactions
does not seem to be a natural fundamental theory.
The prospect of a future unification is what might resolve the tension
with both (A1) and (A2), because an unification of the several interac-
tions would be obviously simpler, and perhaps also more natural.
However, this hope has been seriously undermined in extensive stud-
ies of philosophers of physics: in Maudlin’s "On the unification of
physics" [Maudlin, 1996], in Margaret Morrison’s book "Unifying Sci-
entific Theories: Physical Concepts and Mathematical Structure" [Mor-
rison, 2000] and in her recent handbook chapter "Unification in physics"
[Morrison, 2013].
The next observations differ from the previous one in that they
point out not how Nature appears to be but how it is described. They
are introduced through a second objection to the first point: it could
be said that the eight bosons of the strong interaction, even if seeming
a contingent and non natural number, are nevertheless gathered in a
single mathematical structure (the multiplet of the adjoint representa-
25 As this fragment from [Lykken and Spiropulu, 2014, 36] recognizes: "(...) there are
three different types of leptons (a type of fermion): the electron, muon and tau. Why three?
Why not two, of four or 15? (...) Theoretical particle physicists spend a lot of time thinking
about such questions".
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tion of SU(3)) that exhibits their hidden unity, beauty and naturalness.
So the eight gluons should not be a worry. The detailed description of
how the interaction is mathematically represented should refute this
objection, contrary to a widespread belief (ref. 1.5.2 p. 31)26.
So let’s look more in detail how the interaction is described. As pre-
viously stated, each gluon, to preserve the internal symmetry, carries
one unit of color and one of anticolor (the "colors", ’red’, ’green’, and
’blue’, name the charges of this interaction). Therefore, there are nine
logically possible combinations of the 3 colors: rr, rg, rb,br,bg,bb,gr,gb,gg27.
This, in principle, amounts to the possible existence of nine types of
gluons [Griffiths, 2008, 284]. The mathematical structure describing
the interaction is, as said before, the symmetry group SU(3), the Spe-
cial Unitary Group with a representation in three complex dimen-
sions. Every symmetry group has the so called ’representations’. It is
always the ’adjoint representation’ that describes the force carriers, in
this case the gluons28. The adjoint representation of SU(3) is not nine
but eight dimensional. In this representation the nine states are struc-
tured in an octet and the other is a singlet element apart. The state of
a particle is given by a vector in a vector space on which elements of
SU(3) act as linear operators. The linearly independent base vectors
that constitute the octet are:
|1〉 = (rb+ br)/√2 |5〉 = −i(rg− gr)/√2
|2〉 = −i(rb− br)/√2 |6〉 = (bg+ gb)/√2
|3〉 = (rr− bb)/√2 |7〉 = −i(bg− gb)/√2
|4〉 = (rg+ gr)/√2 |8〉 = (rr+ bb− 2gg)/√6
and the singlet element is:
|9〉 = (rr+ bb+ gg)/√3
The combination rr+ bb+ gg is not verified in experiment [Griffiths,
2008, 285]. Later I will come back to this detail. Thus, the eight gluons
that exist in Nature are described by the eight so called ’generators’
that compose the octet, the set of linearly independent vectors above
26 Let me repeat, for sake of clarity, where my argument is to be framed, as said in p.
44 and in 1.5.2 p. 31. I am not interpreting gauge symmetries as redundant mathe-
matical structure without ontological significance (as e.g. [Redhead, 2003]). Within
this point of view it immediately follows the lack of any necessity or naturalness.
I am assuming a substantial ontological status to symmetries, then criticizing any
naturalness, necessity or a priori reasonableness.
27 More exactly, the logical possibilities have been constrained to the nine pairs because
a neutral combination of the 3 particles is expected. This is so because baryons, the
particles composed of three quarks, appear to be color-neutral.
28 An adjoint representation of a Lie group G is one of the ways of representing the
elements of the group as linear transformations of the group’s Lie algebra, where
the elements constitute a vector space (this is what a representation is in general).
Specifically, the adjoint is the representation in which the structure constants them-
selves form a representation of the group. (And the ’structure constants’ of a Lie
group determine the commutation relations between its generators in the associated
Lie algebra).
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that form a vector base of the 8 dimensional group SU(3)29. Each gen-
erator aims to represent the color state of a certain type of gluon30.
The situation is beautifully illustrated in figure 1. The octet of the
Figure 1: The pattern of strong charges for the three colors of quark, three
antiquarks, and eight gluons (in black) with two of zero charge
overlapping in the center. The vertical axis is strangeness and the
horizontal is isospin.
figure illustrates indeed the existence of a tight pattern between the
gluons (and also with the quarks ), as the second objection was point-
ing out. But, to what extent should we "celebrate" the beautiful and
unified pattern exhibited between gluons? The next subsections sug-
gest we should not celebrate too much, as the theory is not so natural
as these patterns might suggest.
2.3.3 The symmetry space
First of all, consider the space of possibilities of symmetry groups.
This space has been explored and classified in the ’Cartan classifi-
cation’. The full classification of all possible ’simple’ Lie algebras is
divided in four types [Lederman and Hill, 2004, 315]:
1. Rotational symmetries of spheres that live in N real coordinate
dimensions: O(2) = U(1), SO(3) = SU(2), SO(4), SO(5), ... , SO(N),
...
29 Always for a gauge group the number of force-carriers is equal to the dimension of
the adjoint representation; for the case of SU(N), the dimension of this representation
is N2 − 1, therefore for SU(3) the dimension is 8.
30 The states are added in linear combinations according to the principle of superposi-
tion of QM. The numerical parameters are required for normalization.
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2. Rotational symmetries of spheres that live in N complex coordi-
nate dimensions: U(1), SU(2), SU(3), SU(4), ... , SU(N), ...
3. Symplectic groups, which are the symmetries of N harmonic
oscillators: Sp(2), Sp(4), ..., Sp(2N), ...
4. The ’exceptional’ groups: G2, F4,E6,E7 , and E8
As it appears, the resulting landscape is undoubtedly vast; indeed,
it is infinite, as we see in the infinite order of the Lie groups. Thus
this classification allows us to realize the first dimension of the con-
tingency of the symmetry groups chosen: SU(3) is just one of the
infinite groups that can be used to describe the constitutents of an
elementary interaction —not to say that this is already assuming that
we must have a Lie group, which is hardly a priori 31.
fermions Such is the classification of symmetry groups used to
represent the properties of all elementary fields/particles of the Stan-
dard Model. Furthermore, there is another layer of multiple possibili-
ties if one focuses the attention not to the bosons but to the fermions.
As previously stated, for each group there are infinite possible rep-
resentations. While for the bosons the representation chosen is al-
ways unique, namely the adjoint representation, for the fermions, the
physically interesting representations are the so called ’irreducible
representations’32. The states in the irreducible representation are
those that possess the determinate properties measured in reality, like
isospin and hypercharge for the case of SU(3)33. Thus, the connection
of a symmetry group with physical reality —with empirical data— is
made through the choice of an irreducible representation of the group
[McKenzie, Forthcoming, 10]. It turns out, though, that there are in-
finite representations of this type for each group [ibidem]. So there is
a connection mapping the irreducible representation with a physical
interpretation of families of particles that would exist in the world.
Therefore, there are a priori infinite possible classes of sets of particles
allowed for each of the (in turn, infinite) symmetry groups. The moral
I want to draw is that, in the end, the particular final choice is mostly
made due to empirical adequacy among a vast space of possibilities.
31 It could be thought that, due to consistency with the other parts the whole theory,
most possibilities are forbidden. Next subsection shows that this is not so.
32 Informally, the irreducible representations of a group are the representations of the
smallest possible order, i.e. those that cannot be further reduced. More technically,
they are said to have no nontrivial invariant subspaces.
33 More in detail, the force-carriers correspond, in general, to the eigenvectors of the
generators while the eigenvalues of those eigenvectors are the physically measurable
charges (color, in this case) [Robinson et al., 2008, 66].
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2.3.4 A ninth gluon
To bolster this argument I put forward another detail regarding the
choice of SU(3). We have seen before that the singlet element corre-
sponds to one of the nine logical possibilities, but that it does not
appear to exist. One can then wonder why eight gluons instead of
nine [Griffiths, 2008, 285], [Bottomley and Baez, 1996]. In fact, such a
ninth gluon could have existed; a nine-gluon theory is perfectly pos-
sible in principle, but it would describe a world (very) different from
the actual [Griffiths, 2008, 285]. In that case, it would be as common What about the
singlet element?and conspicuous as the photon34. The adjoint representation of SU(3),
in this scenario, could have been properly used to describe the situ-
ation. The ninth gluon could have corresponded to the singlet state
of SU(3). That is, I am remarking that the structural representation
SU(3) (even after the representation is fixed) is not univocally corre-
spondent with the actual world but is at least compatible with two
different possible worlds.35
Likewise, for the counterfactual scenario of nine gluons the sym-
metry group of QCD could have been other than SU(3). Specifically,
a theory of nine gluons can be described by the group U(3) [Griffiths,
2008, 286]. The experimental results that discover eight gluons are U(3) or SU(3) for
nine gluonswhat drives the choice of SU(3) rather than alternatives as U(3). This
is a usual way scientific practice is carried out –and so it has to be–; to
remark this practice in this specific field of physics is aimed to show
that there is no known a priori or natural reason for the group SU(3)
to be preferred over U(3).
In sum, on the one hand even SU(3) with a fixed representation
does not univocally correspond to one state of affairs and, on the In sum
other hand, there is not any a priori or natural reason over the rest of
groups to choose this one to describe the actual world.
Summing up all the section so far, it turns out that the mathemati-
cal description : Recap of the section
so far1) is motivated by empirical adequacy among a large space of possi-
34 [Griffiths, 2008, 303] entertains the possibility that the ninth gluon would have corre-
sponded to the photon. This is now discarded but it was investigated in the eighties
(Fischbach, E. et al., (1986) Physical Review Letters, S6, 3). In [Griffiths, 2008, 303,
Problem 8.11] it is explained how the situation would look like: the gluon would
couple to all baryons with the same strength, not, as the photon does, in proportion
to their charge. In the end this would look like as an extra contribution to gravity,
contrary to actual evidence.
35 The phenomenon of confinement states that all naturally occurring particles have to
be color singlets. This "explains" why the gluons of the octet are not free particles.
Appropriately, in [Griffiths, 2008, 286] the term ’explanation’ is also quoted. |9〉 is
indeed a color singlet, and if it exists as a mediator it should also exist as a free
particle. Moreover, it could be exchanged between two color singlets (a proton and
a neutron, say), bringing about a long range coupling of the color strength [Griffiths,
2008, 286]. Again, we do not know a priori that this is not the case, so empirical data
makes us discard this option.
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bilities (2.3.3);
2) it does not univocally correspond to one state of affairs (2.3.4);
3) there is no a priori or natural reason to prefer one description (SU(3)
over U(3)) in the counterfactual scenario of 2.3.4; and finally, regard-
ing what there appears to actually be in Nature,
4) there is no obvious reason to believe that the number of force car-
rier particles that constitute this fundamental interaction is natural
(2.3.2).
In conclusion, the mathematical description of the strong force and
the strong force itself appear to be non-natural and clearly not a priori
nor metaphysically necessary, in spite of its beauty and elegance, of
the unified account with the rest of interactions, and of the theoretical
predictions much before any empirical evidence.
[Martin, 2003, 52] shares the same diagnosis against gauge invari-
ance, "often invoked as a supremely powerful, beautiful, deeply physical,
even undeniably necessary feature of current fundamental physical theory".
He argues for the heuristic character in the discovery and postulation
of gauge symmetries. Notably, he remarks other factors that have to
be taken into account when a gauge-invariant term is added into
the lagrangian. It is not only the mere demand of local gauge invari-
ance because, as said above, infinite possibilities verify this condition.
These other requirements are, he says, Lorentz invariance, simplicity,
and renormalizability [Martin, 2003, 44]. His main upshot is to argue
for the heuristic character of such symmetries and, as others before
([Brown, 1999], [Teller, 2000], [Lyre, 2000], [Healey, 1997]), he argues
that the gauge fields are put in by hand to large extent, so that "in contrast
to how it is often portrayed, one does not strictly speaking ‘generate’ a new
interaction field in running the gauge argument" [Martin, 2003, 45].
2.3.5 The whimsical big picture
After the particular case of SU(3), the argument can be strengthened
by looking at the big picture, at the Standard Model as a whole. Not
being natural nor a priori nor necessary can be straightforwardly ex-
tended to the rest of local gauge invariances that describe all the in-
teractions of the Standard Model. Crucially, all the candidate funda-
mental physical theories, even the most natural versions, share such
local gauge symmetries as an essential constituent, thereby becom-
ing prone to the present criticism (to this effect, recall the quote from
Weinberg in p. 49).
The other two known elementary interactions are described by U(1)
and SU(2). This leads to a resulting complex symmetry group which
is the product of the three, the gauge group U(1)xSU(2)xSU(3). This
well-known achievement, again, displays a very specific form36. It is
36 [Morrison, 2013, 383] raises a similar point when criticizing the lack of unification:
"the problem of free parameters and the fact that the theory is an amalgam of three different
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this form that asks for explanation, that should not be seen as natu-
ral. It can be immediately visualized in the schema that summarizes
Figure 2: The Standard Model
the elementary particles of the Standard Model in figure 2. The "zoo"
of particles is constituted by elementary matter particles and force
carrier particles –the gauge bosons–; each type of gauge boson corre-
sponds to one elementary interaction (with the infamous exception
of gravity) and then there is the Higgs boson. The several consider-
ations before regarding SU(3) have focused only in the 8 gluons; a
glance at its place in the whole picture shows that the gluons are just
one of the five types of bosons, in the middle of a total of seventeen
types of fields/particles. This does not appear to be neither natural
nor simple. The point is more evident when one recurs to one of the
most investigated candidate fundamental theories (tens of thousands
of papers devoted to it), supersymmetry (SUSY). While this theory al-
legedly achieves the unification of the four fundamental interactions
in the scale of 1016GeV , nonetheless it has to double the number of
existing particles. This is seen in figure 3. We arrive thus to a quantity
of total elementary particles of thirty four.
And being more precise, there are still more types of particles
(as the eight different gluons, which occupy only one place in the
chart). Fermions (i.e. quarks and leptons) have spin 1/2 which is pos-
sible only on two spin allignments: the ’left-handed’ and the ’right-
handed’. It turns out that only the left-handed fermions (labeled by
symmetry groups U(1)xSU(2)xSU(3) rather than a single group speaks against the idea that
this is a truly unified theory". She also points out, against unification but then also
against the metaphysical picture associated with (A2) –thus with naturalness and
simplicity–, that "a ToE presumes that gravity is a force like the others when according to
General Relativity it is very unlikely the others in that there are no particles that couple to the
gravitational field and act as force carriers; the effects of gravitation are ascribed to spacetime
curvature instead of a force per se" (the same observation was made in [Maudlin, 1996,
143]).
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Figure 3: Supersymmetry MSSM model
subscript L in figure 4) participate in the weak interaction, the right
handed fermions (with subscript R) do not. Moreover, there are five
spinless higgs states that are not supersymmetric: neutral ones called
’h’, ’A’ and neutral, positive and negative H states. Counting 5 higgs
bosons, and counting the W± as two types of bosons, this sums a
total of 31·2= 62 types of different particles in MSSM.
Figure 4: Supersymmetry MSSM model, here differentiating the different
higgs states and the spin allignments of fermions (left with sub-
script L and right with subscript R).
last results from lhc If this still does not seem complex and
unnatural enough, a last but not least addition is to note that the
most recent experiments at the LHC are strongly suggesting the aban-
donment of supersymmetry in its most natural versions, since it is
not finding the expected empirical support [Lykken and Spiropulu,
2014], [Evans et al., 2013], [Fowlie, 2014]. Therefore, the only way the
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SUSY enterprise can go on is by switching to the officially more com-
plex and unnatural versions of it (see also [Feng, 2013] for details on
the naturalness of SUSY versions). And remember that SUSY repre-
sents the most researched of the improved versions of our empirically
tested best physics (QFT) 37.
2.4 conclusions
As it has been progressively advanced along the chapter, the specific
unnaturalness of gauge symmetries described in the previous section
aims to support the following conclusions:
1. Current physical theories are in tension with any metaphysical picture
related with criteria like (A1), (A2), or (B) (p. 48), that is, criteria
of naturalness, simplicity, aprioricity or necessity of any sort.
Therefore, if our current physics is about the fundamental level
or the fundamental theory turns to be structurally similar to
current physics, then it is reasonable to abandon criteria like (A1),
(A2), or (B).
37 Let me conclude the section by stressing the main moral from the point of view of
the lagrangian formalism. The lagrangian of the Standard Model is the best sum-
marized description we have codified of our micro-physics. It is summarized thus
[Cottingham and Greenwood, 2007]:
L = −14Wµν ·Wµν − 14BµνBµν

W±, Z,γ kinetic
energies and
self-interactions
+L¯γµ
(
i∂µ − g
1
2fi ·Wµ − g ′ Y2Bµ
)
L
+R¯γµ
(
i∂µ − g
′ Y
2Bµ
)
R

lepton and quark
kinetic energies
and their
interactions with
W±, Z,γ
+
∣∣∣(i∂µ − g12fi ·Wµ − g ′ Y2Bµ)φ∣∣∣2 − V(φ)

W±, Z,γ, and Higgs
masses and
couplings
−(G1L¯φR+G2L¯φcR+ hermitian conjugate).

lepton and quark
masses and
coupling to Higgs
Nonetheless, an explicit appearance of all the terms occupies at least two pages, cf.
[Cottingham and Greenwood, 2007]. By looking carefully but in perspective at the
whole formulation (at the full two-pages formulation that I cannot append here) it
can be realized the high complexity as well as its whimsical contingent terms, both
parameters as well as terms introduced to represent the interactions between the
many particles exposed before. Thereby the same moral is glimpsed from this point
of view.
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As previously discussed (2.1.1 p.38), it is hard to maintain that
our best theories are really fundamental. The denial of funda-
mentality can be justified by means of a scientific antirealist po-
sition, or else by arguments within the realist framework. Even
if granting to science the authority as to what there is, the re-
alist can have reasons to believe that what science says is not
all there is and, especially, is not what fundamentally there is.
The lack of commitment to fundamentality is what plausibly
corresponds to the actual state of physics. That this is so at the
present time can be realized by appealing to the existence of
the big desert scale, and to the contemporary interpretation of
current theories as effective theories of an undefined more fun-
damental theory. See next chapter for more details.
Taking current physical theories as not fundamental, and not
assuming the other disjunct of the premises above (i.e. not as-
suming that the fundamental theory will turn to be structurally
similar to current physics) leads us to the second conclusion
elaborated in the next point.
2. So, conversely, if current physics is not fundamental, and is
preferable to maintain criteria like (A1) or (A2) as far as possible
—in spite of their tension with current physics— then a qual-
itatively different new physics gains plausibility at a fundamental
scale. Furthermore, given the same premises, a specific proposal
gains plausibility, namely that of a highly complex fundamental
dynamics. More in detail:
a) Assume that there are good reasons to preserve the two
desiderata of naturalness and simplicity. We do not know
how the fundamental theory is, but the desiderata suggest
that it will not look like our current theories (QFT, SUSY,
or any other resting on the gauge principle). So a funda-
mental physics structurally similar to how current theories
are is at odds with the assumed criteria. Therefore such
scenario should be discarded.
b) An obvious continuation in the rationale is to expect a fu-
ture unification which would restore the simplicity and
naturalness. However, this scenario is not expected, accord-
ing to what is thoroughly argued in [Morrison, 2013], [Mor-
rison, 2000] and [Maudlin, 1996]38). This, if correct, yields
to the abandonment of the unified scenario ’1’ of p. 37.
c) Therefore, after the abandonment of these two metaphysi-
cal scenarios, it is legitimated the possibility of a substan-
tially different metaphysical scenario.
38 Though there are opposite opinions, e.g. [Wilczek, 2008] is optimistic (but it was
written before the lack of success of MSSM in the LHC).
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And specifically, it gains plausibility the particular scenario
of a highly complex dynamics. This is, arguably, the best
candidate for a fundamental theory to preserve, within the
possible, the naturalness and the simplicity. Let me elabo-
rate below the last part of this conclusion.
As I have said previously, part of the physics community has en-
dorsed, on other grounds (focused in the parameters), the idea
that the current laws are unnatural. To solve this, some try to
restore the naturalness. A famous move is the mentioned appeal
to a multiverse, or to an (eternal) succession of big bangs and
crunches. I argue that there is at least another option, whose
virtues and defects I assess in ch. 3. One that does not attempt to
restore naturalness, but takes at face value the non-naturalness
and complexity, in that it accepts and actually enhances the com-
plexity up to the fundamental level, hypothesizing that the true
fundamental dynamics is indeed highly complex.
The actual unnaturalness can be taken to suggest an increasing
complexity underneath39, opening the door to a scenario seri-
ously considered by some physicists —as next chapter shows—
but neglected in the philosophical literature, the scenario of a
highly complex (deterministic chaotic, or truly random) under-
lying dynamics.
Let’s see in what respects this scenario should be preferred over
one structurally similar to the actual. The idea is that this sce-
nario is better because the present intermediate degree of complex-
ity and unnaturalness is taken to be more unnatural and more
complex (and, as argued in the next point 3 and in the next
chapter, is more philosophically puzzling). Once accepting that
the degree of complexity and unnaturalness presently acknowl-
edged is something that is not going to leave (remind previous
point 2.b), then, instead of reluctantly acquiescing to this intermedi-
ate degree, a better option is to consider that eventually the fun-
damental dynamics in higher energy scales is more complex,
but complex enough so that any judgment of complexity and
unnaturalness fades away. The complexity is so high that is not
possible to state a finite set of dynamical principles; this results
in a less contrived and puzzling situation than a highly contin-
gent finite set of rules with a very specific form –i.e. the unnat-
ural lagrangian made of a very specific list of interaction terms
39 There is both the intuitive and the technical understanding of ’naturalness’ that sup-
port this point. As to the latter, it is usually considered that there is an unnatural
parameter because there is some unknown mechanism underneath, whose effects
can be quantified in the theory by introducing the parameter. The parameter thus
codifies an unknown complexity underneath. This is evident with the corresponding
technical definition of ’t Hooft (cf. 2.1.2), according to which a parameter is natural
as long as it can be reduced to 0 by the introduction of a new symmetry. The addition
of a new symmetry clearly increases the dynamical complexity, as argued before.
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and parameters–. Basically, it is not meaningful anymore to take
it as composed of dynamical principles. Due to its chaotic or ran-
dom nature, such metaphysics does not suffer either from being
an ad hoc choice among a large space of possibilities. In sum, in-
tuitively, it is so complex that it makes no sense to worry about
whether it is composed of complex or unnatural principles. Ba-
sically, because it is not anymore composed of principles. As
an illustrative analogy, the high complexity is judged to be less
complex in the same vein as the liquid state of water is said to
be more symmetric than the frozen snowflake, in spite of the
chaos and lack of ordered organization of the molecules in the
liquid state.
Thus, as long as we consider problematic the lack of natural-
ness and simplicity, it is preferrable the new proposal which,
enhancing to the extreme these defects, can be considered less
unnatural and less complex.
The rationale behind coincides with the line of thought of [Wein-
berg, 1981]: what is to be explained is not the symmetries but
the lack of them, whereby it turns to be more natural, not a fi-
nite set of (governing) laws or symmetries, but an originally
asymmetric, “chaotic”, state —like [Mumford, 2004], I would
talk about a ’lawless’ state; [Wheeler, 1983a] says ’higgledy-
piggledy’; and [Froggatt and Nielsen, 1991], as Peirce, talk about
’random dynamics’.
3. The intermediate degree of complexity previously described
has been criticized on philosophical grounds in ch. 1; a meta-
physical account of laws —a clearly unsolved issue in the philo-
sophical literature— is not helped at all by a physics that postu-
lates such a contrived finite set of unnatural and complex laws.
That is, the metaphysical stance that postulates an ontologically
primitive set of fundamental governing rules becomes more puz-
zling in light of the actual form of current physical theories. For,
if this is the alleged set of fundamental laws —cf. the (not com-
pressed version of the) Lagrangian of the Standard Model—, is
it not more puzzling than the unified and simple first picture?
While a necessitarian or an antireductionist would clearly have
a hard time to deny that, it is disputable, though, for accounts
that accept the contingency. Should the humean, which accepts
the laws as an unquestionable brute fact, be more uncomfortable
with such a contrived set of laws? In the first chapter I stressed
that the overwhelmingly stable regularities (the highly ordered
and stable "solutions of the equations") are an objectively philo-
sophically puzzling issue, also for the humean. This chapter has
analyzed some details of the actual laws of physics ("the equa-
tions") in order to flesh out the idea that such a specific form
—such a "best induction", for the humean— displays also a very
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specific, contrived, whimsical form. However, as I take that the
humean does not endorse any criteria of naturalness or simplic-
ity like (A1) or (A2), a structurally similar set of fundamental
laws —thus unnatural and complex— will not really worry the
humean conception of laws.
4. The specific sense of unnaturalness employed here is closely re-
lated to contingency, as evident in its definition. Hence, in what
respects the modality of the laws, their description in 2.3 pro-
motes their contingency, a conclusion opposite to what the pre-
vious chapter defended. To what extent this contingency can co-
exist or undermines the cited necessity is studied in next chap-
ter (3.3).

3
F O R C O M P L E X I T Y
Abstract
This chapter provides further arguments in support of the metaphysical
scenario defended at the end of the previous chapter, the scenario of a
highly complex underlying dynamics. I start by arguing how, even if
endorsing scientific realism, the current interpretation of physical theories
as effective theories allows for a variety of metaphysical images. Then, in
3.2 I present John A. Wheeler’s project of ’law without law’, which
coincides with the alternative defended at the end of the previous chapter,
and certain objections to such a project are assessed. In 3.3 I explore the
same scenario from another framework, bringing forward the project
developed in the last decades by a team of physicists led by H. B. Nielsen,
which argues for a process of formation of symmetries. The project
elaborates thoroughly Wheeler’s idea of law without law from a specific
perspective: they defend that the symmetry principles are not fundamental
but derived, and that they are an inevitable consequence that arises from
all possible complex lagrangians. I briefly reconstruct their major results
and assess the rationale underneath, notably similar to that which
constitutes part II.
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3.1 introduction : effective theories and fundamental-
ity
The present chapter argues that a metaphysics whose fundamental
level possesses substantially different characteristics (3.1) and, in par-
ticular, a metaphysics of a highly complex underlying dynamics (3.2,
3.3), is not an unreasonable nor ungrounded option.
As suggested at the end of the previous chapter, there is an associa-
tion of a highly complex dynamics with a lack of guiding laws (and
lack of stable patterns). Of course this need not be so; the relation is
not exhaustive, in that the highly complex dynamics can be associated
to a highly complex set of laws. But it is the former association that
makes this picture in harmony with deflationist accounts of laws. As
I argued in 1.4.2, these deflationist accounts, when denying a govern-
ing conception of laws, are indirectly facing this unexplored lawless
scenario. They might say that this is not necessarily so, but I already
argued how the lack of governing laws hardly explains the presence
of stability and of non-accidental regularities (cf. 1.4.2). So it is in the
interest of the antirealists that: 1) this scenario is at least a meaningful,
consistent, possible scenario, and 2) that there is some explanation of
how from this lawless level there appear to be stable, simple regular-
ities —like those described by our current laws. The second point is
studied in the whole second part of this dissertation. The first point is
argued in the previous and the present chapter. It is obviously not the
aim of the chapter to provide an exhaustive metaphysics (this would
require at least another whole PhD dissertation), but just to provide
a critical assessment of some specific arguments regarding such a sce-
nario.
The outline of the chapter is the following. First, I elaborate a previ-Outline of the
chapter ously mentioned argument related with how contemporary physics
is thinking of physical theories; specifically, I draw a conclusion that
follows from the treatment of scientific theories as effective theories.
In section 3.2 I bring forward how this metaphysical picture has been
advocated by John A. Wheeler. In section 3.3 I sketch a similar project
—mostly unknown among philosophers— of a group of physicists
which aim to provide an explanation of symmetry principles by con-
sidering that they derive from a highly complex underlying base.
a qualitatively different physics The thesis of a qualita-
tively and substantially different fundamental physics is not uncom-
mon, as noted in [Weinberg, 1992] (cited by [Martin, 2003, 47]):
"Though symmetry figures prominently into most attempts to
go beyond the Standard Model, the search for a new funda-
mental theory unifying all forces is saddled with the task of
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determining what, in all likelihood, are radically new ideas and
fundamental physical principles governing the theory".
At the same time, the metaphysical picture assessed along all the
chapters does not refute the truthfulness of what current physical the-
ories state; it takes them not to be fundamental theories —something
that, as argued in chapter 2, is not an implausible assumption.
A more conservative
stanceStill, even if accepting that they are not fundamental, there is an
option more conservative with the scientific image. It does not deny
that the fundamental level could be substantially different, but it is
not likely that it will be so. This is motivated by the virtues of cur-
rent physical theories —in other words, it comes from the enthusi-
asts of current physical theories (foremost amongst them, the theoret-
ical physicists working in them). In this respect, theoretical physicist
Nima Arkani-Hamed, if faced with the lack of confirmation of super-
symmetry in the LHC, suggested the postulation of other new super-
symmetric models that put non-detected superpartners just beyond
the reach of experiments [Lykken and Spiropulu, 2014, 38]. Among
other reasons, the theory possesses strong virtues —in this thesis
overlooked— that commit physicists to stick to essentially analogous
and structurally similar theories. This move would be framed in the
second metaphysical picture set up before, in 2.1 p. 37.
Granting the plausibility of this scenario, let’s focus on the argu-
ments in support of another alternative. The possibility of a quali- Effective (Field)
Theoriestatively different physics is bolstered by a change in attitude after
the contemporary interpretation of our best empirically tested phys-
ical theory, QFT, as an effective field theory. While this new attitude
clearly does not imply any specific thesis about the existence of a final
theory —as underlined in the conclusions of [Castellani, 2002, 264]—
it allows the possibility of a "new physics" [Castellani, 2002, 262].
Specifically, it is allowed that the renormalization up to higher ener-
gies can result in radically different theories from the current models
of QFT.
This possibility is bolstered by the fact that there are several orders of Big desert scale
magnitude in the energy scale between the fundamental scale and the
current experimentally tested scale, as previously explained. There is
an order of magnitude between the Planck scale (arguably assumed to
be the lowest possible scale, which is not even necessarily so) and the
scales probed in high-energy particle physics. As advanced in 2.1.1 p.
41, from the electroweak W±, Z0 scale of 10−18m to the presumably
fundamental Planck scale of 10−35m there are 17 orders of magnitude,
a change in scale similar to that in passing from macroscopic physics,
at the 1m scale, to the electroweak scale [Froggatt and Nielsen, 1991,
12]. Current fundamental theories are silent about what happens in
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such energy levels.
On the other hand, since the universe in the initial instants after
the Big Bang consisted of a regime of very high energies, the lower-Formation of laws
energy renormalized dynamical laws that we are now discovering as
QFT did not exist; therefore they have arisen while the expansion of
the universe was taking place. That is, it is implicit in the standard
scientific picture that there has been a temporal process of something
like a formation of laws1.
Putting together both claims, we can assert that current laws might
have undergone a process of formation, from a possibly very differ-
ent scenario.
In fact, in the very definition of the notion of renormalization, the
procedure at the base of effective theories, the possibility of allowing aBehind the method
of renormalization substantially different scenario is evident; renormalization is defined
as "an expression of the variation of the structure of physical interactions
with changes in the scale of the phenomena being probed" [Gross, 1985, 153,
bold added].
Castellani specifies how the description of the physics substantially
changes as the scale varies:
"as one scales down to lower energies, the solutions of the Renor-
malization Group equations approach a finite-dimensional sub-
manifold in the space of possible Lagrangians thus defining an
effective low energy theory, which is formulated in terms of a fi-
nite number of parameters and is largely independent of the
high-energy starting situation" [Castellani, 2002, 262].
A certain energy threshold is established defining when a certain pa-
rameter (the parameter is usually a term in the lagrangian indicating,
for instance, the mass of a heavy particle) can be ignored. This is
to say that the effects of the nonrenormalizable interactions are small
enough as to be negligible. When this energy threshold is approached
the effects of, say, the heavy particle, cannot be ignored anymore, and
a new theory becomes the most appropriate description. This can be
"a renormalizable QFT, another EFT, or something completely different"
[Castellani, 2002, 262].
This adds up to the specific conclusions of the previous chapter
regarding the contrived form of the actual laws. There I argued that
such form was in tension with the criteria of naturalness and simplic-
ity, and the conclusion was supporting a specific alternative, that of a
1 This is not necessarily the case, though. One can assume that lower-energy renor-
malized dynamical laws did "exist" —whatever that means— before their regime of
applicability existed —they exist somehow eternally, independently of their applica-
tion to the actual world.
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complex underlying dynamics, which I argued is not unnatural and,
in some sense, even simpler than the actual laws.
3.2 wheeler’s law without law
I would like to bring to the fore one of the modern precursors of the
line of thought defended in this thesis: John Archibald Wheeler. In
[Wheeler, 1973] and [Wheeler, 1983b] he suggested the idea of "law
without law", in concordance (if not almost identical) with what this
thesis studies. His picture is in tune with any metaphysics skeptic of
a realist conception of laws.
Wheeler does not develop his core idea so, in that sense, he does
not provide new arguments beyond what I present throughout this
dissertation; however, what he does is to provide detailed and use-
ful examples. One of them is the case of a gas in a box, studied at
length in chapter 5 from a specific contemporary approach. The other
examples are the phenomenon of universality of exponents near ther-
modynamic critical points, a less known "semicircle law" for the dis-
tribution of characteristic frequencies of a randomly coupled system,
and a new physicist’s version of the so called problem of the traveling
salesman. His proposal can be gathered thus:
lwl : ’Chaos plus unknown regulating principle(s) lead to approximate
laws’.
When he says ’chaos’ he does not refer to deterministic chaos, as
now usually understood, but to something closer to randomness;
in his own words: "everything is built higgledy-piggledy on the unpre-
dictable outcomes of billions upon billions of elementary quantum phenom-
ena" [Wheeler, 1983b, 398]. I seek to evaluate how meaningful this
chaotic scenario can be by assessing the diverse formalizations of the
notion of randomness in annex A. In the remainder of the section I
reflect upon some worries regarding the regulating principle.
Among the various examples, take what I will later study at length
(ch. 5), the 2nd law of thermodynamics. With respect to it Wheeler
stresses the observation that motivates the idea of emergence of "or-
der from chaos":
"How can stupid molecules ever be conceived to obey a law so
simple and so general? [...] What regulating principle accom-
plished this miracle?" [Wheeler, 1983b, 400].
The standard scientific stance was to assume that there is an ulti-
mate set of fundamental laws of physics from which every other dy-
namical law follows — in the words of Wheeler, "one or more beautiful
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equations, chiseled as it were on a tablet of granite and standing there from
everlasting to everlasting" [Wheeler, 1983b, 398]. Wheeler, instead, talks
of regulating principles, so now the immediate question is: to what ex-The main objection
tent these principles differ from the standard laws?
The same sort of suspicion has been raised to similar projects. For
instance, Lee Smolin is attracted by the idea that laws did evolve
through time and, inspired by Peirce’s law of habit (cf. annex B) has
started to elaborate these ideas (in [Smolin, 2014] and [Unger and
Smolin]). In a recent talk he gave (at the conference "New Directions
in the Foundations of Physics", 18 April 2014) he was justly asked this
central objection. That is, whether the regulating principles/Peirce’s
law of habit are not themselves laws.
I take this as a main objection to the similar proposals presented
throughout this dissertation. This is why in 1.1 one of the ways I
phrased the goal of the thesis was as the study of how a smaller set
of dynamical laws can lead to a bigger set of dynamical laws, where
the smaller set is expected to be more plausible than the bigger set
—the bigger set being the current physical laws. Likewise, this is why
a central concern is to avoid, as much as possible, that the constraints
sufficient for the emergence of stable behavior are anything like a dy-
namical law —so that is why the second part talks of non-dynamical
constraints. I come back to this main objection at the end of the sec-
tion.
the importance of the question : "why these laws and
not others" Let’s carry out an assessment of Wheeler’s regu-
lating principle. Physicist David Deutsch elaborated useful critical
insights in [Deutsch, 1986]. He starts by defending Wheeler’s moti-
vation: he agrees that there is a threat of circularity in the search for
an ultimate principle from which everything else follows if we take it
to be itself a law of physics. For why this principle holds rather than
some other would be "an insoluble problem". Therefore, he contends,
the ultimate principle of physics cannot be a law. As such, this Wheel-
er/Deutsch argument adds up to the series of arguments raised so
far.
Notice that the question "Why these laws and not others?" has been
introduced in the discussion, and its role turns out to be crucial: it is
this question that motivates a critical stance against the standard sci-
entific view on laws. This question is exactly what I stated in chapter
1 as the third philosophical question about laws (1.1 p. 6). Now it is
presented pressing against the traditional scientific view on laws.
Let me connect this question ’3’ with the the long chapter 2, where
I provided diverse arguments in support of an alternative to the tra-
ditional view. Amongst them, a central goal was an elaboration of
question ’3’, for I spelled out how the laws actually look like, and I
judged them as contrived (something that I analyzed mostly in terms
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of unnaturalness): such a survey of the actual laws yielded a precise
glimpse of what it means that they could have been otherwise, and a
precise glimpse that they could have been otherwise indeed.
It is more plausible to postulate, at most, only very general principles,
rather than dynamical laws of temporal evolution: the latter by defi-
nition inevitably display a contrived, contingent, unnatural form, be
it in the form of a differential equation, or in the form of a vector field
expressed as a matrix of a Lie algebra (cf. 2.3).
Those principles are then the only responsibles of constraining an
initially unconstrained space of possible time evolutions.
tension with modern physics Deutsch admits that Wheeler’s
motivation is compelling, but describes a state of affairs in modern
physics that is in tension with Wheeler’s proposal: Tension with how
modern physics
describes the world"a physical theory amounts to the specification of an action func-
tional and the quantum field configurations that constitute its
domain. Thus the expectation is that we shall soon discover the
ultimate "fundamental fields", their invariance properties, and
their action functional. The principle of the stationarity of this
action functional, together with the principles of quantum the-
ory, would be the ultimate dynamical "laws of nature" [Deutsch,
1986, 2].
Deutsch refers to the principle of stationary action, applicable in all
the known domains of physics. Can Wheeler’s proposal coexist with
such a scientific image?
It can coexist only if those laws are not the most fundamental laws.
In this respect, chapter 2 and the beginning of this chapter have been
arguing for the plausibility of a substantially different scenario in the
fundamental level. Then, a final theory along the lines of Deutsch’s
fragment should not signify a truly fundamental description of real-
ity.
synthetic or analytic principle? That being said, Deutsch
analyzes the fundamental principle hypothesized by Wheeler in the
following terms: should that principle be analytic or synthetic?
If it were analytic it would be a consequence of logic alone (such How could be the
fundamental
principles?
is Deutsch’s understanding of analyticity). The question in this case
becomes whether such type of analytic proposition is capable of mak-
ing an assertion about the world or its factual content is empty.
If, on the other hand, we consider that the principle is synthetic, then
it is not stating anymore truths about every possible world, the con-
tingency I already highlighted (in ch. 2) shows up, and the question
becomes: how can be justified that the synthetic principle is the true
one instead of some other?
The former case is thus threatened by the vacuity of meaning of an
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analytic principle —and this is so according to a widespread philo-
sophical tradition (as e.g. [Wittgenstein, 1921]). If this is the case, it
undermines the "rationalist" approach to laws of nature according to
which laws follow from logical principles (a position presented in
chapter 1 and pursued along a novel path in 1.5).
On the other hand, in the case of the principle being synthetic, the
worry takes us back to the motivation for the search of an alterna-
tive proposal, that is: the assumption of the existence of a set of fun-
damental laws brings out the question of why these laws and not
others. This question, now, is addressed at the undefined synthetic
principle(s) postulated by Wheeler.
This second objection drives us back to what I named as the main
objection, related with the fact that the principles postulated over and
above the chaotic base do seem to be the same as what we wanted to
avoid, i.e. dynamical laws of time evolution.
Granting the resemblance with dynamical laws of time evolution,
Deutsch himself evidences the real lack of lawlessness of Wheeler’sThe main objection
again: How might
’principles’ differ
from ’laws’?
schema. That is, the schema:
Chaos + regulating principle =⇒ approximate laws
It is to be rewritten in the very uninspiring form:
’Stochastic laws lead to approximate deterministic laws’
Let’s look at this main objection in our future field of study, statis-
tical mechanics, a field also treated by Wheeler. In this field there is,
according to Deutsch, an implicit lawlike element that he identifies in
the probability distribution of the statistical postulate: "the principle of
equal a priori probability of statistical mechanics" [Deutsch, 1986, 5].
This objection relies on the critique that stresses that equiprobability
amounts already to a lawful stochastic distribution, not to random-
ness. I myself have indeed argued (1.3 p. 11) that a probability dis-
tribution contains an element of order. Deutsch thus describes the
motion of molecules as not being lawless, and he thus interprets the
uniform probability distribution function as the stochastic law we
wanted to avoid.
The rationale of this line of thought goes like this: ’random’ should
not mean a specific distribution (even if it is the uniform distribu-
tion) for random means any possible distribution, not a fair visitation
rate of all the outcomes as in the uniform distribution. In frequentist
terms, the critique can be phrased thus: the equiprobabilities of the
uniform distribution are stating that there will be an approximately
equal frequency of all the outcomes, and this clearly need not be the
case for a truly random distribution. Therefore, the uniform distribu-
tion should not be associated with the notion of randomness.
Parallel criticisms have been made against the association of random-
ness with equiprobability (e.g. [Gillies, 2000], [Myrvold]), oriented at
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the classical interpretation of probability; see 4.3.2 for more detail.
However, I argue throughout this thesis against such view. To what A reply
extent does a uniform distribution have to be interpreted only as an
assignment of a fixed probabilistic form and not as a description of a truly
random or very complex situation?
I defend in annex A that there is a relation between the notion
of randomness and that of equiprobability, as intuitively thought. I
do so following the (equivalent) formal definitions of randomness
as unpredictability, typicality, and incompressibility (A.3). In a nutshell:
given such definition(s), what should be expected is that a random se-
quence will not display any biased distribution among the outcomes
in the long run, but a uniform distribution.
Even if a uniform distribution is indeed a probability function, it does
not follow that a uniform distribution is exclusively the result of a
stochatic law. It can also be the most likely result of a random gener-
ation — I argue this in A.4.
Further, that randomization implies an equal visitation rate of all
the outcomes when certain symmetries are present in the system un-
der study is argued in [Strevens, 2013], and I analyze it in chapter 4.
The procedure developed in chapter 4 helps to explain equiprobabil-
ity not in the line of the criticized classical interpretation, but from
other ingredients —namely, from a (genuine or not) random walk
plus certain symmetries of the system. This specific argument is in
4.3.2 p. 108, based on [Strevens, 2005].
Independently, I study in chapters 4 and 5 whether the statistical pos-
tulate of SM can be justified without involving lawlike elements in
the explanation. I argue that this postulate can be accepted for the
actual laws as well as for most possible laws, given that they will ex-
hibit certain properties, once we assume some spatial symmetries of
the system. In this sense, the statistical postulate is explained from
non-dynamical elements, therefore itself is not a lawlike factor that
could harm Wheeler’s idea of ’law without law’.
In sum, the elaboration of Wheeler’s proposal, and an answer to
what I labeled as the ’main objection’, continues with the arguments
of the next chapters. In a generic framework in chapter 4, in the par-
ticular field of statistical mechanics in 5, and in annex A.
Before this, it is worth mentioning the developments carried out by
a project, mostly unknown among philosophers, that elaborates at
length a process of formation of symmetries.
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3.3 formation of symmetries
To frame this section, let me recapitulate what has been argued so far.
I presented in 1.5 a central aspect of contemporary physical theories,
namely the important role of local gauge symmetries, to the extent
that I highlighted a quantum field theory whose laws are univocally
determined by gauge symmetry principles. This is a novel result in
the history of physics, and I argued that it is worth pursuing in that
(perhaps) improves our understanding of the notion of law. Then, a
thorough study followed in chapter 2, pointing out that the status of
symmetry principles was far from necessary or a priori "superprinci-
ples", and as such in need of explanation. This conclusion was taken
as a premise for a further conclusion, namely, the plausibility of a
substantially different physics in the fundamental level.
Now, a natural continuation of the dialectics is: if laws of nature
stated in the form of symmetry principles are in need of explana-
tion —just as laws of nature in general— what explanation could be
provided? And two answers, at least, gain prominence: 1) symmetry
principles are explained as consequences of the matter-content of the
universe, the "initial conditions", or 2) symmetry principles are not
fundamental but derived from a non-symmetric lower level. In what
follows I reflect about what is meant by the two options —the latter
being the main object of study of the coming chapters.
3.3.1 Consequences of the initial conditions
The first option is to recur to the matter-content of the universe, its ele-
mentary particles or fields —the elementary constitution of the space
content, whatever that be— in order to explain the symmetry princi-
ples. The current symmetries are then explained as a consequence of
the types of entities that populate the universe.
Remember that this claim has been already grounded in what I ar-
gued in 1.5: I presented the existence of renormalizable local gauge
theories of QFT, where the fields univocally specify the laws (they
specify the gauge symmetries, corresponding to the elementary inter-
actions of such fermionic fields) except for the values of the constants
appearing in them.
This means that now the burden of proof is translated to the matter-
content of the universe. And an answer to this is to take those partic-
ular types of entities just as a primitive brute fact.
Brute facts are, perhaps, one of the worst types of explanation; still,
if somewhere could be acceptable, here could be, where we face such
basic unavoidable constituents of reality as its very content. Thus, take
the initial conditions as a primitive brute fact, and this, following the
well defined mathematical relations of QFT, implies its own dynam-
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ics. The symmetries would be thus explained as a mathematical con-
sequence of the types of particles that constitute the universe.
An objection, though, is just to consider another equally intuitive
option which turns the direction of the postulation the other way
around: the types of particles are the ones they are in virtue of the un-
derlying symmetry principles. So symmetries are no more explained
but assumed —and this is more in tune with the usual way physics
understood the relation of the content and the laws. Many other wor-
ries could be brought up now (no more, though, than those that could
be brought up against the coming alternative).
Be that as it may, a virtue stemming from this strategy is that the
tight relation between laws and matter-content seems to be more ad-
equate, in light of current physics and also of philosophical consider-
ations. That is, both elements, laws and matter-content, are not inde-
pendent of each other. They are not two parallel ontological realms,
where one —laws— applies to the other —the initial conditions. One
might supervene over the other, or they might be on an equal onto-
logical footing (the latter is the conclusion defended in [McKenzie,
Forthcoming]); but either way, they are not two orthogonal subjects
of inquiry, as was traditionally conceived.
Though the path presented is promising and more can be said in
its support, in the remainder of the chapter I want to put forward
another option, less known in the existing literature, which shares
evident similarities with the main rationale of this dissertation (espe-
cially with what is argued in part II).
3.3.2 Consequence of a non-symmetric complex lower level
I want to bring up and sketch the key features of the proposal that
hypothesizes the existence of a process of formation of symmetries.
Symmetries are not to be considered neither fundamental nor exact,
but derived and approximate. Whereas [Jacobson and Wall, 2010] has
studied this possibility for the particular case of Lorentz symmetry,
H.B. Nielsen and his team have explored the more radical idea that
all symmetry principles are derived and approximate. They have pub-
lished a large quantity of papers (e.g. [Froggatt and Nielsen, 2002],
[Froggatt and Nielsen, 2005], or a book with a recopilation of the
main ideas of their project and a selection of papers [Froggatt and
Nielsen, 1991]).
It is not the standard viewpoint in physics, but many recognized
physicists have been sympathetic to this strategy, a partial list of
which I am citing along the chapter. Those that I know are: Carl
von Weizsäker, George Gamow, Werner Heisenberg, John Archibald
Wheeler, Eugene Wigner, and Steven Weinberg. More recently, Lee
Smolin and all the team led by Colin Froggatt and H.B. Nielsen. Like-
wise, there is a profound similarity with the project called ’entropic
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gravity’ (or more in general ’entropic forces’), investigated e.g. by
Ted Jacobson [Jacobson, 1995], Ariel Caticha [Caticha, 2011], [Nawaz
and Caticha, 2012], Erik Verlinde [Verlinde, 2011], Lee Smolin [Smolin,
2010], Shan Gao [Gao, 2011], [Gao, 2013].
For the sake of concreteness I only sketch the specific project of
Nielsen’s team, but undoubtedly a future line of research should be
to elaborate a better analysis of the parallel proposals (not to say, a
proper philosophical analysis of Nielsen’s project, here only summa-
rized).
The central point of Nielsen’s project can be stated thus:
symm : All possible complex lagrangians lead in the low-energy limit to
the symmetries of current physics.
That is, they are considering a fundamental level ruled by an unde-
termined complex behavior. This level is obviously below the current
quantum level, for quantum mechanics does not describe a complex
dynamics like the one they suppose. This complex behavior, labeled
by them as “random dynamics”, is thought to inevitably yield the emer-
gence, in some limit, of all the current symmetries. The limit is taken
to be the low energy domain, which corresponds to the experimen-
tally accessible energies below 1TeV.
Notably, this approach is in the opposite spirit of that of assuming
hidden symmetries that have been spontaneously broken (explained
in [Brading and Castellani, 2013, sec. 4.2], and see my discussion in
1.3 p. 11).
The underlying idea is illustrated by the historical example of Heisen-
berg dealing with isospin symmetry in the thirties [Froggatt and
Nielsen, 1991, p.188]. Heisenberg took that symmetry to be a fun-
damental principle of his unified field theory of elementary particles.
However, later on it was shown that isospin symmetry is really an
"accidental" consequence of QCD plus the smallness of the up and
down quark masses. It is thus not fundamental but derived.
The authors take this idea and extend it to all symmetries:
”we entertain the hypothesis that all known symmetries of the
empirically discovered laws of nature —and the laws of nature
themselves— should be derivable in some limit, essentially in-
dependent of what the physics might be at very short distances”
[Froggatt and Nielsen, 1991, 12].
Take as an example local gauge symmetries. What they have pre-Gauge symmetries
sumably shown is that, if the fundamental Lagrangian from which
physical laws are derived is chosen at random, then the existence of
local gauge invariance at low energy can be a stable phenomenon
in the space of all Lagrangian theories. This is argued in [Chkareuli
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et al., 2009], [Forster et al., 1980], [Antoniadis et al., 1983], [Froggatt
and Nielsen, 1991, ch. 6].
A specific result is that the presence of a massless photon emerges
from an open set of Lagrangians picked from the space of almost all
possible functional forms. In sum, at low energy is obtained the ap-
pearance of a local U(1) gauge symmetry and the existence of what
corresponds to a massless photon.
They have worked likewise in the derivation of all the other sym-
metries. The process of derivation of symmetries, as explained in
[Froggatt and Nielsen, 1991, ch.7], follows different strategies. One
is to derive them from other more fundamental symmetries. This is The 3 methods of
derivationdone for the derivation of parity, charge, conjugation, time reversal
and strangeness (or more generally, flavour) conservation: if correct,
these can be interpreted to be no more fundamental symmetries of
the Standard Model but natural consequences of a gauge field theory
(see below for more details, and cf. [Froggatt and Nielsen, 1991, ch.3]
and the references therein).
The other two types of derivation of symmetries are more relevant for
our interest in metaphysical issues. One is the renormalization group
method. According to this strategy, the symmetry becomes a better
approximation as a certain domain of energy is approached. This
method thus coincides with the observations laid out at the begin-
ning of the chapter, regarding the interpretation of effective theories
based on renormalization techniques. In the third place, another strat-
egy is dubbed "formal appearance". A derivation of this type reveals
the symmetry to be a purely formal one, without real physical signif-
icance, which "nevertheless attains physical significance in some phase of
the vacuum due to quantum fluctuations" [Froggatt and Nielsen, 1991,
92]. Let’s see what they argue more in detail.
the symmetries of the standard model In order to provide
a minimally wide picture of how this project has been conducted, I
am going to summarize some crucial stages in their derivation of all
the symmetry principles. Let’s highlight how they assess the status
of the symmetries of the Standard Model. Following [Froggatt and
Nielsen, 1991, ch.3], they describe all the interactions of the Standard
Model with a Lagrangian L such that L is the most general one consis-
tent with the following four assumptions: The derivation of the
Standard Model1) renormalisability, so that it forbids the coefficients of interaction
terms having dimension of mass to a negative power ;
2) Poincaré invariance, which is to say that the Lagrangian has to be
Lorentz invariant and translationally invariant ;
3) gauge invariance under the gauge group S(U(2)xU(3)) ;
4) a given matter content corresponding to the fermions of the Stan-
dard Model, so this includes neutrinos, and left and right-handed
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quarks and leptons [Froggatt and Nielsen, 1991, 20].
Now, it turns out that these assumptions already constrain the La-
grangian L to exhibit all the other symmetries of the Standard Model.
This result is illustrated in figure 5.
Figure 5: The symmetries of the Standard Model. Poincaré and S(U(2)xU(3))
gauge symmetries are assumed, the rest are derived in the ’Ran-
dom dynamics’ project. From [Froggatt and Nielsen, 1991, 42].
Thus, regarding the Standard Model, five out of eight of the symme-
tries have been derived. The 8 symmetries are: 1) space-time transla-
tional invariance, 2) Lorentz invariance, 3) gauge invariance, 4) charge
conjugation invariance, 5) parity invariance, 6) time reversal invari-
ance, 7) flavour conservation, 8) chiral symmetry (fig. 5). The last five
are those that have been allegedly derived within the Standard Model.
The first three instead require an explanation beyond it. The deriva-
tion of the five, though, requires some assumptions: the existence of
small quark masses and the absence of the QCD topological θ-term.
As the authors say, "it is reasonable to suppose that these auxiliary
assumptions will be understood in terms of physics beyond the Stan-
dard Model" [Froggatt and Nielsen, 1991, 130].
Granting these results, we see that Yang-Mills gauge and Poincaré
invariance are assumed. What can be done in their regard? The three
diverse strategies are independently applied for the derivation of
both symmetries (cf. [Froggatt and Nielsen, 1991, ch. VI] and refer-
ences therein).Poincaré invariance
For instance, regarding the Poincaré symmetry, consisting in rota-
tional and space-time translation invariance, they have to recur to a
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pre-geometric theory, given that they have to go beyond general rel-
ativity: the reason is that the Poincaré invariance is just part of the
diffeomorphism symmetry of general relativity, so it is built into it
[Froggatt and Nielsen, 1991, 129]. Thus, a pre-geometric theory is
sought such that it introduces a purely formal diffeomorphism sym-
metry (this when they opt for the strategy dubbed before as ’formal
appearance’). Their proposal, then, is that quantum fluctuations can
be the mechanism capable of stabilizing the Poincaré invariance, for
the key point is to show that the corresponding formal Poincaré sym-
metry is not spontaneously broken [Froggatt and Nielsen, 1991, 6.2.1].
the emergence of lorentz invariance Let me enter a bit
more in detail, in order give a more specific glimpse of their proce-
dures, by outlining the rationale in the specific derivation of Lorentz
invariance, found in [Chadha and Nielsen, 1983] (the papers [Anto-
niadis et al., 1983], [Forster et al., 1980] argue in the same direction).
They start by considering a not covariant model of electrodynam-
ics, which is to say that they assume a Lagrange function which is
gauge invariant and renormalizable, but not Lorentz invariant2. They
spell out the model and study the behaviour of the various couplings
in function of the energy scale. Remember that the objective is to
show that, as the energy scale lowers, the model progressively dis-
plays more Lorentz invariance. Therefore, such invariance is to be
considered only a property in the infrared domain of a large class of
Lagrange functions.
They start by writing down the most general form of the action,
having something that looks like this:
Wnon−int(J,η) =
∫
dx(JµAµ + ηγ
0ψ+Lnon−int(Aµ,ψ)) (1)
where JµAµ corresponds to the photon source and photon field
respectively, ηψ to the electron source and electron field respectively,
and:
Lnon−int(Aµ,ψ) = −
1
4
ηµνρσFµνFρσ−
1
2
ψγ0γα
(
e
µ
+α
1+ iqγ5
2
+ eµ−α
1− iqγ5
2
)
(1/i)δµψ
where worth remarking is ηµνρσ which are the effective coupling
constants3.
After certain deductions that follow from such non-covariant model,
[Chadha and Nielsen, 1983, sec.5] shows how the smaller is the scale
2 By gauge invariant they specifically refer to the fact that the primitive interaction
term is obtained from the free Lagrange function by replacing every derivative by
a covariant derivative. By renormalizability they refer to the fact that the Lagrange
function only contains terms whose mass dimension is 6 4.
3 The four indices of ηµνρσ, after some restrictions due to the strength field tensors
Fµν and Fρσ, represent a total of 20 independent coupling constants.
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the more the property of Lorentz covariance manifests. The energy
scale is λ, and the equation that specifies the behaviour of the model
in function of the change of scale λ is4:
δηµνρσ(λ)
δlogλ
= −
α
6pi
(gµρ+ g
νσ
+ − g
µσ
+ g
νρ
+ ) −
α
6pi
(gµρ− g
νσ
− − g
µσ
− g
νρ
− ) (2)
This can be written, after many steps and making a slight nota-
tional change (I am avoiding all the possible technicalities, but this is
necessary to show the coming conclusion) as:
1
e2(λ)
ηµνρσ(λ) =
1
2e2(λ)
[
g
µρ
(γ)(λ)g
νσ
(γ)(λ) − g
µσ
(γ)(λ)g
νρ
(γ)(λ)
]
+
1
e2(λ)
δηµνρσ(λ)
(3)
where the first term corresponds to the covariant term and the second
to the non-covariant5. Thus, this equation describes the behaviour of
the model (more specifically, of the effective coupling ηµνρσ) under
change of scale λ.
Now, by another way they arrive to the result that ([Chadha and
Nielsen, 1983, 142]):
δ
δlogλ
(
1
e2(λ)
δηµνρσ(λ)
)
= 0 (4)
With these two results we are now ready to verify the emergence of
the Lorentz invariance. Keeping in mind the result of equation 4, look
at the evolution of equation 3 as λ decreases: the first covariant term
will increase, given that e(λ) in the denominator will decrease. Then,
equation 4 is basically stating that the second noncovariant term will
not change its value as λ changes. Therefore, the more λ decreases,
the more predominant will be the effects of the covariant term!
Thus, in this massless non-covariant electrodynamic model, Lorentz
covariance emerges in the infrared limit6.
3.4 conclusion
If we grant the success of this whole project of derivation of symme-
tries, given the minimum number of assumptions and the subsequent
most generic form of the lagrangian employed, it means that the sym-
metries will hold in the low energy limit regardless of the details of
the fundamental theory. This crucial feature is made explicit here:
4 Where the gij± are diverse metrics, and α the fine-structure constant.
5 And more in detail, e(λ) is a coupling constant and gij
(γ)
is the photon metric, onto
which the previous metrics have been contracted to it.
6 Needless to say, see [Chadha and Nielsen, 1983] for further details. There are a lot
of subtleties that I neglected for sake of exposition.
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”it would then hardly matter what the fundamental ’theory’
is; it would anyway give rise to the observed regularities. This
would mean that almost any theory could explain ’everything’
known and thus be good enough as a theory of everything
(ToE). There would then be no reason to accept any spatial
model or ToE as the truth; it would be better to imagine that
the most fundamental physics is chaotic —a random model—
or not to assume anything about it. This is really the content of
the random dynamics hypothesis: the fundamental physics, or
ToE, does not matter, since almost all models at the fundamental
level will have sufficient structure that they agree with the phe-
nomenologically observed regularities” [Froggatt and Nielsen,
1991, 133].
It is of course disputable whether the assumptions are sufficiently
minimal. An interesting future line of research would be to carry out
this study. The project is vast, given the quantity of work that this
line of research has produced. For each paper different assumptions
and derivation procedures can be employed —a brief example of both
assumptions and derivation procedures has been shown for the case
Lorentz invariance in the previous section.
Lastly, the meaningfulness or plausibility of this project is bolstered
if we do not assume the cosmological principle, the principle that pos-
tulates that the distribution of matter in the universe is homogeneous
and isotropic when viewed on a large enough scale7. This point of Without the
cosmological
principle
view is clearly illustrated by Barrow in [Barrow, 1988, p.299], where
he connects the emergence of symmetries with the falsehood of the
cosmological principle, and with the chaotic cosmologies (as those
developed by [von Weizsäcker, 1951], [Gamow, 1952]), in turn sup-
ported by the theory of inflation. Let me quote him, to conclude with
the words of an authority (the fallacy of appeal to authority notwith-
standing):
"Suppose that the Universe did indeed begin in a state of chaotic
anarchy. If the evolutionary emergence of particular symmetries
depends upon the local temperature and density, then they will
emerge at different rates in different parts of a chaotic universe.
(...) If the phenomenon of inflation occurred in such a hetero-
geneous Universe then one could find that our entire Visible
Universe evolved from the accelerated inflation of a single mi-
croscopic domain possessing similar laws and symmetries. Out-
side this domain things might, literally, be unimaginably differ-
ent".
7 The principle is a basic assumption of modern cosmology, whose motivation comes
from assuming that the forces are expected to act uniformly throughout the universe,
so they should not produce observable irregularities in the large scale structure over
the evolution of the initial matter field.
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There is no space here to assess the success of the ’random dy-
namics’ project; this would require at least another PhD dissertation.
In the coming part II a similar project is carried out from a differ-
ent perspective. Nevertheless, I wanted to bring forward this parallel
approach, largely unknown among the philosophical literature, that
Wheeler began to work out (and probably others before) and that
these physicists have been thoroughly developing. If the project is
successful, then it is able to explain some of the most evasive philo-
sophical notions: laws of nature and symmetry principles.
Part II
N O N - D Y N A M I C A L C O N S T R A I N T S
S U F F I C I E N T F O R R E D U C T I O N O F
C O M P L E X I T Y
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Abstract
This chapter argues that, if a system displays a chaotic trajectory in
phase space and certain non-dynamical conditions hold, stable
regularities arise without needing a specific dynamics guiding the
evolution of the system. I start by explaining how stable regularities
can be obtained from a lower level in which the actual dynamics is
chaotic, an explanation based on the so called ’method of arbitrary
functions’. I then argue how in this method the particular form of
the assumed laws is irrelevant. If this is the case, regular behavior
would emerge not only from the presupposed actual dynamics but
from a larger set of possible laws. More specifically, regular behavior
would emerge from the set of possible laws that display a chaotic
trajectory. Finally, I discuss how this extension to all chaotic
trajectories can be significant to the case of a scenario without
fundamental guiding laws. To this end I appeal to the recent insights
regarding the shared properties of the notions of randomness and
chaos.
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4.1 stability from complex underlying dynamics
The aim of the thesis can be restated in this chapter in a specific way.
In order to propose an account of stable regularities without appeal-The goal
ing to fundamental laws, this chapter studies whether it is possible
to explain the formation of stable probabilistic regularities through
the so called ’method of arbitrary functions’. First, I remark that the
method provides an explanation of probabilistic patterns in actual
deterministic newtonian systems —I explain how this is so in 4.2—.
Then I bring up the development, carried out by Michael Strevens,
that generalizes the conditions of application of the method and ex-
tends its applicability in the domain of complex sciences. Then, from
these results stems the claim, I argue, that the same probabilistic pat-
terns can be obtained without requiring a particular form of the dynamics
involved. The results are thus expected to hold for a wider class of
dynamical laws and, as such, for a wider set of possible trajectories
in phase space. Specifically, any trajectory that displays a random-
looking path —no matter if fruit of deterministic laws or not— will
yield, when plugged into the method of arbitrary functions, a higher-
level stable probability distribution. I argue that the random-looking
path can be accomplished by any chaotic dynamics and also by, typ-
ically, a truly (process-)random trajectory. This result will be used to
defend the main claim, that is, the possibility of stable regularities
without fundamental guiding laws. I spell out the detailed form of
the whole argument at the end of this section. A precise clarification
of what is meant by ’chaos’ and ’randomness’ is respectively dealt in
a coming subsection (p. 90) and in the annex A.
4.1.1 From the humean point of view
Though not necessary, it is going to be convenient to keep in mind the
point of view of the humean about laws and express the situation at
stake in his terms: consider all the possible trajectories a system can
take through phase space —that is, without committing to specific
laws—1; allegedly each of them has a best induction corresponding
to a set of statements —the humean laws— that best describe such
a trajectory. What I argue is that, for the set of those humean laws
that display a random-looking trajectory —irrespective of whether
the "best system account" induces in some cases deterministic laws or
not— and in certain conditions, higher-level stable probabilities will
1 Even so, the set of possible trajectories will be restricted according to some principles
that we would like to assume. One of the most obvious examples is the conservation
of energy —as e.g. Maxwell also assumed—. This is elaborated in 4.4.2.
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arise in the long term. The method of arbitrary functions grounds
the explanation of this phenomenon. The conditions mentioned are
non-dynamical constraints to the setup of the system under study,
constraints that the method was already assuming in standard exam-
ples.
This humean point of view is not necessary but optional; however,
it will be useful to adopt it, especially when the results defended
are interpreted as the ground for the main goal of this thesis. The
main goal is, I repeat, an account of stable behavior, of the stability of
the at least apparent non-accidental regularities. Notably, the regular-
ities described by the current best laws of physics. Likewise, and even
more interesting, the regularities described by the ideal true final laws
(cf. ch. 1 and 2). The account aims to explain the stability or robust-
ness of the regularities without assuming fundamental pre-existing
governing laws. Thus, it is within a framework like the humean, that
lacks fundamental governing laws, that we can better understand this
idea2.
If we do not switch to this type of framework an objection can be An objection
raised, as we are showing something —the emergence of stable regu-
larities, i.e. of lawful behavior— by always previously assuming some
fundamental laws. This is a natural objection that could be raised if
the reader does not switch to the scenario without guiding laws; in
fact, my argument can be interpreted from both points of view —
assuming laws and not assuming them— and thus can be misinter-
preted, so let me clarify this now.
In order to consider a lawless scenario my strategy is indirect, I take Reply
into account not only one dynamics but all the possible dynamics and
then I arrive to a certain conclusion; thus one can both affirm that:
1) what has been done is to show that the conclusion holds for all
dynamics, in the sense that they are always assumed in some or
other form —and this is a correct interpretation but not the inter-
esting one—, or
2) by showing that the conclusion holds for all dynamics it follows
that it will also hold for any lawless unguided behavior whose trajec-
tory could have been described by any of those dynamics3. Therefore
the conclusion holds also in a lawless scenario.
A lawless unguided behavior can exhibit many different trajectories
in phase space; obviously it does not correspond to only one. That is
a reason behind taking this approach that considers a whole set of
trajectories. Hopefully, it considers at least the overwhelming major-
ity of possible trajectories that an unguided random behavior could
2 I say ’like the humean’ because I am not committing to a humean framework but to
any framework that dispenses of guiding fundamental laws.
3 Later I spell out this argument and I label it as ’B’. Its justification is dealt in 4.4.
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take, as I argue in 4.44.
Compare again this proposal with the deflationist physical neces-
sity as understood by a humean. He is also reluctant to bestow neces-
sity to the humean mosaic, and so he is to the trajectories in phase
space. There is no further explanation, according to him, as to why
the whole humean mosaic is as it is, and even why it displays some
extremely frequent —perhaps even exceptionless— regularities. The
humean does not appeal to the notion of randomness when describ-
ing the humean mosaic, he talks of a ’brute fact’: the mosaic is a prim-
itive fact without a reason (cf. 1.4.2). This thesis shares the deflationist
spirit in that it does not commit to a genuine physical necessity. How-
ever, unlike the humean literature, this thesis has argued that the "cos-
mic coincidence" of extremely stable regularities requires explanation
(cf. 1.1 p.4 and 1.4.2 p.26). To provide a possible explanation I pos-
tulate some non-dynamical conditions, meaning by ’non-dynamical’
that do not directly specify the form of the dynamics. I advance that
these conditions are related with an assumed stable symmetrical con-
figuration of the physical setup of the system under study.
In sum, from the humean point of view this chapter can be phrased
in the following way: any random-looking trajectory in a subregion
of the energy hypersurface that satisfies certain non-dynamical con-
ditions will display, with probability 1, in the long run and in higher
levels, stable regular behavior.
4.1.2 What is meant by ’chaos’
What is done in this chapter is not a modification of the method of
arbitrary functions, it is an exploration of its sufficient conditions, ar-
guing that the domain of applicability can be extended to a wide
set of possible (fundamental) laws. More specifically, to any possi-
ble chaotic dynamics. This is the first claim that later I label as (A).
Further, the method will also work for any lawless random behav-
ior whose trajectory could be identified with any of those trajectories
fruit of those chaotic dynamics. This is the conclusion of the chapter,
which I later label as (C).
What is required of the chaotic trajectory is that it displays a random-
looking "wandering" behavior through phase space. Thus, the step
to a random dynamics seems, prima facie, rather straightforward, as
a truly random dynamics will also typically possess such a property.
However, it could be objected that true process-randomness is not
always random-looking. But this will not represent a strong threat.
It is true that it can be that a coin launched a million of times lands
heads all the times. But as [Frigg, 2004] shows, the proportion of cases
4 For sake of clarity: when I talk of ’lawless unguided behavior’ is the same as when,
for instance, I employ the similar terms ’random wandering trajectory’.
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in which process randomness does not display a product random se-
quence is small enough to be neglected for our purposes. The detailed
argumentation of this is in 4.4 (and A.4). In brief, I claim that if the
results hold for any chaotic trajectory they also hold for a random
trajectory (what I later label as (B)).
Regarding the term ’chaotic’, I use it in the technical sense though
the colloquial sense also transmits the key characteristic pertinent
here, that is, the random-looking aspect of the trajectory. What is
the technical sense? And also: What exactly means random-looking?
Regarding the former question there is not a shared answer. Tradi-
tionally (e.g. in the textbooks [Strogatz, 1994], [Hasselblatt and Ka-
tok, 2003]) ’chaos’ has been defined in terms of, first of all, sensitive
dependence on initial conditions, i.e.: in a dynamical system that is
chaotic arbitrarily small variations in initial conditions become mag-
nified over time —what is also known as exponential divergence of
nearby trajectories. Regardless of the discussion about the proper
definition, all the characteristics I mention —especially the coming
ones— support my purpose (of sec. 4.4) of highlighting shared prop-
erties between chaotic and random trajectories.[Strogatz, 1994, 323]
includes in the definition the requirement of aperiodic long-term behav-
ior. It means that there are trajectories which do not settle down to
fixed points, periodic orbits, or quasiperiodic orbits as t → ∞. In
[Hasselblatt and Katok, 2003], for a dynamical system to be chaotic
it is also required that it is topologically mixing and that its periodic or-
bits are dense. The former means that the system evolves over time so
that any given region or open set of its phase space eventually will
overlap with any other given region. The latter that every point in
the space is approached arbitrarily closely by periodic orbits. These
three characteristics are especially pertinent because they remind and
resemble the idea of ergodicity. As I clarify later, the random-looking
aspect I have been appealing to is aimed to yield, together with other
conditions, an approximate resemblance with an ideal ergodic trajec-
tory (i.e. a trajectory that visits with same frequency regions of phase
space of same volume). Finally, in addition to these definitions, let me
mention the proposal by Charlotte Werndl [Werndl, 2009a] who de-
fends a definition of chaos in terms of mixing 5. This is also especially
appropriate, as mixing implies ergodicity.
The random-looking aspect of the trajectory in phase space is achieved
when the input is not the same, due to the exponential divergence
of the chaotic dynamics. The resulting random walk is the first in-
gredient for having the necessary condition such that the method of
arbitrary functions can be applied. As I explain later in 4.2, this con-
dition is that, in the long term, all the phase space is visited by the
system in approximately the same proportion. The reader familiar
5 She thus qualifies a previous definition of chaos in terms of the Kolmogorov property
[Belot and Earman, 1997]. This is further elaborated in 4.4 (and A.4.2).
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with the foundations of statistical mechanics can recognize that this
requirement resembles the ergodic hypothesis.
4.1.3 The argument
Let me state explicitly what is the final conclusion of this chapter, call
it (C):
(c): ’There are systems in certain conditions that exhibit stable simple regu-
larities without being guided by any dynamics’
The departure point is the formation of stable ’simple’ regularities
from an underlying complex dynamics6. This is basically the main
upshot of [Strevens, 2003], which I explain in 4.2. This introduces an
important general remark: an essential characteristic of my proposal
is that it is based in the phenomenon of reduction of complexity. A
phenomenon that occurs in the long term and in higher-levels accord-
ing to the mathematical theorems stated in nex section.
Likewise, this scenario is the same as that considered by Nielsen’s
team, whose abundant work has been summarized in 3.3. Strevens’
approach is abstract and suggests its application in different domains
of high-level sciences, whereas these physicists address the origin of
the fundamental symmetries. They have in mind not (only) a complex
lower-level deterministic dynamics but a truly random dynamics.
Conclusion (C) aims to support a deflationist metaphysics of laws,
the main subject of this dissertation, according to which non-accidental
regularities are only strongly stable regularities, arisen not because
some rules dictated it but because of the processes here explained,
grounded in probabilistic theorems.
To arrive to conclusion (C) I divide the argument in two steps,
whose truth together entails (C). The first is premise (A):
(a): ’There are systems in certain conditions that exhibit stable simple regu-
larities for all lower-level chaotic dynamics’
I show this via the method of arbitrary functions. The second step
is premise (B):
(b): ’If an event X holds for all chaotic dynamics, then it holds in most
cases with no dynamics at all’
From these two premises, (A) and (B), it follows the conclusion (C).
At the end of this chapter, p. 119, there is a recapitulation of the argu-
ment showing explicitly its logical form.
If (B) is true and there are (hopefully plausible) non-dynamical con-
6 ’Simple’ as opposed to ’complex’. Still, a more precise definition is in next section.
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ditions that render (A) true, I have argued that this can be taken to be
the central part of an explanation of the existence of non-accidental
regularities in a scenario without governing fundamental laws. As
such, this is a possible account of the notion of physical necessity and
of the nature of laws.
In section 4.3 I argue for (A). In section 4.4 I argue for (B). The philo-
sophical significance of (C) is stated in 5.5. Next section 4.2 paves the
way by introducing the key points of the method of arbitrary func-
tions.
Chapter 5 centers around the field of classical statistical mechanics,
where it argues for the same conclusion (C) with a different strategy,
namely with the approach called ’typicality’. An extension of the con-
clusion (C) in the domain of quantum mechanics is claimed in 5.3.1.
4.2 the method of arbitrary functions
introduction I expose in this section what has come to be known
as ’method of arbitrary functions’, which dates back to Von Kries
[Kries, 1886] and Poincaré [Poincaré, 1896], including the recent in-
sights developed by Michael Strevens[Strevens, 2003]7. There is a lack
of non-technical literature explaining the method and its possible sig-
nificance, so a secondary aim of this section is to fill this gap. A
primary aim is that, by spelling out the details of the method, the
reader starts to see the main point of this chapter, i.e. the irrelevance
of the details of the dynamics for obtaining the expected results of
the method.
The way I present it is starting from the questions raised by Strevens’
book "Bigger than chaos. Understanding complexity through proba-
bility" [Strevens, 2003]. This book and the paper "How are the sci-
ences of complex systems possible?" [Strevens, 2005] seek to explain
the fact that higher level laws are simple, whereas they are assumed
to be reducible to lower level laws that are instead complex. By ‘sim- The target:
explaining the
reduction of
complexity
ple’ is meant that they can be described by equations with few vari-
ables8. Clear examples of simple laws are the laws of thermodynam-
ics or the laws of the increase rate of rabbits’ population in a certain
ecosystem. In each case there is an assumed complex microlevel dy-
namics to which the macrolevel laws reduce. The complexity in the
microlevel is due to the very large number of degrees of freedom
(e.g. the large number of particles) as well as the nonlinear interac-
tion among them. In the example of thermodynamics, its microlevel
is modeled by kinetic theory (or statistical mechanics), which presup-
poses a large number of particles ruled by chaotic newtonian deter-
7 Other philosophers that have explored this technique are [Hopf, 1934], [Engel, 1992],
[Plato, 1983] and [Myrvold].
8 Usually linear equations, but not necessarily, as nonlinear equations —like the logis-
tic equation shown later— can produce simple behaviour too.
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ministic dynamics. This microlevel model aims at a reductive expla-
nation of the macrolevel laws of thermodynamics, as the tendency
to equilibrium (the "minus 1st" law), the nondecrease of entropy (the
2nd law), or the ideal gas law9 pV = kNT . Strevens explains not only
how this difference in the type of laws is possible within a reduc-
tionist framework, but also how, in certain cases, the simplicity of
the higher-level laws is (surprisingly) due to the complexity of the
lower-level laws. More specifically, it is the microlevel chaotic behav-
ior, together with some other properties of the systems, that leads to
the macrolevel simple laws10.
It is puzzling indeed, let me remark, how there could be some sim-
ple regularities in an ecosystem, as for instance the increase rate of
rabbits population. This regularity depends on an innumerable quan-
tity of variables interacting among them in a complex way: the rabbit
population depends on the quantity of predators, the rate of repro-
duction, the health status of each rabbit and each predator, the avail-
ability of resources, their individual geographical position, etc. Still,
these sort of simple laws do exist in population ecology, as e.g. the
Malthus equation, the Lotka-Volterra equation or the logistic equa-
tion. Then, as said, Strevens focuses the attention on the existence
of simple dynamics in many macrolevel sciences in spite of the sup-
posed microlevel complex dynamics that underlies them. The scope
of his explanation spans many of the high-level sciences, from the
behavior of gases to ecosystems, economy, meteorology, chemical re-
actions, linguistics or sociological statistics.
It is my aim to provide a further development of his insights in
order to argue for a philosophical reinterpretation of the results that
can be achieved with this technique, namely, an explanation of the for-
mation of stable regularities. This is studied in 1) an abstract setting
potentially applicable in those systems that verify the proper condi-
tions (this chapter) and 2) in the case of statistical mechanics (ch. 5).
As highlighted before, there is something about low-level complex-
ity and chaos itself that is directly responsible of high-level simplicity.
This is just what in the approach of typicality (ch. 5) I also under-
line: in certain contexts, the fact that a dynamics is chaotic involves,
justly because of this property, a simple higher-level behavior. In the
case of typicality, it yields a typical behavior that is the tendency to
equilibrium of the "minus first" law.
an example Let’s advance now in this gradual approach to the
method. The best way to understand it is with an example. Later I
will add a formal definition and further references. Among the many
9 Where p is pressure of the gas, V its volume, k is the Boltzmann’s constant, N the
number of particles of the gas and T the absolute temperature.
10 This does not mean that such type of explanation holds for all high-level simple
behavior. Thanks to Michael Strevens for pointing me this and many other valuable
observations.
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possible examples, I choose the roulette wheel used by Strevens and
originally used by Poincaré. Still, other gambling games could have
been chosen, as well as more "exotic" examples like the interesting
application of the method that Poincaré himself carried out for prov-
ing the equidistribution of planets in the celestial sky [Poincaré, 1896,
129], [Engel, 1992, 68]. I have schematized the mathematical formula-
tion of this example later in p. 105.
Figure 6: A wheel of fortune
Consider a roulette wheel. [Strevens, 2003, p.48] says: The roulette wheel
"The complex probability of the ball’s ending up in a red section
is determined, like all complex probabilities, by two things: the
physics of the wheel, represented by an evolution function, and
the distribution of the initial conditions, represented by an ic-
density. The initial condition distribution will be determined
by facts about the croupier who is spinning the wheel. Because
the croupier changes from time to time, the relevant ic-density
presumably changes from time to time as well. But, as everyone
knows, the probability of obtaining red remains the same".
This fragment states a key idea that leads to the conclusion that
almost any probabilistic distribution of the initial conditions will de-
termine approximately the same probability at the outcome. Let me
note that in this quote what he calls the "physics of the system" is
fixed; later I will investigate the possibility of variation of it.
Now let’s analyze how it is that the roulette wheel tends to exhibit,
in the long run, a stable 50/50 frequency of red and black outcomes,
and does so irrespective of the croupier (irrespective of the way the
croupier uses to launch the ball). The outcome of a trial on the wheel
is determined by the initial speed with which the wheel is spun,
which can be modeled by a random variable ζ. The contribution of
the croupier to the probabilities of red and black, then, takes the form
of a probability distribution over the initial spin speed ζ. While this
ic-variable ζ can take different distributions, the probability at the
outcome, as we know, is always the same, 0.5 for red and 0.5 for
black. We then have a constancy of the probability at the outcome,
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independently of the initial probability distribution. A way of un-
derstanding this (remarkable) fact is the following. The outcome red,
equidistributed between the black slots, is represented in function
of the variable ’speed of the wheel’ ζ as seen in figure 7. Now take
Figure 7: Red and black outcomes of a roulette in function of the initial
speed
two different initial probability distributions, one corresponding to
an enthusiastic croupier that uses to launch harder than a second
more mellow croupier; both are represented in figure 8. We already
have the intuition —and the casino already knows— that changing
the croupier does not affect the final probability at the outcome. The
reason is that the contributions of each slice of red over the entire
graphic will be approximately the same proportion as those of the
black slices and, crucially, it will be so also if we fix the attention to
a small enough region of possible values of the speed (i.e. it will be
so in any small region of the domain of the function of fig. 7). Thus,
for each croupier the proportion of outcomes will approximate to 0.5.
For this to occur there must be an alternation between red and blackThe verification of
’micro-constancy’ quick (i.e. the alternation must be highly sensitive to the variation of
the variable —speed in this case—) and constant (i.e. its pattern must
be constantly repeated)11. Strevens labeled in a single term these two
crucial properties as the property of ’microconstancy’. This property
will be necessary for the obtaining of a stable frequency at the out-
come. It is easy to visualize graphically (see figure 7).
Together with this property, the other necessary condition is that
the probability distribution over the ic-values has to be smooth. ThatPlus the property of
smoothness is, the croupier can be stronger or more mellow, but it cannot have a
highly peaked distribution that does not cover a whole pattern (that
is, the variance of the distribution cannot be too small). But not cov-
ering the whole pattern will be difficult when the patterns are con-
stantly repeated, i.e. when the aforementioned ’microconstancy’ ob-
tains. A visualization of this requirement is obtained when we see
how a non-smooth distribution as the one of figure 9 would clearly
11 The relativity of terms as ’quick’ or ’small’ will be soon considered.
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Figure 8: The frequency distribution of speeds for the throws of two differ-
ent croupiers, superimposed over the outcome in function of the
initial speed
not display the output distribution equal to the 50/50 strike ratio.
Thus,
"a smooth density will be approximately flat over any neigh-
boring pair of red and black areas in the evolution function,
for which reason the contribution made by that part of the ic-
density to the probability of red will be approximately equal
to the contribution made to the probability of black" [Strevens,
2003, p.50].
Strevens generalizes the case presented showing that, in general, if
the evolution function for an outcome e is microconstant, any smooth
ic-density determines the same probability for e, equal to the ratio of
red to black. This is the explanation of ’microlevel insensitivity’, that
is, the "washing out" of the microlevel details.
4.2.1 Smooth arbitrary functions
Let’s elucidate better what there is behind the method of arbitrary
functions. Consider a system ruled by deterministic nonlinear dynam-
ics and whose initial condition values are variable according to some
arbitrary probabilistic function12. If we assume microconstancy there
is a constant ratio of possible outcomes when the value of a variable
12 These are the ’arbitrary functions’ that name the method. It says ’arbitrary’ because
this probability distribution can be arbitrary, that is, can take any form —as long as
it is smooth. Notably, [Strevens, 2013, 12.5] argues that also the lack of a probabilistic
distribution will work.
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changes, and this occurs within any small region. (In the case of the
wheel: when the value of the spin speed changes, the proportion of
the outcomes in a given small region is constant and is the same pro-
portion for different regions).
Optionally, we can take the variation of the input variable (’ic-variables’
in Strevens’ terminology) as representing an ensemble of systems,
each of which possesses one value of that variable. (In the case of the
wheel: we have a set of wheels each with a croupier, each croupier
launches with a specific spin speed, then the global ensemble will be
represented by a probability distribution). Later will be useful to take
this point of view.
The constant ratio visualized in the evolution function (fig. 7) of the
ensemble turns to be the final proportion of outcomes. Why this is so
and why the functions at the input can be arbitrary?
Curiously, one of the keys is that what you have as an input is not a
determined unique value but a probability distribution; and the more
distributed —so the more smooth— the better. Because then you will
have different values that will be distributed over the constant evolu-
tion function (as in figure 8). If it were just a unique input (i.e. the spin
speed would be exactly the same in many trials) the final outcome
would always be the same (assuming a deterministic dynamics), al-
ways red or always black.The surprising fact of the method is that we
obtain a stable outcome when the input is not unique but runs across
different possible values smoothly distributed, for any possible form
of this distribution —i.e. for any "arbitrary function". Therefore, it is
to be remarked that for the method these details are irrelevant —the
particular form of the (smooth) input probabilistic distribution.
Figure 9: This is not a smooth distribution
With smoothness, a bit more specifically, it is meant that the func-
tion is absolutely continuous with respect to the variable. The moti-
vation for requiring smoothness is that it will make possible to ap-
proximate the slow variation of the function in a given small domain
of the function as if it were a flat distribution. This will be combined
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with the microconstant property, which will mean that in this same
small domain the pattern of outcomes will be exhibited13.
on assuming smoothness Poincaré himself put forward the
question as to why to accept the continuity requirement. He answered
by appealing to the unreasonableness that would mean its denial in
the physical systems he was considering —in the roulette and in a
system of planets equidistributed around a star. He argues this in his Poincaré’s 1st reply
famous "Science and Hypothesis" [Poincaré, 1905, p.222]. The choice
of a discontinuous function would have been unreasonable, he says.
Let’s accept by now this answer, which at least seems intuitive.
But still accepting continuity there is another possible pitfall. There
are some continuous cases that would not lead to the desired results.
In the mentioned example of the equidistribution of planets around
the Sun, Poincaré remarks one possible initial configuration of values
of the variables that would entail the alignment of all the planets, that
is, the opposite of the expected equidistribution. This corresponds to
the case in which the two random variables X and Y, ignoring for the
moment what they refer to (see p.105 for the answer), are related such
that Y = pi2 −Xt. It amounts to a case in which the planets would have
"all been lying on a kind of spiral of peculiar form, with its spires very close
together" [Poincaré, 1905, p.223].
I am bringing forward this objection mostly for the interest in the
type of answer he gives. Poincaré says that "all will admit that such an Poincaré’s 2nd
reply: Such
counterexample is
highly unlikely, ...
initial distribution is extremely improbable". Here he is giving his opin-
ion about a crucial point that shows up along the whole dissertation,
as I point out right away. It is a point about the meaningfulness of (or
lack of) assigning probabilities to events as the initial configuration of
a system whose manifestation is unique, e.g. the universe. His answer
appeals to the principle of sufficient reason in a, perhaps, disputable
idiosyncratic way: we might admit, he says, that there could be a
reason for the initial configuration of planets were distributed, for in-
stance, in a straight line, or either in any irregular way. However, it ... for it is difficult to
conceive a reason
behind.
is difficult to conceive a reason such that the initial distribution is the
highly regular and complicated one described before. In his words:
"there is no sufficient reason for the unknown cause that gave them birth to
have acted along a curve so regular and yet so complicated", adding "which
would have been expressly chosen so that the distribution at the present day
would not be uniform" [Poincaré, 1905].
Poincaré’s two answers, with their own rationale —i.e. relying on
the hard to conceive reason behind—, share the same moral of what
I defend differently throughout the whole dissertation. Namely, that A type of argument
common throughout
this thesis
these exceptional cases need not be treated as unsurmountable objec-
13 The ’constant’ ratio of the term ’microconstancy’ is the pattern exhibited, and the
’micro’ is due to its application in said small domain.
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tions as long as we just relax our demands of what is going to be
proved and with which certainty. Like the case of −ergodicity in-
stead of ergodicity, or the case of typicality (which neglects cases of
Lebesgue measure 0), here the level of confirmation must be relaxed
to a minor degree: in this and the rest of chapters I appeal to prob-
abilistic theorems of convergence14, so in the ideal circumstances in
which the sufficient conditions are satisfied the results obtained will
not hold with certainty; what can be mantained instead is that there
will be a convergence in probability. And the rates of convergence
might be far from acceptable depending on the case15.
How can this be explicitly defended? There is a necessary implicit
premise such that both Poincaré’s case and the arguments here fol-
low. It is implicit in both cases the premise that any prior option (e.g.
any specific spatial distribution of planets in Poincaré’s case, or any
different humean mosaic in one of my cases) is not more likely than
any other.
Thus, with the premise that ’no option is more likely than any other’
together with the other premise: ’X is much more numerous in the
space of possibilities’ it is valid to infer that: ’X is much more proba-
ble’. Or, as I prefer to put it, holding that:
(a): ’X is much more numerous in the space of possibilities’, and
(b): ’There is not any reason to prefer one possibility rather than an-
other’, it can be maintained that:
(e): ’(a) and (b) constitute an explanation of the occurrence of X’16.
Still remains the question as to how justify the implicit premise (b)
—that some take for granted in certain contexts, as Poincaré seems to
have done. To do so, I will contend the intuitive but criticized relation
between randomness and an approximately uniform probability dis-
tribution (in A.4).
This reasoning stated in (e) is present along the thesis in:
• chapter 5, implicit in the very idea of typicality;
• 1.4.2, where I criticize the postulation of the actual humean mo-
saic as a brute fact, stressing that such a whimsical set of laws
("so regular and yet so complicated") is in need of explanation
(something elaborated at length in ch. 2);
14 Basically the law of large numbers in its weak version (cf. A.3.1), and the analogous
version in ergodic theory that is the ergodic theorem for markov chains (cf. [Strevens,
2003, pp. 10, 376]).
15 But see later how theorem 2 p. 104 guarantees good rates of convergence when
smoothness is assumed.
16 An important clarification. There is, indeed, no certainty in this proposed explana-
tion. That is, (a) and (b) might not be the real explanation of X. This lack of certainty
has to be accepted —as it is accepted the lack of certainty of the very process of
induction (our unique way of gaining knowledge of the external world!). So more
properly, (a) and (b) should be taken to be only a plausible explanation of the occur-
rence of X.
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• at the end of 3.2 defending Wheeler’s approach from an ob-
jection, i.e. against the argument that a uniform distribution is
(exclusively) the result of a stochastic law;
• A.4, where I defend a definition of process-randomness in terms
of its outcomes;
• here in 4.4 where, in the same line of A.4, I argue that from a
proportion of cases of measure 1 verifying property X it follows
that the probability of X is close to 1 —or, as I prefer, what I ar-
gue is that there is a proportion of cases of measure 1 verifying
property X, and this explains the occurrence of X.
After this long interlude, let me recapitulate: a smooth ic-distribution Other hints on the
justification of
smoothness
has been assumed as one of the necessary conditions. How plausible
is such an assumption? Are there any arguments in its support?
In addition to Poincarés observations above, [Strevens, 2013, 12.3]
elaborates17 an argument based on the idea that enviromental noise,
or surrogates in its place, provoke a general tendency in the ic-distributions
to smooth out or, even, to uniformity. Likewise, [North, 2010] defends
something stronger, namely a uniform distribution, but restricted to
hold for a narrower set of variables, i.e. the "canonical variables" of
fundamental physics. From now on I won’t question the smoothness
assumption.
intuitive explanation of the results of the method Af-
ter these observations regarding smoothness, let’s continue with the
elucidation of the method. We have a method that tells us that a prob-
ability distribution at the input will spread its values over the evolu-
tion function in a way that will inevitably equilibrate and converge in
the long run to the constant proportion manifested in the evolution
function. I provide now a non-technical explanation of why this is
so, followed by a formal statement of the method and references for
further details.
Keep in mind figure 8. Both the values around the mean as well as
those in the tails of the arbitrary ic-function will fall under some re-
gion or other of the evolution function; to visualize it, take for in-
stance a region of the right side of the distribution of figure 8, that
is, a part of the decreasing slope. As long as the input distribution is
smooth enough, some values will fall in one microregion correspond-
ing to red and some others in the contiguous region corresponding to
black. The values of the black region will be less, but: 1) the smaller
are the divisions in the evolution function the less accentuated will
be the difference (this is the ’micro’ of the ’microconstancy’), 2) the
more smooth is the input distribution the less accentuated will be the
17 Actually he reelaborates more clearly what was spelled out in [Strevens, 2003, 2.53]
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difference (this is the smoothness condition) and 3) in global, it can
be seen how this difference when comparing two contiguous regions
is compensated by comparing one of the regions with the other con-
tiguous at the other side of the curve. In sum, given that the ratio is
micro-constant, when a high number of trials is made, the final distri-
bution will correspond to the constant ratio of the evolution function
irrespective of the form of the smooth input probability distribution.
The resulting proportion of outcomes coincides with the constant ra-
tio because for each small region (but not too small as to not contain
at least one pattern) of the curve we get approximately the constant
ratio —in a way that the error produced by the slope gets compen-
sated in the total addition of regions.
4.2.2 When does microconstancy obtain?
Figure 10: A motley wheel
A variation of the example of the roulette is ideal to show a way
to get microconstancy, i.e. to get a pattern frequently repeated in the
evolution function.
In the previous case of the roulette, the many cycles around the
wheel imply that the pattern reflecting the paint scheme of the wheel
appears many times. So we find it in the evolution function of fig. 7.
A whole cycle of the wheel yields a repetition of the whole pattern,
which in fig. 7 consists of a pattern of 8 reds plus 8 black outcomes
(according to how I draw it at the beginning of the chapter, in fig.
6). Now, Consider an asymmetrically painted roulette as the one of
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figure 1018. Here the pattern repeated would be like the one of fig.
11 for one cycle. As such, it would not be microconstant, because
an ic-distribution superimposed would favor more one zone of the
whole pattern than other zones. However, there are several ways ac-
cording to which a variation in the setup can be made such that the
evolution function becomes microconstant. One labeled ’embedding’
is discussed in [Strevens, 2013, 78-82]. Just let me mention a simpler
one: extend the range of the variable spin speed much beyond the
value ’M’ of fig. 11. ’M’ coincided with the wheel making just one
cycle. But allowing for the wheel to spin and spin for many cycles,
we can start to obtain an evolution function every time more "com-
pressed", as in fig. 12. Thus the evolution function becomes more and
more microconstant.
Figure 11: A non microconstant evolution function
Figure 12: The setup allows for many cycles. The evolution function is mi-
croconstant.
Let me now recapitulate by highlighting why we needed the two
conditions. If we had a uniform distribution of the possible initial
conditions, in the long term all the values would have been equidis-
tributed among all the possible outcomes corresponding to each ini-
tial condition. Each initial condition would have been approximately
equally frequent (because the distribution is uniform), so the final
probabilistic outcome would mirror the pattern drawn in the evolu-
tion function. In this case it would not have been necessary that the
18 This explanation is based in [Strevens, 2013, p. 78]. In that book he treats with many
other examples, so I recommend it to the interested reader as well as to the skeptic.
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evolution function is microconstant; it can just display an asymmetric
pattern like in fig. 11. However, if we have microconstancy we can
dispense of the uniform distribution and allow any smooth arbitrary
function. In this case we also get an outcome that is proportional to
the patterns manifested in the evolution function. Given the small-
ness and repetition of the patterns, we can balance and compensate
the unequal distribution of a non-uniform probabilistic distribution.
In this way we achieve a proportional visitation rate of the outcomes
for any IC-distribution.
All this has been an outline of how and why the method works. A
rigorous proof and generalization can be found in [Engel, 1992]. Yet,
some of the most representative theorems are presented right away.
4.2.3 Theorems
I want to end the section by stating the theorems in which the method
is based.I state the formal definition in general terms for a physical
system with one degree of freedom. The generalization to higher di-
mensions can be found in [Engel, 1992, ch. 4] and is analogous to
the one-dimensional case (compare the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for the two cases as summarized in [Engel, 1992, p.35 and
p.72]).
It has been proved that, being X a random variable and t ∈ R large,
the random variable (tX)(mod1) converges in the variation distance
to a uniform distribution on the unit interval if and only if X has a
density. This is proved and succintly stated in theorem 5.3 of [Engel,
1992]19:
Theorem 1. A necessary and sufficient condition for convergence in the
variation distance is that X have a density
Though, additional smoothness assumptions are needed to have
good rates of convergence, and so is stated in theorem 3.1 of [Engel,
1992]:
Theorem 2. The random variable (nX)(mod1), which is the fractional part
of the product of a large real number n and a random variable X, converges
in the weak-star topology to a uniform distribution in [0,1] when n tends to
infinity if and only if the characteristic function of X vanishes at infinity.
I include here the formulation by Poincaré of the case of the roulette
wheel. Following [Engel, 1992, 3.1], the problem considered is finding
conditions on the random variable X under which, being n a positive
integer
19 Some technical clarifications: The weak star topology on a set X, with respect to a
family of functions on X, is defined as the coarsest topology on X which makes these
functions continuous. The variation distance between two n-dimensional random
vectors X and Y, dv(X, Y), is defined as supA | P(X ∈ A) − P(Y ∈ A) |. A sequence Xk
converges in variation distance to X if dv(Xk,X) tends to zero as k tends to infinity.
4.2 the method of arbitrary functions 105
lim
n→∞P{(nX)(mod1) 6 1/2} = 12 (5)
Equation 5 has been proved to hold for any random variable X with
a density20.
Let me state here also the case of the law of small planets that
Poincaré elaborated. It helps in the comprehension of the method, is
related to physical macroscopic regularities and I think it is beauti-
ful. [Poincaré, 1896] considered a large number of planets orbiting The law of small
planetscircularly around a star. His aim was to prove that after enough
time the planets are distributed uniformly among all the signs of
the zodiac. Denote by X the angular velocity of one of these plan-
ets and by Y its distance to the star at a fixed time tx. Assume that
both are unknown and described by a continuous joint density. The
planet’s distance at a time t, L(t), is equal to the random variable
L(t) = (tX + Y)(mod2pi). The proof assumes the joint density of X
and Y to be sufficiently smooth (absolutely continuous with respect
to x) and then uses Fourier methods to prove that (tX+ Y)(mod2pi)
converges in the weak-star topology to a random variable U uniform
on [0, 2pi] as t tends to infinity.
Additionally, [Strevens, 2003] argues that the analysis presented, as
such, is philosophically flawed for finite, if large, values of the vari-
able at stake: it needs a further constraint stronger than the smooth- Stronger smoothness
for realistic (finite)
cases
ness described above (as absolute continuity). The sort of smooth-
ness that it has to be demanded is what he dubs ’macroperiodicity’,
which roughly demands that the initial probability distribution has
to be approximately uniform over almost all micro-sized regions (cf.
[Strevens, 2003, 2.23, 2.5]).
Before concluding this exposition, an important note is that the re-
sults of this method resemble other approaches found in statistical
mechanics, namely 1) Ergodic theory, 2) what Jos Uffink calls ’coarse- Resemblance with
other fieldsgraining stochastic dynamics’ [Uffink, 2006, 135] as well as 3) ‘typi-
cality’ approaches to equilibrium, especially when it is stressed the
“typicality of dynamics”, as I do in chapter 5. These approaches share
central points with the method of arbitrary functions. They share a)
the appeal to probabilistic convergence, b) the employment of an ap-
parently random initial element —random variables in the MAF, a
random-looking trajectory in the others— and c) the aim of explain-
ing regular macroscopic behavior: what in statistical mechanics is the
tendency to the equilibrium macrostate, in [Strevens, 2003] is general-
ized, with the subsequent addition of further constraints, to an open
variety of situations.
20 An extension by Fréchet(1921) upon [Poincaré, 1896].
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4.3 the role of the dynamics
In the previous section I have summarized central aspects of the
method of arbitrary functions and of the generalization elaborated
in [Strevens, 2003]. Two conditions, the so called microconstancy and
smoothness, must be fulfilled by the system so that simple stable
probabilistic behavior arises. This holds in cases in which "the physics
of the wheel" is ruled by the actual microlevel deterministic dynamics.
This section aims at showing that the role of the actual microlevel
dynamical laws is dispensable. If this is the case, simple behavior can
emerge not only from the presupposed actual chaotic deterministic
laws but from a larger set of (metaphysically) possible chaotic laws.
This is what I labeled before (p. 92) as ’(A)’. Prima facie, this exten-
sion to a wider set of laws should not be very controversial given that
the original analysis in [Strevens, 2003] (granting that is correct) is
generic and oriented to be applied in different cases. In fact, Strevens
made a tangential observation that here instead becomes the central
concern:
"The value of a microconstant probability may come out the
same on many different, competing stories about fundamental physics.
The probability of heads on a tossed coin, for example, is one
half in Newtonian physics, quantum physics, and the physics of
medieval impetus theory" [Strevens, 2003, p.62 (italics added)]21.
This section aims to show explicitly that this statement is true.
Then, together with (B), I advocate for the possibility of stable regu-
larities without being ruled by any particular dynamics, that is, being
the system genuinely randomly wandering through phase space —
what I labeled as ’(C)’. As previously stated, these stable regularities
can correspond, in any non-governing view of laws, to the only ap-
parent non-accidental regularities that we acknowledge in the world.
Or better, these stable regularities can correspond to the regularities
that are summarized by our best laws of physics.
After the previous section I am in a position where I can specify the
non-dynamical conditions that (A) was appealing to. (A) is restated
here:
(a): ’There are systems in certain conditions that exhibit stable simple regu-
larities for all lower-level chaotic dynamics’
Fortunately, no new constraints need to be added to the generic anal-
ysis presented so far. The two conditions cited —microconstancy and
smoothness— suffice. I briefly cited before (4.2.1) what has been ar-
gued for the justification of the smoothness condition —citing Poincaré,
Strevens, and Jill North. Then, for a system to verify the first prop-
21 And the same is said in [Strevens, 1998, p.19]
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erty, microconstancy, I propose (following [Strevens, 2013]) that some
particular physical non-dynamical constraints suffice and, crucially,
do so for any possible chaotic dynamics. I propose that these non-
dynamical constraints are certain spatial symmetries of the setup of
the system under consideration. This is a "non-dynamical" proposal
based in Strevens’ suggestions, though he opts for another "dynami-
cal" option. He does so for weak and somehow irrelevant reasons, so
we can still mantain the "non-dynamical" proposal.
4.3.1 Random looking and proportional visitation rate
It is important to understand what do we achieve when we have these
two conditions. The idea is that the conditions simulate what would
be achieved by a truly ergodic trajectory. They guarantee, together
with a chaotic trajectory, a stable proportional visitation rate among
all the outcomes. As analyzed in [Strevens, 2013], the proportional —
in most examples equidistributed— visitation rate of the possible val-
ues is accomplished in the long random wandering across the space
of possibilities and is what we intuitively believe that effectively hap-
pens in plenty of cases22. This happens (or we think this happens)
when throwing dice, including in the process many variations involv-
ing shaking, bouncing and rolling the dice, drawing balls from urns,
roulette wheels of different sorts, in less artificial setups as in cer-
tain ecosystems, certain arguments present in Darwin’s hypothesis of
natural selection, the model of statistical mechanics of hard spheres
bouncing in a container and probably many other cases within com-
plex sciences. In all these examples, the real reason of the correct
belief of equiprobability (of equal —or proportional— visitation rate
of every possibility) is, arguably, related with microconstancy. This
will be more clear when I justify the non-dynamical account of micro-
constancy summarized in (S):
(s): ’There are setups with certain spatial symmetries such that, if there
is sensitive dependence on probabilistic initial conditions, then the evolution
function is microconstant’
The explanation of (S) I am offering in the next subsection paves the
way to my claim (A). If (S) is correct, I can reformulate (A) (p. 92)
making explicit the ’certain conditions’ referred and, in turn, getting
rid of the neologism ’microconstancy’ by substituting it according to
(S). Then we arrive to something like (A*):
22 We believe this because we believe that a random walk takes place, though this
not necessarily implies equiprobability. A speculation of the psychology behind our
ascriptions of equiprobability is found in [Strevens, 2013, ch.4].
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(a*): ’A stable probabilistic pattern at the outcome holds, in the long
term, for any chaotic dynamics constrained by some facts about physical
symmetries and with a smooth input probabilistic distribution’.
4.3.2 (Equi)probability from physical symmetries and not from epistemic
ignorance
What has been said so far suggests a link from physical symmetries
to objective probabilities (evident in my statement (A*))23. Let me
elaborate this generalization. [North, 2010] and [Strevens, 2013] ex-
plain how the principle of indifference can be given a non-epistemic
reading, thus obtaining an alternative to the classical interpretation of
probability that avoids its main problems. The problems I refer to are
basically the claim that you can extract knowledge from ignorance
and the Bertrand paradoxes. The works cited remark that there is a
process of extraction of probabilities from symmetry arguments that
not necessarily must involve symmetries of the (lack of) knowledge;
that is, you can infer probabilities from physical symmetries. The prin-
ciple of indifference takes us from a symmetrical situation due to
epistemic ignorance —so, symmetries in our knowledge— to proba-
bilities. The suspicious and widely criticized a priori gain of knowl-
edge from ignorance involved in the principle of indifference (see
e.g. [Gillies, 2000] or [Myrvold]) does not appear in the new point
of view24. Here the knowledge of the probabilities comes from the
knowledge of physical symmetries. Then, the objective probabilities
of some events are such in virtue of —at least in part— the physical
symmetries of the world. This new point of view brings up a nice
explanation of the failure of the classical interpretation. It explains
why it seemed so reasonable and straightforward, in many cases, to
think according to the traditional epistemic reading of the principle
of indifference: it was a wrong way of thinking but it was bolstered
by the coincidence, in paradigmatic cases, of the correct physical sym-
metries of the mechanism and the symmetries in our knowledge (i.e.
our ignorance) about the outcome. Thus the former was the real re-
sponsible of the probabilities but it was the latter wrongly taken to
be the responsible.
After this general observation, let’s continue with the justification
of (S) (and therefore of (A*) and (A)).
23 This link is what Strevens suggested initially in the paper [Strevens, 1998] that has
now become the book ’Tychomancy’ [Strevens, 2013].
24 Allegedly, the paradoxes related with the choice of a reference class, versions of the
Bertrand paradox, are also solved.
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4.3.3 The dispensable role of the dynamics for microconstancy
To depart from a settled base that fits my goals, I have been taking
Strevens’ claims as the departure point of my arguments (though
as said before, Strevens’ claims are not evident or uncontroversial,
so I try to provide further justifications when needed). So let’s con-
tinue from his approach. In later papers the ideas of [Strevens, 2003]
have been developed towards different goals. All are different from
mine but they describe features that indirectly support the aim of
this section, i.e. that the particular details of the dynamics are dis-
pensable. For instance, in [Strevens, 2011] his aim is that of a meta-
physical reduction of a stable probability distribution from something
non-probabilistic. My aim instead is that of a metaphysical reduc-
tion of a stable probability distribution from something not only non-
probabilistic but also non-dynamical. With ’non-dynamical’ I mean
that there must not be any specific mention to any constraint that de-
fines the form of the dynamics. I claim that this can be achieved fol-
lowing, with few qualifications, the theory stated in [Strevens, 2003]
and [Strevens, 2013]. There it is concluded that, in order to apply
the method in a generic situation, the two properties, microconstancy
and smoothness, must be satisfied. This section focuses on the first
property. In order to satisfy it, there must be a constant ratio of the
outcomes25 and that it alternates frequently. So the question that has
to be formulated in order to understand and generalize microcon-
stancy is: on what depends the constant stable form of the evolution func-
tion and its frequent alternation? This question can be answered, I argue,
without appeal to the dynamics. If this is so, the answer represents a
justification of (A) (p. 92), and as such it represents the core of this
thesis. As previously stated, the non-dynamical condition proposed
consists in the stable symmetrical structure that must be exhibited by
the spatial configuration of the system. In some sense, then, the sta-
bility assumed in the space is "propagated" to the dynamics, whose
stability I "refused" to assume ab initio for several reasons (ch. 1). The
stability of the dynamics is, in fact, the explanandum of the whole dis-
sertation. Whether is better or worse to have the stability postulated
in the space / initial conditions than in the laws is a question I will
not treat. Even so, it seems a philosophical question worthy of further
research.
4.3.3.1 Demystifying microconstancy
Besides the non-dynamical account of microconstancy assessed here,
there can be other proposals equally valid. In fact, [Strevens, 2013]
opts for another candidate involving the dynamics after proposing
the one here defended. Now let’s deepen into the non-dynamical can-
25 In the case of the roulette of fig. 7 is 50:50, but any other ratio would hold too, as in
fig. 10.
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didate.
Microconstancy can be defined as the property that obtains if and
only if, within any small neighborhood of the evolution function, the
proportion of initial conditions producing a given outcome is the
same (see fig. 7 p. 96). First of all, we must be aware that the fact
that the wheel alternates sections of equal length is not necessary for
microconstancy; had the wheel been painted so that one third of its
slots were red and two thirds black, the evolution function would be
different but it still would display a constant ratio of outcomes, now
of 1/3 for red and 2/3 for black (figs. 10 and 12).
Now, would it still be microconstant if we modify the actual dynam-
ics of the wheel, for instance by taking the case of a wheel constructed
so that it wobbled as it rotated around its axis? Prima facie it is not at
all clear that it would still be microconstant. Still, I want to show that
it would be so for this case as well as all for the possible variations of
this sort.
My answer is that the quick alternation (the ’micro’) is achieved by
the random-looking behavior of the chaotic trajectories and the con-
stancy can be achieved by the symmetry of the physical configuration
of the system.Microconstancy
through the
symmetry of the
physical
configuration
We can start to see this in the simple case study of the roulette wheel:
the microconstancy is given by the wheel’s symmetric paint scheme
and the rotational symmetry of the wheel’s dynamics. The latter, in
turn, is related with the circular shape of the wheel and with the
cycles it makes. In fact, Strevens himself suggested this:
"The physical details underlying these facts are unimportant in
themselves. In a wheel that comes slowly to a halt, for exam-
ple, the precise facts about the frictional forces that slow the
wheel do not matter. Only one fact about these forces matters,
the rather abstract fact of the rotational symmetry of their com-
bined effect." [Strevens, 2003, p. 62].
He adds that the same is true for the case of a tossed coin: here
only the symmetrical distribution of mass in the coin matters. As I
am arguing in the next paragraphs, it turns out that we can infer the
value of a probability "from few facts about physical symmetries, even if
one knows very little about physics" [ibidem].
The spatial symmetry is a feature that the setup of the roulette
wheel exhibits as well as some other closed systems in science (a gas
in a box, ecosystems, etc.). Perhaps also the whole universe in some
initial configuration. This last claim, considered also in p.138 (5.3), 5.5
and explored from a different approach in 3.3.2, is not strictly neces-
sary given the abstract analysis I carry out along this chapter, leaving
open the applicability to each particular system. However, as the the-
sis is, in all, about the metaphysics of fundamental laws, the applica-
bility of this theory in the cosmological domain is of interest. More
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exactly, its applicability would support a universal unified version of
laws. In that case, the allegedly universal non-accidental regularities
that the laws of physics state —the Schrödinger equation, the Einstein
Field Equations and so on, or better, the regularities that the true fi-
nal laws would describe— are a result of the process described here.
This would involve a fundamental level of either high complexity or
randomness. As such, regularities would not be the result of a "pre-
existing" governing set of rules.
Otherwise, the lack of application in a cosmological scale would be
more in tune with an antirealist account of laws, in the sense of some-
thing like oases of order emerging among the "chaos", a la Cartwright
[Cartwright, 1999]. I.e.: the convergence theorem applying not glob-
ally but only in a finite set of closed local setups that verify the proper
conditions; a sort of "nomological machines"26. More on this in the re-
ferred sections.
Coming back to what makes a dynamics microconstant, what is
needed is whatever guarantees the existence of relevant symmetries
in the operation of the mechanism, for example, "whatever entails that
a spinning coin takes about the same time for each half-revolution, or that
a spinning roulette wheel takes about the same time for each 1/36th of a
revolution" [Strevens, 1998, p. 19]. In the case of the wheel, the equal
constant ratio is a consequence of the fact that, at any point in any
spin, the wheel takes equal time to rotate through a red segment as it
does to rotate through a black segment. Further, another contribution
to the microconstancy of the evolution function in the wheel example
comes from the fact that the repetition of the whole pattern in the
evolution function occurs each time the wheel performs a whole cy-
cle. In this case, it has been thanks to the rotational symmetry of the
wheel that allowed the constant pattern.
In the case of the coin, the symmetry is due to the fact that the coin
has two equal sides. The time one side takes to flip has to be the
same time the other side takes. Crucially, there cannot be a preference
for any side. This observation links the role of the spatial symme-
tries with the dispensable role of the dynamics. There is no physical
difference between the sides of the coin and as such they cannot be
differentiated. There cannot be a preference for any side whatever the
laws are: it is not logically possible that any law whatsoever differen-
tiates one side from the other. Thus, necessarily, the symmetry will
hold in all the possible laws.
The same occurs when the spherical shape of the gas particles is in-
volved: the symmetry of the shape makes (metaphysically) impossi-
ble to have a dynamics that discriminates a certain side of the particle
having a different reaction to a collision.
26 The laws just mentioned (Schrödinger equation, EFE, etc.) could be cited here too,
as the antirealist does not consider them as universal.
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In sum, in the three cases there is a spatial symmetry responsible
of the microconstancy. Furthermore, the spatial symmetries involved
are features treated necessarily in the same way by any dynamics. For,
how could any law distinguish what is indistinguishable in virtue of
the spatial symmetry? A spatial symmetry is a mathematical property
of objects. Two paradigmatic cases are the homogeneity of the whole
space or a geometrical symmetry. The latter is an invariance under
a specified group of transformations, which can be rotations, reflec-
tions or translations, among others. What can happen is that a law
ignores the symmetry while other laws do not. This is, for the law it
just does not matter the symmetric features of certain objects because,
say, the law is about certain interactions in other ontological level. But
no law whatsoever can distinguish —in the sense of treat differently—
the invariant aspects that the symmetry is gathering. For instance, the
lack of a preferred region of a spherical shape. It just does not matter
how the law is because the properties referred as spatial symmetries
are independent of any dynamical consideration.
Two important remarks to avoid confusion. First, do not confuse theseClarifications
symmetries with the symmetries of laws. The latter are essentially re-
lated with the dynamics27. The former are by definition independent
of the time evolution of the system they belong to. Second, what of
course can happen is that the spatial symmetry is broken because
one dynamics dictated so (while not all). In this case, it cancels the
application of the method and therefore our desired results. But the
stability of the symmetries is just something that is postulated in the
premises of (S) and (A*); if the assumption does not hold then the
conclusion will obviously not follow. In other words, among all the
possible dynamics, those that break the symmetries just make the an-
tecedent of the conditional claims (S) and (A*) false, so both claims
are still true. This, still, allows me to remark an underlying moral
behind this chapter: the chapter talks of the propagation of the prop-
erty of stability in the world itself to the level of its own behavior; in
other terms, from the symmetries of things to the symmetries of laws.
This, if correct, is an example of what is called a ’symmetric argument’
(following the terminology of [Brading and Castellani, 2003]), not a
symmetric principle.
Finally, to complement this point, return to what (S) was stating:
(s): ’There are setups with certain spatial symmetries such that, if there
is sensitive dependence on probabilistic initial conditions, then the evolution
function is microconstant’
Notice that the account of microconstancy based on (S) does not ap-
peal to the details of the actual dynamics or to any specification of
the form of the dynamics in general; for instance, it does not appeal
27 1.5, chapter 2, and 3 have been studying this other type of symmetries.
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to how the collisions between entities have to be (something explic-
itly faced in 5.4) or, say, what rate of decrease some repulsive force
has to obey. Besides the sensitive dependence, the statement (S) itself
does not appeal to how the dynamics have to be. Therefore, I main-
tain that (S) holds not only in our world with our actual laws but in
any other metaphysically possible world28. A justification of micro-
constancy via (S) shows that the form of the dynamics is irrelevant,
thus justifying (A).
As to the symmetries, I have been focusing on spatial symmetries
for sake of exposition, but the analysis holds for any symmetry ex-
istent with respect to any basic property29. For instance, the difference
in the property of mass between two objects is prone to be treated
differently by the laws.
It is left open to each particular case which are the relevant symme-
tries; unfortunately, I do not think that a general account can be more
concrete about it. A case by case analysis should be made, in spite
of the attempt to provide the underlying reasons behind. Thus, the
extent of the claims is not the strongest, but it need not be so. It has
not been argued that wherever there is microconstancy there is some
symmetry underlying it. Nor that wherever there is a symmetry this
will yield microconstancy. But it need not be stronger inasmuch as
(A) is stated consequently as a weak claim (p. 92), sufficient to serve
as a premise for (C).
28 The quantification ’There are’ of (A) combined with the modal scope has to be under-
stood such that the same setups with same symmetries will display microconstancy
in every metaphysically possible world.
29 Thanks again to Michael Strevens for this important point.
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4.4 coincidence of a random trajectory with a chaotic
trajectory
After the defense of (A) in the previous section, this section argues
for (B), which was:
(b): ’If an event X holds for all chaotic dynamics, then X holds in most
of the cases with no dynamics at all’
In different terms we could also say: if all chaotic trajectories have
property X then a random trajectory will typically have X. The intu-
itive underlying idea for supporting (B) is the likely coincidence of
a generic random trajectory with a generic chaotic trajectory. But, is
this justified?
Prima facie seems plausible to believe that a random trajectory will
look like a chaotic trajectory —the latter, as said in 4.1, looks like ran-
dom. But the intuition is, of course, insufficient. Fortunately, the idea
that any truly random trajectory can typically be interchanged with
some chaotic trajectory can be discussed with precision.
The immediate objection with such an identification is that, even
if granting the random-looking character of all chaotic trajectories,
process-randomness is not always random-looking, and it is in this
’process’ sense that we are interested at30. As said before, it is per-
fectly possible that a coin launched a million of times lands heads
all the times. This is stressed with insistence in Antony Eagle’s entry
[Eagle, 2012]. So what can be said? Let me start gradually by an out-
line of how to understand the two notions, chaos and randomness,
to get a grip of the similarities, thus defending the existence of rele-
vant shared properties. More specifically, that a sequence generated
randomly shares some pertinent properties, most of the times, with a
sequence generated by a chaotic dynamics.
I sketched at the beginning of the chapter (p. 90) the characteristics
that define chaos, suggesting its resemblance with the notion of ran-
domness. First of all there was sensitive dependence on initial con-
ditions. This is something that a random trajectory would intuitively
share: a random dynamics would display, very probably, an exponen-
tial divergence for close initial conditions (indeed, it would even show
divergence for the same initial conditions). Even if one can be reluc-
tant to appeal to probabilistic reasonings in such scenarios, the very
high number of possible paths to take in the next state by a random
dynamics would provide the reason for believing in an exponential
divergence for small variations of initial conditions. Because there is
30 See the annex A (esp. A.3) for definitions of the terms employed. In a nutshell:
’process-randomness’ means that the trajectory is generated randomly, by a "ran-
dom process"; not that the resulting sequence looks actually random (this is the
"product sense"). In (B), the sense has to be the process sense, both when talking of
"no dynamics" (i.e. process-randomness) as when talking of "chaotic dynamics".
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just no reason at all to follow the same path.
Then I mentioned aperiodic long-term behavior [Strogatz, 1994, 323].
That trajectories do not settle down to fixed points, periodic orbits,
or quasiperiodic orbits as t → ∞ seems obviously also a feature of a
truly random trajectory. A product-random trajectory verifies this by
definition; however, as I explain in annex A, we have to consider a
process-random trajectory. And a trajectory fruit of a random genera-
tion does not necessarily verifies aperiodic long-term behavior. How-
ever, as before, it is possible but clearly unlikely that, as t → ∞ , a
fixed point or a periodic orbit will be maintained by a random pro-
cess31.
A more precise argument can be made when chaos is defined in terms
of mixing [Werndl, 2009a], not in the topological sense but in the
measure-theoretic one. This is presented in next subsection. After this,
another argument from a more generic point of view is presented in
4.4.2. So let’s see now how chaos fits in a hierarchy in which random-
ness is also present.
4.4.1 ’Randomness’ and ’chaos’ within the ergodic hierarchy
There is a straightforward way to show the relevant shared features
of chaos and process-randomness when we take into account the er-
godic hierarchy as a reference. This hierarchy consists of the follow-
ing classification of dynamical properties (cf. annex A.4.2):
Bernoulli ⊂ Kolmogorov ⊂ Strong Mixing ⊂Weak Mixing ⊂ Ergodic
Now consider the following two accounts of chaos and randomness.
First, following [Werndl, 2009a], define chaos in terms of strong mix-
ing32. Second, identify, as I argue in annex A following [Berkovitz
et al., 2006] and [Eagle, 2005], process-randomness as unpredictabil-
ity, whose degree is quantified by the ergodic hierarchy. Randomness
in its highest degree is then associated with the Bernoulli level33.
It follows that the highest degree of randomness, the Bernoulli level,
includes the properties of mixing; hence, it includes the properties
of a chaotic system. Therefore, if we get some results in virtue of
the properties of chaotic systems, we can get the same results with a
truly random system, which will also possess those properties. Thus:
31 In next subsection 4.4.2 I make a precise elaboration of this type of argument. Now
we are still at the beginning of the gradual presentation.
32 I have been oversimplifying for sake of clarity but let me be more detailed here.
Regarding characterizations of chaos within the ergodic hierarchy, others proposed
[Belot and Earman, 1997], before Werndl, that strong mixing was only a necessary
condition for a system to be chaotic; a sufficient condition was to be in the higher
level of Kolmogorov (also called a ’K-system’). Regardless of this discussion, my
results hold.
33 It remains open whether I could relax the demands and have a weaker definition of
randomness still appropriate.
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if an event X holds for all chaotic systems, then it holds for a random
system. Therefore, (B) is true.
4.4.2 Coincidence of trajectories
Let me insist on the validity of (B) from a more general perspective
that does not appeal to the ergodic hierarchy. Even so, I do not think
that the argument of previous section rests on controversial premises.
The argument applies whether one identifies chaos with strong mix-
ing or with a K-system. Likewise, the current best account of ran-
domness is in terms of the ergodic hierarchy, as I elaborated indepen-
dently in annex ch. A.
Now I want to show that a trajectory in phase space generated
by a random dynamics (which is to say: it has not been generated
by any dynamics) will typically coincide with a trajectory generated
by a chaotic dynamics. If that were the case, (B) would be true. As
pointed out before, a random trajectory —in the process sense— can
perfectly be a trajectory that does not possess any of the properties
of chaos. Therefore, at most I will be able to defend the coincidence
of a random trajectory with a chaotic one in most cases. I will argue
that the rest of cases are neglectable. There are mathematical tools,
namely ’measure theory’, to verify this. Thus, in my defense of (B) I
must justify that the measure of chaotic trajectories is much bigger
than the measure of non-chaotic ones. Or else, justify the (less de-
manding) claim that the measure of the intersection of chaotic and
random trajectories is much bigger than the measure of the intersec-
tion of non-chaotic and random.
I put the argument more explicitly. Consider a class T of all the kine-
matically possible trajectories in phase space. T is a subclass of the
whole space of metaphysical possibilities, delimited by prior ontolog-
ical assumptions. For the set of metaphysical possibilities is plausiblyKinematical
possibility too wide: metaphysical possibility can arguably tolerate, for instance,
that any function from points in space to points in space qualifies as
a possible trajectory. And this includes, for instance, objects jumping
all over the place with no continuity to their motion, something per-
haps "too wild" to be willing to admit. So the class T includes some
assumptions aimed to exclude certain behaviors, conceptual possibil-
ities not ruled out by logic. Now, what are these prior ontological
assumptions? This is hard to say, and I am deliberately not commit-
ting to a definite answer. Even so, I mentioned already the assump-
tion of continuity (as the continuity equations that pervade physics)
and a principle of conservation of energy34. Yet things become more
34 Admittedly, these assumptions are disputable too. It is just in this dissertation that
I am entertaining a concept of law of nature that might have evolved through time.
Thus, this approach seems, at least prima facie, at odds with the time translation
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concrete when looking at how physical theories treat the kinemati-
cally possible, as I am going to show now. But even so, 1) there are
plenty of different physical theories (CM, GR, QM, ...), and 2) it is not
straightforward to know what is the space of kinematical models for
a given physical theory.
Consider by way of illustration the Newtonian theory, with a model
of gravitating point particles with distinct masses, as in [Belot, 2011,
7]. A point in the space of kinematically possible models of the the-
ory assigns to each of the particles a worldline in spacetime, without
worrying about whether the worldlines of each particle jointly satisfy
the Newtonian laws of motion.
There is also a subset of the kinematically possible models, the so
called set of dynamically possible models. This is a space of solutions
which is a 6N-dimensional submanifold whose points correspond to
particle motions obeying Newton’s laws. Here such submanifold will
be ignored for it constrains too much, to a single set of laws, the ac-
tual ones.
This is precisely formulated e.g. in [Pooley, 2013, 12, italics added]:
In a coordinate-dependent formulation of Newtonian theory
like that so far considered, the KPMs [kinematically possible
models] might be sets of inextendible smooth curves in R4 which
are nowhere tangent to surfaces of constant t (where (t,~x) ∈
R4). The models assign to the curves various parameters (m,
...). Under the intended interpretation, the curves represent pos-
sible trajectories of material particles, described with respect to
a canonical coordinate system, and the parameters represent
various dynamically relevant particle properties, such as mass.
The space of DPMs [dynamically possible models] consists of
those sets of curves that satisfy the standard form of Newton’s
equations.
The picture can be completed with the corresponding formula-
tion in the lagrangian formalism, as in [Pooley, 2013, 40]. Here, the
kinematically possible models are monotonically rising curves in the
product space formed from the configuration space (whose points
represent possible instantaneous states of the system), and a one-
dimensional space representing time. Then, the dynamically possible
models are those curves that extremize a particular functional of such
histories: the action.
Still restricted to classical mechanics, a brief guide to realize what
can be said about the most fundamental structural assumptions can
be found e.g. in: "The structure of physics" [North, 2009], "On the Nec-
essary Truth of the Laws of Classical Mechanics" [Darrigol, 2007], or
symmetry entailed by the conservation of energy. This tension shows how an explicit
commitment to more assumptions leads one into shaky territory. It is not necessary
to commit to a defined answer —at the obvious prize of leaving more abstract and
unsettled the subject.
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"Symmetries and the Explanation of Conservation Laws in the Light
of the Inverse Problem in Lagrangian Mechanics" [Smith, 2008].
Now, let’s continue with the argument. Among this space T of all
the kinematically possible trajectories, consider the following. Call C
the set of those trajectories that display the property of chaos. Define
a generic random trajectory a such that a ∈ T . There are two ways to
continue from here. One is to continue without further assumptions.
That is, a random trajectory is any generic trajectory belonging to T.
In this stronger case, to justify (B) I must defend that the (standard
Lebesgue) measure of C, the complementary set of C, is much smaller
than the measure of C, i.e. µ(C) << µ(C). Or alternatively, that its
measure is 0, i.e.: µ(C) = 0. If true, it follows that in most of the cases
a random trajectory will coincide with a chaotic trajectory. We can
write this formally as something like:
µ(C) = 0 =⇒ P(Ca) ∼ 1
However, I do not know if this is the case and, to the best of my
knowledge, there is not literature proving this. So the second way to
go is by constraining the set to which a belongs in virtue of having,
by definition, the properties of being process-random, thus belonging
to a set R ⊂ T , the set of random trajectories. Then, what has to be
proved is that µ(C ∩ R) << µ(C ∩ R) or that: µ(C ∩ R) = 0. As be-
fore, this would entail that P(Ca) ∼ 1. And the latter can be seen as a
schematic way of phrasing (B).
So, how to defend the neglectability of the size of {C∩ R} ?
[Frigg, 2004] shows that the proportion of cases in which process
randomness does not display a product random sequence is small
enough to be neglected. I quote him: "whenever a dynamical system be-
haves randomly in a process sense [...], almost all of its trajectories exhibit
product randomness (in the sense of algorithmic complexity), and vice versa"
[p.21]. In short, he says: "product and process randomness are extension-
ally equivalent" 35.
Then, this allows to follow the strategy of identifying product-
randomness in chaotic models and then substitute the product sense
by the process sense. More formally, the argument can be stated like
that. Being (R*) the set of product-random trajectories,
35 A synthesis of the elements grounding his claim is the following: "Brudno’s theo-
rem states that the Kolmogorov-Sinai Entropy is equivalent to the Algorithmic Complexity
for almost all trajectories of a system. The above theorem states that the communication-
theoretic entropy is equivalent to the Kolmogorov-Sinai Entropy. Hence, Algorithmic Com-
plexity is equivalent to the communication-theoretic entropy for almost all trajectories. The
punch line of this is that the last equivalence equates notions of process and product random-
ness"[ibidem].
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1. µ(R∩ R∗) = 1
2. µ(R∗ ∩C) = 1
3. µ(R∩C) = 1
Premise ’1’ is what I stated above appealing to [Frigg, 2004]. Then,
that a chaotic model typically generates a random-looking sequence
—understood in the product sense— is what premise 2 says, and is an
uncontroversial statement. At the beginning of this section I pointed
out the similarities in the definitions of chaos and randomness in the
process sense. In the product sense it is even less remarkable as it is
in the very definition of chaos [Bishop, 2008, Sec. 1] that is contem-
plated, among other properties, the exhibition of "seemingly random
and unpredictable behavior that nevertheless follows precise rules". Again:
"Phenomenologically, the kinds of chaotic behavior we see in real-world sys-
tems exhibit features such as SDIC, aperiodicity, unpredictability, instabil-
ity under small perturbations and apparent randomness" [Bishop, 2008,
sec. 1.2.7], where ’apparent randomness’ is clearly meaning product-
randomness.
Therefore, accepting the two premises, ’3’ follows. And given that:
µ(R ∩C) = 1 iff µ(R ∩C) = 0, this conclusion is equivalent to what
I wanted to prove, i.e. that the size of R ∩C is neglectable. Therefore
P(Ca) ∼ 1. Therefore (B) is true.
4.4.2.1 Recapitulation
Now I would like to schematize all the results of the chapter in the
terms of the logical structure used in this section. Claim (A) was stat-
ing that for all the members of C high-level patterns arise (call this the
property ’L’). This is the first premise. The conclusion of the chapter
was that systems whose dynamics is random can exhibit in certain
circumstances stable regularities. Or as I put it before: (C): ’There are
systems in certain conditions that exhibit stable simple regularities
without being guided by any dynamics’. Summarizing the premises
and the conclusion together we can write that, for a system exhibiting
certain spatial symmetries:36
(A) : ∀x(Cx→ Lx)
(B) : P(Ca) ∼ 1
(C) : P(La) ∼ 1
36 This nice very highly condensed summary is a valid argument if and only if rules
like the following hold:
∀xα⇒ P(α(xa)) ∼ 1 ; and
(P(α→ β) ∼ 1)∧ (P(α) ∼ 1)⇒ P(β) ∼ 1
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Abstract
This chapter studies the same subject of the previous from a different point
of view. The subject, the irrelevance of the form of the dynamics for the rise
of a specific stable behavior, is now studied in the field of statistical
mechanics. Specifically, through an approach called ’typicality’. This
approach argues that the tendency to the equilibrium macrostate occurs for
initial conditions that are typical, where ’typical’ is spelled out in
measure-theoretical terms. This chapter reconstructs the arguments
underpinning this approach and the objections that stress that the
independence from the underlying dynamics cannot be correct. A way to
avoid the objections is to reformulate the approach such that the typicality
has to be not only of the initial conditions, but also of the dynamics. That
is, the tendency to equilibrium occurs for all dynamics that are typical,
which roughly means that it occurs for the overwhelming majority of them.
After defending that this approach represents a case in support of the
emergence of lawful behavior, I claim that, unfortunately, the extent to
which the typicality of dynamics has been proven is too narrow for this
purpose. Finally, nuancing this negative conclusion, I end the chapter by
showing supportive results from numerical simulations that I have
programmed in MATLAB. Specifically, the simulations aim to show that
the tendency to equilibrium, in the hard-sphere model of classical
statistical mechanics, holds for a wide set of possible dynamics.
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5.1 introduction
This last chapter 5 tackles the same subject of chapter 4 from a
similar point of view. Specifically, it aims to explain the occurrence
of a certain stable behavior, namely the tendency to the equilibrium
macrostate in classical statistical mechanics, without needing in the ex-
planation any detail about the particular form of the underlying dynamics.
In the literature on the foundations of statistical mechanics there is a
recent account that arguably does so, the approach called ’typicality’.
This approach is a contemporary sophisticated version of the boltz-
mannian approach, which I will outline below. It is originated in the
work of [Lebowitz, 1993a] and [Lebowitz, 1993b]. Roughly, it states
that as long as the initial conditions of the system are typical —where
the meaning of ’typical’ is cashed out with precision in measure-
theoretical terms—, then the system will exhibit thermodynamic-like
behavior —that is, a tendency to the equilibrium macrostate, a non-
decrease of entropy.
I shall follow [Goldstein, 2001] and [Frigg, 2009] and explain how
they argue that typicality makes no reference to the dynamics —in
an analogous way as to how, in chapter 4, the method of arbitrary
functions did not mention how the dynamics had to be, besides be-
ing chaotic1. If the details of the dynamics are irrelevant, this opens
the door to consider that the conclusion —i.e. the tendency to equilib-
rium in the coarse-grained level— obtains for almost any dynamics;
therefore probably also for a random dynamics. The heedful reader
will have realized that the logical form of the argument is the same
as that of the previous chapter (compare with 4.1.3 and 4.4.2.1).
I shall assess to what extent the claims of the typicality approach are
proven, and whether in the end the results can be useful for a meta-
physics of laws. While the goal is to assert that they can be useful,
this claim will be strongly nuanced.
The section 5.4 aims to support the claims of the independence of
the dynamics with computer simulations that I have programmed.
Specifically, the simulations show that the tendency to equilibrium,
in the hard-sphere model of classical statistical mechanics, holds for
a wide range of different possible dynamics —arguably, almost any
dynamics in which energy and linear momentum are conserved. The
simulations model a group of hard spherical particles that move ac-
cording to a certain set of laws in a container. I have programmed the
simulation in a way that is easy to change the laws that rule their be-
havior. Thus, for each different set of laws it can be verified whether
the tendency to equilibrium obtains. The results are shown in 5.4, and
the algorithm is included in the annex C. A brief animated illustra-
tion of the simulations can be found online in the links:
1 I must thank Tim Maudlin for orienting me towards the idea of the typicality of
dynamics, so I got confident that the project was worthwhile.
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https://vimeo.com/90044328
https://vimeo.com/90863487
The global conclusions of the whole thesis are found in the last sec-
tion 5.5.
This chapter is obviously in line with the previous chapters. Chap-
ter 3 was concerned with the formation of symmetries employing
reasonings that resemble informal accounts of typicality: the results
allegedly held for all complex lagrangians. Chapter 4 was arguing for
the irrelevance of the details of the dynamics in the method of arbi-
trary functions, to conclude that its results would hold independently
of the underlying dynamics.
Similarly, this chapter is a discussion of some mathematical proper-
ties that can be interpreted to be sufficient conditions for the physical
world to exhibit certain regular behavior. Subsequently, the chapter
defends the import of these insights in a possible understanding of
the notion of physical necessity.
[Strevens, 2003, 4.8] and [Strevens, 2013, esp. ch. 2 and 9] analyze
the case of statistical mechanics from his specific perspective (based
on the method of arbitrary functions). I am going to pursue an alterna-
tive similar approach, that of typicality. It remains a future interesting
question to what extent these two perspectives overlap.
5.1.1 Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics
The point of departure is Ludwig Boltzmann’s project of understand-
ing the macroscopic properties and laws of thermodynamics in terms
of their microconstituents and their laws. This is, in brief, the main
mission of kinetic theory and statistical mechanics. The latter can be
said to be the continuation of the former, after the introduction of ir-
reducible probabilistic distributions not to the microconstituents but
to the states of macroscopic entities —to the state of the whole gas—
[Uffink, 2006, 9]. After Boltzmann, plenty of different paths have been
pursued in order to obtain a reductive explanation of the laws of ther-
modynamics. Nowadays, the recent approach called ’typicality’ is a
sophisticated version of Boltzmann’s insights. More precisely, Boltz-
mann along his life endorsed different views [Uffink, 2014]; typicality
resembles his most famous contribution, the permutational argument
—what corresponds to his first and second period, following [Uffink,
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2014, 1.4]2.
In the classical case study of an ideal gas in an isolated container,
the macrostate towards which all systems tend is the macrostate in
which the gas has spread out all over the box filling its volume, the
’equilibrium macrostate’. Boltzmann showed, recurring to combina-
toric mathematics, that the equilibrium macrostate is compatible with an
overwhelmingly higher number of microstates. An idiosyncratic presenta-
tion of this key fact of statistical mechanics can be found in [Albert,
2000, ch.3], where the figure 13 comes from. Now let me formulate
more concisely Boltzmann’s conclusion, following [Frigg, 2008].
Consider a gas composed of n particles with two degrees of freedom
each (usually three, but I adapt it to my 2-dimensional simulation).
The state of this system is specified in a 4n-dimensional phase space
Γ by a point x. This point is the microstate, with the information of
position q and momentum p of every particle:
x = (px1,py1,px2,py2, ...pxn,pyn,qx1,qy1,qx2,qy2...qxn,qyn)
The phase space comes endowed with the standard Lebesgue mea-
sure µ. The particles obey the laws of classical hamiltonian mechanics;
they define a phase flow φt that is measure preserving, which means
that for all regions R ⊆ Γ ,µ(R) = µ(φt(R)) (this result is known as
Liouville’s theorem). The system is perfectly isolated from the envi-
ronment, therefore the energy is conserved. This restricts the motion
of the microstate x over a region of Γ that is the energy hypersurface
ΓE, of 4n-1 dimensions. The Lebesgue measure µ restricted to ΓE, µE,
is also invariant.
From the macro point of view, the gas is characterised by its macrostates,
where the equilibrium macrostate is labeled as Meq. ΓMeq is the
corresponding macroregion in phase space which contains all the
x ∈ ΓE for which the system is in Meq. Macrostates supervene on mi-
crostates; a macrostate is compatible with many different microstates.
Now, the main conclusion of Boltzmann’s combinatorial argument
is that the measure of ΓMeq with respect to µE is overwhelmingly
larger than any other macroregion. For the details of the proof, see
e.g. [Uffink, 2006, 4.4], or the primary source [Boltzmann, 1877]. In
fact, this region occupies almost all the energy hypersurface, as the
figure 13 conveys.
Given this radical difference in the sizes of the different macro-
regions, it was intuitive to think that the non-decrease of entropy
2 Extended presentations of Boltzmann’s thermodynamical theory abound. Specific
of Boltzmann, see the entry [Uffink, 2014]; a canonical treatment is [Sklar, 1993, II.3]
as well as [Uffink, 2006, ch.4]. As to general works on the foundations of statistical
mechanics, in addition to those just cited, very clear and concise are [Frigg] and,
more extended, [Frigg, 2008]. Cf. also the idiosyncratic [Albert, 2000], and [Sklar,
2009], [North, 2011], [North, 2002], [Lebowitz, 2008], [Atkins, 2007], and [Zanghì,
2005, ch.2]. Further, David Wallace has prepared a lengthy bibliography on the foun-
dations of statistical mechanics that can be found in his webpage. For a less academic
and more poetic introductory work, see [Schneider and Sagan, 2005].
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Figure 13: An illustration of an energy hypersurface, displaying the predom-
inant size of ΓMeq, the region of all the microstates correspondent
to the equilibrium macrostate. From [Albert, 2000]
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stated by the 2nd law and, more in general, the tendency to equilib-
rium stated in the ’minus first law’ [Brown and Uffink, 2001], will be
overwhelmingly more likely to occur. These insights would preserve
the time-symmetric newtonian picture of the world while explaining
the time-asymmetric behavior stated by the 2nd law. Further, the 2nd
law and the tendency to equilibrium in general would not be strict
laws but approximate, holding only because of the overwhelming
likeliness of such behavior. Hence, there seemed to be no real conflict
between reversible microscopic laws and irreversible macroscopic be-
havior.
The success of his project, however, was undermined from many
grounds. In general, an innumerable quantity of obstacles and rid-
dles have been showing up ever since: the reversibility objection, the
recurrence objection, the implausibility of the independence assump-
tions, the unsettled intepretation of the various probabilities, the sta-
tus of the past hypothesis, the validity of the results outside the sim-
plified models studied3, the ensemble approach versus the standard,
the plausibility of the ergodic hypothesis, etc.
This brief fragment of the beginnings of kinetic theory/statistical
mechanics represents the seed of an abundant ulterior research. It is
widely recognized that it is difficult to recognize the forest for the
trees among the vast extant literature; to this end see the references
recommended in footnote 2.
It is not a goal of the chapter to elaborate more thoroughly the
compelling riddles around the foundations of statistical mechanics;
from next section onwards I shall focus on the particular elaboration
of Boltzmann’s combinatoric argument in the typicality approach. In
so doing, I will come back to the leitmotif of this dissertation, the
irrelevant role of the underlying dynamics in the explanation of stable
behavior; in this case, thermodynamic-like behavior.
5.1.2 On the treatment of the actual newtonian dynamics in statistical
mechanics
assumptions of the model Several assumptions are made in
kinetic theory / statistical mechanics, varying depending on the philo-
sophical approach and the system under study. I will reproduce the
model of hard-spheres, which models molecules of a gas closed in a
perfectly isolated container. The gas is either ideal or a diluted gas,
neglecting long-range forces, with a fixed kinetic energy T = p
2
2m .
To study thermodynamic-like behavior, it is usually assumed that the
initial conditions are in a state of low entropy: in the numerical sim-
3 In principle, statistical physics is more generic than just studying the behavior of
gases in a laboratory; the study of macroscopic properties in terms of their micro-
constituents is something that can be studied also of galaxies, where the stars are the
microscopic constituents [Uffink, 2006, p.4]. But not everybody agrees on that; more
on this in 5.3 p.138.
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ulations at the end of the chapter, I place all the molecules in the
"famous" left down corner of the container.
The molecules of the gas, then, are the micro-constituents, and they
are modeled not as point-particles but as hard spheres, so they have
a certain small radius. In my computer simulation the scenario is in 2
dimensions, so the spheres are actually circles. The gas molecules in-
teract like billiard balls, so they have no effect on one another except
when they collide. ’Hard’ entails that the collisions are elastic (i.e. no
kinetic energy is transformed in other forms, for instance is not lost
in the form of heat). It is also assumed a large number of microscopic
constituents, typically of the order of Avogadro’s numberN = 1023 or
more. Due to technological limitations —the limited performance of
my computer— I have modeled a much smaller number of particles;
even so, the expected results obtain.
Regarding the laws, the deterministic laws of classical mechanics are
assumed.
As it belongs to classical mechanics, the model ignores the allegedly
negligible corrections of relativity theory as well as quantum mechan-
ical effects4.
an erratic wandering dynamics There is a further assump-
tion that I especially want to highlight. It is again about the presence
of randomness in physical models, and it is manifested in assump-
tions of most of the approaches of statistical mechanics. Remember
how I raised this point in 1.3 p. 11, where I put forward the on-
tological commitment to the randomness implicit in indeterministic
laws, as well as in the ’spontaneous’ processess found in contemporary
physics (spontaneous symmetry breaking, spontaneous fluctuations,
...).
Here, in statistical mechanics, in spite of the guiding laws being clas-
sical deterministic newtonian laws, there is, also, "an assumption about
the erratic nature of the dynamics" [Uffink, 2006, 5].
Quoting what [Sklar, 1993] states, one of the chief assumptions of the The requirement of
randomness or
independence...
Maxwell–Boltzmann program, and it is an assumption that runs right
through to the ergodic theory of modern physics, is that at some level
of description a condition of independence must be met "for the theory
to properly explain why the correct values of state parameters of gas systems
can be obtained from taking the average values of mechanical properties of
the individual particles of the system".
There have been various strategies for underpinning this requirement
of independence: the assumption of equal initial probabilities, the
ergodic hypothesis, the ’rerandomization posit’, also known as the
Stoßzahlansatz in the initial theory of Maxwell (i.e. the assumption
that there are no correlations in the collisions of molecules of dif-
4 Yet, for arguments against the irrelevance of quantum mechanics, see [Albert, 1994]
or [Wallace, 2001].
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ferent velocities), or the hypothesis of molecular chaos, also known
as ’stochastic postulate’. Each of these introduces a condition of ran-
domness or independence at subtly different locations in either the gas
model employed or in the method of calculation of the state proper-
ties of the gas (e.g. temperature, pressure, or entropy).
How can the posits about the erratic wandering nature of the dynam-
ics coexist with the deterministic guiding laws? [Sklar, 1993, p.215]
says "that further justification is needed is clear for, as usual, it is a deep
question remaining open as to whether any rerandomizing assumption is
even consistent with the underlying deterministic evolution of the phase
points".
...achieved through
chaos, All these sort of requirements, I would like to suggest, can be natu-
rally justified by appealing to the well-known compatibility between
determinism and chaos, and then realizing the relation between chaos
and randomness —that is, what I have argued in the previous chapter
in 4.4 (and A.4).
To see this, let’s start by reading how Lebowitz talks about this es-
sential assumption of statistical mechanics: “interactions in the domain
ΓMab will be so convoluted as to appear uniformly smeared out in
ΓMb . It is therefore reasonable that the future behavior of the system, as far
as macrostates go, will be unaffected by their past history” [Lebowitz,
1999, (bold is mine)] 5.
This is an assumption about the independence of one state with its
past states. In sections 4.4 and A.4.2 I showed the proposal based on
the Ergodic Hierarchy according to which randomness is defined in
terms of the lack of correlations of one state with its past states. These in-
dependence/randomness requirements can be obtained through the
chaotic properties of the deterministic newtonian mechanics, which
wash out the correlations with past states, yielding the needed random-
looking, erratic nature —see 4.4 for more details.
For sake of illustration, in the particular case of the hard-sphere model
I came to know the reasons of the high sensitivity to initial conditions
of classical deterministic mechanics when reading [Strevens, 2003,
4.8]: in such model, the outcome direction after the collision of one
sphere with the convex spherical surface of another sphere is highly
sensitive, as seen in figure 14....or achieved
through genuine
randomness
That being said, the justification of the randomness and indepen-
dence premises can be also undertaken from another interesting path.
Namely, rather than by appealing to the chaotic properties of the de-
terministic dynamics —as just defended—, by entertaining the sce-
nario of a genuine random dynamics.
A substitution of the chaotic laws by a genuinely random dynamics
5 Here, M refers to the system’s macrostate, Γ the phase space, ΓM the phase space
region corresponding to M, Ma the system’s initial macrostate, Mb its later macro-
state. ΓMab is the region of ΓMb that came via ΓMa (the set of microstates within
ΓMb that are on trajectories that come from ΓMa ).
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Figure 14: The collision of two classical circular particles is highly sensitive
to initial conditions, as seen in this figure. From [Strevens, 2003]
would immediately justify the diverse randomness and independence
requirements. Remember that Lebowitz’s quote above was stating the
requirements in the same terms as how randomness was character-
ized in [Frigg et al., 2011] (and [Berkovitz et al., 2006]), as explained
in ch. 4 and A. Thus, the rerandomization posit, the independence as-
sumption(s), and any other surrogates would be met by a genuinely
random dynamics —in the long run, almost always.
After these reflections about statistical mechanics in general, let’s
analyze the specific variation of the boltzmannian approach called
typicality.
5.2 typicality of initial conditions
The leading idea of the typicality approach is that a system exhibits
entropic behavior because it is typical for the system to behave in this
way. ’Typical’ is defined as a property assigned to a behavior of a sys-
tem: intuitively, a behavior is typical if it is displayed by the evolution
of most of the possible initial states of the system. A precise meaning for
’most’ is achieved through measure theory, as I spell out later. Thus,
in contrast to Boltzmann’s approach, typicality-based explanations es-
chew commitment to probabilities.
In [Maudlin, 2011] diverse examples illustrate the general idea: the Galton board
exampletoss of a coin, of a die, or the case of a Galton board (also known as
’quincunx’; a board with pins through which balls fall down from a
hopper to a set of baskets). As we already know, the galton board dis-
plays, in the long run, a normal distribution centered in the middle
basket. How to understand the nature of this probability distribution,
that we take to be neither subjective nor epistemic? The limiting fre-
quency in the middle basket can be explained in terms of typicality,
that is: because most of all the possible initial distributions end in
that result. In other words, the typical behavior for a ball falling in
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the Galton board is to fall in the center. Why this already known fact
is actually the case can be understood focusing on the typical behav-
ior in the deflection of a ball hitting a pin. The typical behavior of a
ball hitting a pin is that it gets deflected to one of the sides half of the
times (without needing to know why this is so, we can venture that it
is due to the symmetry of the pins and the chaotic actual dynamics).
This explains the previously stated typical behavior of falling in the
center; it explains so through the law of large numbers (defined in
A.3.1): if the typical behavior is to get deflected half of the times to
the left and half to the right, in the long run (i.e. when the balls will
hit a high number of pins), it is expected that the number of turns to
the left and to the right will be approximately the same, yielding the
ball to land approximately in the center.
’Typical’, then, is understood as follows:
"when some specified dynamical behavior (like passing a single
pin to the right, or passing successive pins first to the right and
then to the left) has the same limiting frequency in a set of initial
states that has measure one, that frequency for the dynamical
behavior is typical". [Maudlin, 2011]
In this quote measure theory is introduced, and there is no appeal
to probabilities or likeliness. If the set of states that leads to some
outcome has measure one, then it can be defined as typical (the mea-
sure is calculated with a flat Lebesgue measures over the appropriate
interval).
According to this approach, a certain probability distribution of the
outcomes is guaranteed, irrespective of how the assignation of a dis-
tribution over the initial conditions is made6.
Similarly we can treat the case of a coin toss. The fair coins haveOther examples
as typical a frequency of 50% of landing heads, because most of the
sequences of fair coin tosses, whatever the initial state, lead to that
result in the long run.
In the case of a gas condensed in a corner of a box, the gas will fill
the box because this is the typical behavior, that is, because most of
the initial states lead to that result.
After these examples, let’s formulate typicality with more general-
ity, to come back later to the gas in a box. Following [Frigg, 2009], anDefinition of
typicality element e of a set Σ is typical if most members of Σ have property P
and e is one of them.
In the case of statistical mechanics, the element corresponds to a
micro-state x, the measure employed is the Lebesgue measure µ7, the
set Σ amounts to the set of all microstates, and the property P is the
6 Notice the high similarity with what has been defended in the previous chapter.
7 The standard Lebesgue measure over volumes is the usual tool employed, but the
choice of the type of measure is not uncontroversial; see e.g. [Sklar, 2009, sec. 4].
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property of being such as to evolve to equilibrium.
Notably, it turns out that one gets a set of frequencies that are typi-
cal as an analytical consequence of the deterministic dynamics together
with a measure over initial states. And, "what we in fact believe as a
purely mathematical fact is that the set of initial states with 50% limiting
frequency for deflections to either side is a set of measure one" [Maudlin,
2011, 286].
Now, let’s deepen more in the role that the dynamics play in this
approach.
5.3 typicality of dynamics
characterizations of typicality [Frigg, 2009] spells out a
distinction between three different characterizations of typicality in
the literature. In the end, he concludes that only the one who takes
into account the dynamics is really promising. Frigg criticizes this
first statement of typicality from [Zanghì, 2005]:
"reaching the equilibrium distribution in the course of the tem-
poral evolution of a system is inevitable due to the fact that the
overwhelming majority of microstates in the phase space have
this distribution".
It seems that no appeal to the dynamics has to be made in order
to explain the tendency to equilibrium, and this is taken to be an ob-
jection. It is comprehensible that it raises suspicions, especially after
reviewing the history of the foundations of statistical mechanics and
realizing that one or another dynamical assumption was always in-
troduced.
Always, except in the case of Boltzmann’s combinatorial argument
[Uffink, 2006, 4.4.2]. There it was irrelevant to the argument how the The role of the
dynamics in
Botzmann
particles collide. Following [Uffink, 2006, 57], if this irrelevance were
correct, Boltzmann’s argument would be general enough as to be ap-
plicable not only to ideal gases, but also to dense gases and even to
solids, as Boltzmann indeed suggested [Boltzmann, 1909, 223].
However, there were non trivial assumptions in Boltzmann’s argu-
ment. [Uffink, 2006, 58] cites (among other objections not related with
the dynamics) the assumption that the total energy can be expressed
in the form E =
∑
nii, where the energy i of each of the ni par-
ticles i depends only on the cell in which it is located, and not on
the state of other particles. This can only be maintained if there is
no interaction at all between the particles, so the argument remained
restricted to ideal gases.
Later on, ulterior approaches invoked all sort of dynamical assump-
tions; for instance, mixing, or ergodicity8.
8 Mixing and ergodicity are two properties defined in ergodic theory, the former being
stronger than the latter: intuitively, they are properties that hold in certain stages of
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Coming back to the typicality approach, is it able to really dispense
with dynamical assumptions? If this were so, it would be a success
for our aims, for stable behavior would be obtained independently of
how the dynamics is described; therefore, it would be obtained for
all dynamics; therefore, both the tendency to equilibrium as well as
the stability of the equilibrium macrostate itself could be explained
without a specific set of pre-existent fundamental laws.
A mathematical necessity or, better said, a statistical necessity, would
ground the stable behavior achieved in the equilibrium macrostate.
In other words: without mentioning the hamiltonian of the system,Physical necessity as
statistical necessity a statistical necessity would entail at least some physically necessary
behavior.
The success of this project is critically assessed in this chapter. I am
going to lay out the attempts that dispense with the dynamics, but
also underline that they have been proved for a too narrow domain.
Those attempts, as advanced before, are those that weaken the typical-
ity approach by explicitly introducing a typicality of dynamics. Then,
the numerical simulations of the final section aim to reinforce the
plausibility of a positive answer. Finally, 5.5 reflects upon the philo-
sophical significance of the results of this chapter and of the whole
dissertation.
Let’s reconstruct the dialectics following [Frigg, 2009]. Regarding
the statement above from [Zanghì, 2005], which was roughly charac-
terizing the typicality approach, Frigg remarks the objection that typi-
cal states do not automatically attract trajectories [Frigg, 2009, 5]. He says
so in the sense that the approach to equilibrium will not occur only
because the corresponding microstates are more numerous. Hence,
this first characterization is insufficient.
There is a second way of characterizing the typicality approach. Leav-
ing aside the details, the argument states that the microstates leading
to a decrease in entropy will tend to zero (will be atypical) as the
number of particles in the system increases (in [Frigg, 2009, 6], who
quotes [Goldstein and Lebowitz, 2004, 57]). Frigg argues that this for-
mulation is justified essentially by the fact that the macro-region of
equilibrium is overwhelmingly larger than the other macrostates (for
further details see [Frigg, 2009, 8]).
This justification, though, is unsatisfactory too. The disparity of sizes
of macroregions does not imply, alone, that an entropy decrease will
be atypical. It could be perfectly the case that a phase flow Φt is such
that it violates such conditions —that is, Φt leads to anti-thermody-
namic-like behaviour. In sum, the correct account of typicality must
take into account the dynamics. This is the third approach.
Take ΓE to be the hypersurface of 6n-1 dimensions of the phase space
the process of mixing and stirring a shot of scotch in a glass of water, as Gibbs orig-
inally explained. A definition of ergodicity is formulated in the coming subsections.
For more details see [Frigg et al., 2011], [Berkovitz et al., 2006] and 4.4.
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Γ in which the energy is conserved. Being Meq the equilibrium ma-
crostate, take ΓMeq to be the macroregion consisting of all x ∈ ΓE for
which the macroscopic variables assume the values characteristic for
ME. Then, quoting Sheldon Goldstein , who first explicitly mentioned The proper account
of typicalitythe dynamics into the definition9:
“[ΓE] consists almost entirely of phase points in the equilibrium
macrostate [ΓMeq], with ridiculously few exceptions whose to-
tality has volume of order 10−10
20
relative to that of ΓE. For a
non-equilibrium phase point [x] of energy E, the Hamiltonian
dynamics governing the motion [x(t)] would have to be ridicu-
lously special to avoid reasonably quickly carrying [x(t)] into
[ΓMeq] and keeping it there for an extremely long time—unless,
of course, [x] itself were ridiculously special” [Goldstein, 2001,
p.43]
What is said here is that, together with the already known state-
ment that equilibrium states are typical in ΓE —something already
contained in the quote from Zanghí—, it adds that the Hamiltonian
must be typical. The key point then is that the dynamics have to
be “ridiculously special” for not tending to the equilibrium macrostate.
While typicality was initially oriented to the measure of initial condi-
tions, now it regards also the dynamics-space.
Let me put it emphatically, for this account purportedly reacts
in front of a rationale that pervades the whole history of the foun-
dations of statistical mechanics. Yes, the tendency to equilibrium is
not logically proved by Boltzmann’s combinatorial argument nor by
typicality, for one can find specific counterexamples; nevertheless,
the counterexamples do not refute that (a refined version of) Boltz-
mann’s or the typicality approach can actually be the explanation of
the thermodynamic-like behavior manifested around us —in gases
of all sorts, in coffee cups, in the whole universe. Relaxing the re-
quirements to count as the proper explanation is what the typicality
approach does. From expecting a mathematical proof holding in all
possible cases, now we can be satisfied with an explanation for most
possible cases10.
The typicality of
chaosFurthermore, let me underline how Frigg (in turn following Dürr
and Maudlin) points out the fact that a typical dynamics will be
9 The brackets in the fragments indicate that the notation has been changed from the
original paper for the notation used here.
10 This move is analogous as to what is made in two other moments cited in this
thesis. One is when instead of proving ergodicity, one proves epsilon-ergodicity, a
less demanding version of the former (see [Frigg and Werndl, 2011], and later in
this same section). The other is when the extensional identity between process and
product randomness is defended for most of the times, in spite of counterexamples,
which are said to be neglectable given their small quantity (see A.4, 4.4, and [Eagle,
2012]).
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random-looking, and will be so in virtue of the chaotic properties
of the actual dynamics, something that should sound familiar to us,
as I will remind after the fragment:
"the Galton Board seems to exhibit random behavior. Why is
this? Dürr’s and Maudlin’s answer is that the board appears
random because random-looking trajectories are typical in the
sense that the set of those initial conditions that give rise to
nonrandom-looking trajectories has measure zero in the set of
all possible initial conditions, and this is so because the board’s
dynamics is chaotic [Dürr, 1998, sec.2]. Translating this idea into
the context of SM suggests that the relevant property P is being
chaotic." [Frigg, 2009, p.8]
So, in the context of statistical mechanics (and in that of the Gal-
ton board), hamiltonians with a chaotic dynamics are typical. This
is, exactly, a claim that I argued for in 4.4.2 (p. 116). Specifically, that
µ(C) = 1 (where C denoted the set of all possible chaotic trajectories
in phase space). This claim was important because it was justifying
one of the two premises of the main argument of chapter 4, premise
(B)11. This claim of 4.4.2 amounts to say, in the terminology of this
chapter, no more and no less than the chaotic trajectories are typical12.
In what follows, I am going to summarize Frigg and Werndl’s way
of spelling out the typicality of dynamics, plus the numerical simula-
tions they cite in their support; then I will highlight how these results
are far from sufficient for the purpose of this thesis. Finally, the next
section presents my numerical simulations, still clearly insufficient
to prove the typicality of dynamics, but nonetheless illustrative and
supportive of the purpose of the chapter.
spelling out the typicality of the hamiltonian The re-
search carried out in another paper by Frigg and Werndl [Frigg and
Werndl, 2012] represents a step forward towards our purpose. The
authors formalize which conditions a dynamics has to meet to be
typical.
A first claim of [Frigg and Werndl, 2012, 8] is to restrict the discus-
sion to the obtaining of epsilon-ergodicity, because such property is a
11 I remind that (B) was stating: ’If an event X holds for all chaotic dynamics, then X
holds in most of the cases with no dynamics at all’. This was loosely formulated as
(B) : P(Ca) ∼ 1; where ’a’ was a generic trajectory. To prove (B) it sufficed to prove
that µ(C) = 1.
12 However, the comparison between these two moments contains an important distinc-
tion. The fragment here cited is not really supporting my claim (B), for the former is
weaker than the latter. Frigg’s fragment is implicitly sticking only to the actual laws,
while my claims have to commit to a (much?) wider scope. Across all the fragments
that I quote along the dissertation, never other laws than the actual are assumed
—in the fragments quoted, that is. Instead, in 4.4.2, my claim was committing to all
metaphysically possible chaotic trajectories; as such it needed further justification,
that I tried to provide.
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sufficient condition for thermodynamic-like behavior. They had pre-
viously proved this claim in [Frigg and Werndl, 2011]; cf. also [Vranas,
1998].
A solution is said to be ergodic with respect to a measurable set A if
and only if the proportion of time it spends in A equals the measure
of A (i.e. the time average is equal to the phase average). A dynam- Definition of
ergodicity and
epsilon-ergodicity
ical system is ergodic iff for any any set A any solution x ∈ ΓE is
ergodic. We can define B as the set of points which lie on non-ergodic
solutions (with respect to Meq). It follows that a system is ergodic
iff µE(B) = 0 (this is a complementary definition that will help when
defining -ergodicity).
It is proven that for ergodic systems initial conditions that lie on
thermodynamic-like solutions are typical [Frigg and Werndl, 2012,
9].
-ergodicity is meant to be a more relaxed version of strict ergodicity.
It does not require that µE(B) = 0, allowing sets of initial conditions
to be on non-ergodic solutions with respect to Meq, only if the sets
are of small size; that is: µE(B) 6  (with  a very small number).
Notably, it is proved in [Frigg and Werndl, 2012, 9] that, also for
epsilon-ergodic systems, initial conditions that lie on thermodynamic-
like solutions are typical. This is what they label as ’m-typical’ (’m’
standing for ’measure’).
The typicality of initial conditions, though, is not sufficient. As
stressed along the chapter, an explicit typicality measure of the dy-
namics must be included. This is what Frigg and Werndl seek to do;
specifically, it has to be shown that the Hamiltonian is typical. Thus,
the complete argument has this form [Frigg and Werndl, 2012, p.6]:
The structure of the
argumentPremise 1: The macrostate structure of the gas is such that equilibrium
states are typical in ΓE.
Premise 2: The Hamiltonian of the gas is typical in the class of all rel-
evant Hamiltonians.
Conclusion: Typical initial conditions lie on solutions exhibiting ther-
modynamic-like behaviour.
The task, then, is to ascertain the truth of premise 2. The hamiltonian
has to be typical with respect to a certain measure. The measure, for a
dynamical trajectory, has to be a topological measure; thus, it can be
said that it has to be ’topology-typical’, ’t-typical’. I advance that the
final result of [Frigg and Werndl, 2012] is the following: the Hamil-
tonians are t-typical with respect to the so called ’Whitney topology’,
and this is proved for the Lennard-Jones potentials, a subset of all
the possible potentials —yet, this subset should suffice, they say, for
a wide class of realistic gases.
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topological typicality of the hamiltonians To measure
the typicality of the hamiltonians in its dynamics space, instead of the
Lebesgue measure we must employ a topological notion, namely that
of ’comeagre’ or ’generic’. A set A is ’comeagre’ (or ’generic’) if and
only if its complement is a countable union of nowhere-dense sets.
Intuitively, the idea is to provide a measure able to inform whether
the other sets are scarce. As we are searching for the typicality of
the hamiltonians, we seek to claim something like the following state-
ment, which I label as ’typdyn’:
typdyn : -ergodic Hamiltonians are comeagre/generic in the entire
class of gas Hamiltonians ’G’.
typdyn is a refined version of premise 2 above. Unfortunately, the
class ’G’ is too big. ’G’ is not easily definable, so Frigg and Werndl
restrict their claim to something narrower, namely, the sub-class ’L’
of smooth Hamiltonians that are small perturbations of the so called
Lennard-Jones potential. This constraint, the authors argue, is very
acceptable given the aim of explaining thermodynamic-like behavior
of gases. Thus, first we restrict the Hamiltonians to the smooth ones,
that is, those with a fixed kinetic energy T(p,q) = p
2
2m . Thus, the
variation of Hamiltonians amounts to the sweep over all the possible
potential energies V(p,q) of a generic H(p,q) = T(p,q)+V(p,q). Sec-
ond, we restrict the potential V(p,q) to the so called Lennard-Jones
potential, the potential most notorious and most used to describe in-
termolecular interactions13.
In [Frigg and Werndl, 2012, p.11] we read about it:
"The Lennard-Jones potential is important because there is good
evidence that the interaction between many real gas molecules
is accurately described by that potential at least to a good de-
gree of approximation. Hence, whatever potentials G comprises,
many real gases cluster in a subclass of G, namely L, and so
knowing how the members of L behave tells us a lot about how
real gases behave".
After that, the choice of the Whitney topology comes from a phys-
ically natural way of saying that two Hamiltonians are close; namely,
when the difference between the Hamiltonians themselves as well as
all their derivatives is small [Frigg and Werndl, 2012, p.10].
13 Specifically, this potential has the form:
V = 4α
((ρ
r
)12
−
(ρ
r
)6)
where α describes the depth of the potential well, r the distance between two par-
ticles, and ρ is the distance at which the inter-particle potential is 0. The potential
of the entire system is obtained by summing over all two-particle interactions. The
r−12 term describes the repulsion forces at short ranges, The r−6 term describes the
attraction forces at long ranges (van der Waals force or dispersion force).
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Summing up, the goal has become to confirm what I gather in typ- Full formulation
dyn2:
typdyn2 : -ergodic Hamiltonians are comeagre/generic in the sub-
class ’L’ of smooth gas Hamiltonians with a Lennard-Jones potential
with respect to the Whitney topology.
Now, to prove that typdyn2 is actually the case, they show that
the sub-class ’L’ is comeagre by referring to empirical evidence —i.e.
referring to numerical simulations cited below— according to which
Hamiltonians that are -ergodic for the energy values defined —i.e.
the set of all perturbed Lennard-Jones Hamiltonians— are typical in
L. Thus the end of the paper [Frigg and Werndl, 2012] makes refer-
ence to numerical simulations that provide evidence that this is the
case. The departure point is [Sinai, 1970], that proved the assumption
implicit in Boltzmann and Gibbs that, in a hard-sphere model, the
trajectories of the particles are erratic paths wandering freely over the
energy surface and spending equal times in equal hyperareas of this
surface; more specifically, Sinai proved that the hard-sphere gas is
unstable and that this suffices to guarantee ergodicity (and mixing).
Then, the main reference they cite is [Ford, 1973], which improves
these results. There the authors start by pointing out that: "the ex-
tension of Sinai’s results to systems having purely repulsive interparticle
forces is expected to be straightforward". In addition to that, we have
the progress of [Ford, 1973] itself: there the proof is extended to sys-
tems having attractive as well as repulsive interparticle forces. Contrary
to some mathematical calculations that might suggest pessimistic re-
sults (namely, nonergodic regions of KAM stability14), the simulations
of [Ford, 1973] provide evidence that, variating the energies and den-
sities of particles (so even in the allegedly problematic cases of low
energies or high densities), the expected entropic behavior obtains
without evidence of KAM regions. The KAM regions might be per-
fectly negligible, given that none has been found in the simulations
and "nothing known precludes their being so small as to be physically irrel-
evant" [Ford, 1973, 1].
At the end of the day, the numerical simulations reflect that the Lennard-
Jones gas, which includes repulsive as well as attractive forces, ex-
hibits thermodinamic-like behavior. It is an interesting investigation
given that is closer to actual circumstances and, especially, because it
extends the range of cases under investigation. Its results confirm that
this type of gases conform to the properties of ergodicity demanded
originally by Boltzmann (and Gibbs), and that we demand on behalf
of a typicality account that seems to hold for most of the dynamics.
14 These are finite regions in phase space in which there are trajectories confined dis-
playing perpetually quasiperiodic motion. These regions are predicted by the Kol-
mogorov–Arnold–Moser (KAM) theorem.
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discussion of the results So far, then, certain results in what
respects typical behavior have been highlighted, with a set of con-
straints specific of the model under study. To what extent can theseExtend the results?
conclusions be applied beyond these constraints? Some argue that the
scope of classical statistical mechanics is highly restricted to certain
experimental setups in which it has been tested [Myrvold], [Hoefer].
Others, like [Uffink, 2006, 2] or [Goldstein, 2001] do not find prob-
lematic to take such model as representative of a much wider por-
tion of reality. Let’s take a look at the constraints involved. The main
constraint is that we are dealing with classical (not relativistic, not
quantum) isolated and mechanical systems, namely gases in a closed
container. This is based on the model of hard spheres bouncing.
Regarding the dynamics of the model, remember that we know thatClassical mechanics
is false the classical newtonian laws are actually false in microscopic quan-
tum domains, as well as where relativistic effects are not negligible.
Yet, see the coming subsection 5.3.1 for some hints about how the
same idea of typicality has been traslated to quantum systems.
Does this high simplification rule out the philosophical interest of
the results attained? I think that some arguments attenuate such aA limited context
worry. One could be satisfied that just in certain limited contexts it
has been proved the emergence of stable regular behavior for almost
all possible dynamics. We could be satisfied with the typicality of
dynamics proved only for gases: we have found a restricted domain
in which it is shown the emergence of macroscopic stable behavior,
irrespective of the microscopic dynamics; I take it as an interestingA positive take on
the limited context result that might (or might not) bear an import beyond its domain.
Compare this conclusion with the similar conclusions for similar re-
sults in 4.3.3.1. There I was entertaining that the needed property
of microconstancy (actually, the symmetry with respect to some ba-
sic property) was something that might verify, not only the roulette
wheel and many other examples, but perhaps also the whole universe
in some initial configuration. Then I raised the question whether this
should be necessary for my purposes. I claimed it is not necessary,
and that whether it holds or not, in the end it would support a dif-
ferent metaphysics of laws. Namely, if the results would hold for the
whole universe, then this would support a universal unified version
of laws. In that case, the allegedly universal non-accidental regulari-
ties that the fundamental laws of physics describe would be a result
of the procedures described here. Otherwise, the lack of application
in a cosmological scale would be more in tune with an antirealist ac-
count of laws, in the sense of something like oases of order emerging
among the "chaos", a la Cartwright [Cartwright, 1999] —the context
of the gas in a box would be a nomological machine, whose stability
and lawful behavior, now, I would say, is explained.
There is a further observation against those who argue that the
scope of classical statistical mechanics is restricted only to certain ex-
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perimental setups in which it has been tested [Myrvold], [Hoefer].
I think it is fair to appreciate the significance of classical statistical Another defense of
the limitations of the
context
mechanics far beyond experiments of certain classes of gases in a lab-
oratory —as other philosophers do, e.g. David Albert, Jos Uffink, or
Sheldon Goldstein. My argument relies on the fact that the highly-
idealized model of classical statistical mechanics is, in its general-
ity, grasping the relevant causal structure that really in fact explains
thermodynamic-like behavior. This claim, more in general, is linked
with the habitual and successful modeling which is characteristic of
physical science itself. Modeling reality always neglects lots of fea-
tures, but nonetheless it is very successful. In our case, it neglects,
among others, the time-variable curvature variations of the container
fruit of General Relativity (GR), as noted in [Hoefer, fn 7]. Yet, to
neglect these effects is justified because this variation does affect in-
finitesimally the motion of molecules; crucially, it affects so infinites-
imally that in the end it is not going to play any causal role in the
final explanation of thermodynamic-like behavior. Ultimately, this is
the general idea of modeling in physics, and is what I think justifies
that the insights of classical gases in a container can shed light on the
behavior of, say, the long-term behavior of clusters of galaxies [Uffink,
2006, 2].
However, even if appreciating a contextualized solution, or grant-
ing that the results hold beyond the delimited context —e.g. the uni- Another objection
verse might have shared in some moment the relevant properties of
this (over)-simplified model—, other constraints potentially under-
mine the interest and philosophical significance of the results.
The class of Hamiltonians under consideration is clearly not all the The range of the
dynamicspossible set G aforementioned, but a substantial, though important,
subset, i.e. the subset L of Lennard-Jones potentials. Frigg and Werndl
defend that is not necessary to consider G because L is the most rel-
evant subset and suffices as an approximate proof of their objective.
However, for the purpose of this dissertation, this observation misses
the point, for we are interested in extending the range of possible dy-
namics as far as possible.
I recall that the goal of the chapter is to argue that the results and the-
ories presented can be interpreted to support a certain metaphysics
of laws; namely, support an account of emergence of stable behavior
from a lawless level. Thus, it is not sufficient that the typicality is
proven for a wide class of realistic dynamics of gases; we absolutely
need the typicality to be proven also for the unrealistic dynamics. In
the end, this means that we need it for the whole class of hamiltonians
G, not only L.
Furthermore, the kinetic energy T(p,q) has been fixed for delimit-
ing the subset of smooth Hamiltonians. So, which would be the result
if we vary the possible values of T(p,q)? Again: Can we account for
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all the class of Hamiltonians G, instead of the restricted subset L?
Thus, these limitations imply that the very idea of the typicality of
dynamics has not been strictly proven —not even for the delimited
context. On the positive side, at least the range already covered is
significant, as the potentials under consideration include those with
attractive forces, those just with repulsive forces, and those with both
(the subset L)15.
5.3.1 Outline of the typicality of dynamics in the quantum domain
As advanced before, the typicality approach has been also pursued
in the quantum domain, where the typicality of Hamiltonians is ex-
plicitly stressed. Those who have researched this path are the already
mentioned J. Lebowitz, S. Goldstein, and N. Zanghí, together with
Roderick Tumulka and Christian Mastrodonato, in the papers [Gold-
stein et al., 2009], [Goldstein and Tumulka, 2010], [Goldstein et al.,
2010a], [Goldstein et al., 2010b] and, in parallel, the authors of the
paper [Linden et al., 2009]. This subsection summarizes their results.
It is considered an isolated, macroscopic quantum system. This
system is described by a wave function ψ evolving according to the
Schrödinger equation:
i h
δψt
δt
= Hψt
[Goldstein and Tumulka, 2010] argues that, for every initial state
ψ0 of a typical macroscopic quantum system, the system will spend
most of its time in thermal equilibrium.
More specifically, they argue so by purportedly showing that for typ-
ical Hamiltonians with given eigenvalues, all initial state vectors ψ0
evolve in such a way that ψt is in thermal equilibrium for most times
t.
Now we have moved from phase space to Hilbert space. Following
[Goldstein et al., 2009, 1], let H be a micro-canonical energy shell, that
is, a subspace of the system’s Hilbert space spanned by the (finitely)
many energy eigenstates with energies between E and E + δE. The
thermal equilibrium macro-state at energy E corresponds to a sub-
space labeled ’Heq’ of H, such that dim(Heq)/dim(H) is close to 1.
They say that a system with state vector ψ ∈ H is in thermal equilib-
rium if ψ is “close” to Heq. Then, as said, they claim that for typical
Hamiltonians all initial state vectors ψ0 evolve in such a way that ψt
15 Furthermore, it is worth admitting that perhaps I am missing further results for (or
against) the typicality of dynamics, besides the supportive old numerical simulations
mentioned by [Frigg and Werndl, 2012] (basically [Ford, 1973]). A future task can be
to continue pursuing the goal of the chapter by looking for further supportive results
in the ocean of literature around statistical physics.
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is close to Heq for most times t. Hence, ψt is in thermal equilibrium
for most times t.
This is inspired and closely related to von Neumann’s quantum
ergodic theorem of [von Neumann, 1929], which they investigated
and elaborated in this modern version. Such theorem is thoroughly
analyzed in [Goldstein et al., 2010b].
The macroscopic appearance is expressed in terms of von Neu-
mann’s concept of macroscopic observables, developed for the first
time in [von Neumann, 1929]. Then, they argue that for a typical fi-
nite family of commuting macroscopic observables, every initial wave
function ψ0 from a micro-canonical energy shell evolves such that for
most times t in the long run, the joint probability distribution of these
observables obtained from ψt is close to their micro-canonical distri-
bution.
Likewise, according to [Linden et al., 2009, 8], reaching equilibrium
is a universal property of quantum systems: almost any subsystem in
interaction with a large enough thermal bath will reach an equilib-
rium state and remain close to it for almost all times16.
They claim that:
"With almost full generality all interacting large quantum sys-
tems evolve in such a way that any small subsystem equili-
brates, that is, spends almost all time extremely close to a par-
ticular state. The only conditions we require are that the Hamil-
tonian has no degenerate energy gaps (which rules out non-
interacting Hamiltonians) and that the state of the whole sys-
tem contains sufficiently many energy eigenstates.
Virtually all physical situations satisfy these requirements. Firstly,
all but a measure zero set of Hamiltonians have non-degenerate
energy gaps".
They have proved that for every state of the subsystem, almost ev-
ery state of the bath, and almost every hamiltonian, the subsystem
equilibrates.
I only very briefly have cited these works and their results. Yet, it
is desirable a proper critical assessment of these results in the quan-
tum domain, which I cannot elaborate here. Future research should
critically assess the insights presented.
Before the global conclusions of the whole dissertation, let’s overview
the particular numerical simulations that I have elaborated.
16 The bath refers to the fact that the quantum system is supposed to be surrounded by
an external system at a constant temperature; the whole system is thus composed of
the quantum subsystem and the bath.
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5.4 numerical simulations
This section aims to support the claim of the independence from the
dynamics with computer simulations that I have programmed. Specif-
ically, the simulations aim to show that the tendency to equilibrium,
in the hard-sphere model of classical statistical mechanics, holds for
a large class of possible dynamics; arguably, for almost any dynamics
in which energy is conserved.
5.4.1 Description of the model and the algorithm
The simulation models a hard-sphere group of particles of an ideal
gas in a container that move according to a certain set of laws. I have
programmed the simulation in a way that is very easy to change the
laws that rule the behavior of the particles. Thus, for each different set
of laws it can be verified whether the tendency to equilibrium obtains.
This can be verified by merely looking at the graphical simulation of
the particles bouncing in the container (see the figures 15, 16, and 17
and the links on vimeo.com cited below), or by verifying the results
displayed in the histograms (figures from 15 onwards), which quan-
tify the spatial distribution of the particles at a certain time .
The source code is in the annex C. A detailed explanation can be ob-
tained by reading the several comments included in the source code
—and of course, by reading the code itself. It is based on a code that
I found in Mathworks’ web17, simulating a standard case of billiard
balls colliding —I must thank the author Peter van Alem for making
publicly available his code. A general explanation of my code comes
in what follows.
The aim of the algorithm is to simulate different dynamics in differ-
ent runs of the simulation. It does so in function of a variable labeled
’θ’ (because it represents an angle, as we will see), whose value can
be changed in each execution of the algorithm (or, of course, it can be
programmed an automatic change of the parameter in a multiple exe-
cution of consecutive trials). The variation of this parameter changes
the way collisions occur between particles. Specifically, it changes the
rebound angle after the collision. I made it such that it only changes
the angle, hence the direction, not the intensity of the velocity vec-
tor. Therefore, the linear momentum and the energy are conserved. I
made (incidentally, before arriving at the definitive version) versions
in which linear momentum or energy were not conserved (but they
can be interesting too).How to manage "all
possible laws"
17 http://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/20759-
billiards/content/Billiards2D.m
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Figure 15: The Initial Conditions set the particles randomly distributed but
within the left down corner. The picture is after a time t > 3sec.
For the sake of illustration, the number of particles in this figure
is only N=80, but in the results it was used a higher N.
Notably, the method employed allows a relatively clear-cut way of
covering a full set of different laws. This permits a way of tackling
the elusive task of managing a wide set of possible laws in a concise
way (what I commented in p. 1.3).
More specifically, the value θ represents the value of an angle that
is added to the standard angle post-collision (where the ’standard’
angle means that it is the angle calculated in the standard case of ac-
tual newtonian laws). As seen better in the details of the code, in that
way its variation will be meaningful within the range of values from
0 to 360; further values would only redound in already tested cases.
Hence, sweeping from 0 to 360 degrees, with the accuracy provided
by a variable of type ’double’, we obtain the range of almost all possible
post-collision directions18.
First, it has been reproduced the standard case, following newto-
nian laws, corresponding to θ = 0. This allows to verify that the simu-
lation works properly, by visualizing the behavior as well as checking
the final results.
In order to verify the proper behavior of the actual dynamics and
of the variations, simulations in very clear conditions —with few par-
ticles, moving slowly— have been carried out. A simulation modeled
the case of only two particles, of much bigger size, symmetrically
placed, and colliding. This allowed to easily verify the proper work-
ing both of the standard actual laws as well as the sensitivity to the
variations of the variable θ.
18 The accuracy of a variable ’double’ is limited, but is it sufficient to our purposes?
Given that there is high sensitivity to initial conditions, the use of a too coarse
grained variable might miss possible outcomes. The range of the variable of type
’double’, though, is sufficiently fine-grained, I would say; specifically, it ranges from
the minimum value −1, 79 · 10308 to the maximum +1, 79 · 10308.
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The key moment in which the different post-collision angle is set is here:
1 alfa=abs(asin(V(1,2)/sqrt(V(1,1)^2+V(1,2)^2))) ; % In radians
alfa=rad2deg(alfa); % Change to degrees
beta=alfa-theta;
V(1,1)=sign(V(1,1))*abs(cosd(beta));
V(1,2)=sign(V(1,2))*abs(sind(beta));
6 % IDEM FOR PARTICLE 2
alfa=abs(asin(V(2,2)/sqrt(V(2,1)^2 + V(2,2)^2))); %In radians.
alfa=rad2deg(alfa);
beta=alfa-theta;
V(2,1)=sign(V(2,1))*abs(cosd(beta));
11 V(2,2)=sign(V(2,2))*abs(sind(beta));
As previously said, I recommend to see the source code for all the details. Especially, the variable ’Collision-
EffectMatrix’ and the various interesting changes that are commented in the code (this was a different way to
change the post-collision effects).
% The original matrix that calculates how the velocity vector of the two particles will change
after collision
CollisionEffectMatrix=[0,0,1,0; 0,1,0,0; 1,0,0,0; 0,0,0,1;];
4 % VARIATIONS THAT ALLOW FOR DIFFERENT COLLISIONS
%(though the variation is finally introduced after this matrix, so I maintain the original
matrix)
%CollisionEffectMatrix=CollisionEffectMatrix*0.6 ; % Reduction of speed intensity after
collision
%CollisionEffectMatrix=-CollisionEffectMatrix; % negative sign
%CollisionEffectMatrix=[0,0,1.3,0; 0,1.1,0,0; 0.2,0,0,0; 0,0,0,1;];
9 %CollisionEffectMatrix=[0,0.7,sind(theta),0; 0,sind(theta),0,0; sind(theta),0,0.7,0; 0,0,0,sind(
theta);]; % VALUES WITH DIFFERENT COLLISIONS! (Good but diverges to infinite velocities,
because momentum is not conserved!)
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Figure 16: After 5 seconds, the particles are spreading out, still more concen-
trated in one region
Figure 17: After t > 20 seconds, the particles have spread out almost uni-
formly around the whole container
At the end of the day, a sweep of all the values of θ from 0 to 360
illustrates that the tendency to equilibrium is a property not only for
the actual newtonian laws but of a wider set. It is shown how the
tendency to equilibrium in the macroscale occurs in all the counter-
factual scenarios tested.
Of course, a lot of assumptions are made in this model. Besides Assumptions of the
simulationthe assumptions of the hard-sphere model (see the details at the be-
ginning of the chapter), there are the limitations of the computer
simulation. Worth mentioning is the fact that the random element
introduced in the second series of simulations is not truly random,
but pseudo-random. Even so, this limitation is not a problem, I think.
The reason has been argued justly in the previous chapter: the chaotic
behavior involved in the collisions produces a random-looking evo-
lution indistinguishable from a truly random evolution. A pseudo-
random value will be generated by a deterministic algorithm, but
will be anyway totally unpredictable, satisfying the definitory condi-
tion of randomness19.
In addition to these assumptions, the most important constraint is
19 See MATLAB documentation for a clear survey on the sophisticated pseudo-
randomness that this software possesses:
http://www.mathworks.es/es/help/matlab/random-number-generation.html.
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that the variations of the dynamical behavior are always made such
that the conservation of energy and total linear momentum are pre-
served.
5.4.2 Results
A brief illustration of the simulations can be found online in the links:
https://vimeo.com/90044328
https://vimeo.com/90863487
What I attach here is a partial summary of the results.
For the sake of clarity, the results are presented in a way that it is
easy for the reader to glimpse the overall results and acknowledge
the key conclusion. To this end, I am presenting the results for each
of the different runs of the simulation in the form of a 3-dimensional
histogram. The histogram represents the whole container in the two
horizontal axis ’x’ and ’y’. This region is divided in different coarse-
grained squares. Then, the third axis, ’z’, represents the number of
particles in each coarse-grained region.
These graphics allow to easily glimpse the approximate equidistri-
bution of particles over the whole region. Obviously, here I cannot
include the thousands (millions) of graphics for each variation of the
parameter θ. This is only a partial selection of the results obtained,
sufficiently illustrative of the underlying moral.
5.4.2.1 The tendency to equilibrium for almost all possible elastic collisions
Figure 18: Histogram of the initial distribution, with number of particles
N = 104
Due to the limited throughput of my computer, the maximum num-
ber of particles simulated is N = 2 · 103. Even if the number is ex-
tremely small compared with what is usually assumed (of the order
of Avogadro’s number), nevertheless the results hold, as it is shown.
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(a) Run #1; area coarse-grained in 36 macro-regions(b) Run #2; area coarse-grained in 25 macro-regions
Figure 19: Histograms of two simulations with parameter θ=0, after a relax-
ation time t (t > 20sec).
(a) Run # 1 (b) Run # 2
Figure 20: Histograms of two simulations with parameter θ=200, after a re-
laxation time t (t > 20sec).
5.4.2.2 Long term statistics of a pseudo-random dynamics
In addition to the simulations varying the underlying laws —i.e. for
almost all possible elastic collisions—, another set of simulations has
been carried out with a significant change in the source code. Now, in
each collision the post-collision angle takes a different value, which is
decided randomly. The outcoming value is decided by the MATLAB
function rand(). Therefore, the outcoming value is random —or more
exactly, pseudo-random. The parameter θ is set to the value dictated
by rand(), for each collision of each pair of particles. This can be
obtained by adding the line:
theta = rand()*360 ;
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(a) Run # 1, with low-entropy I.C. (b) Run # 2, with random I.C.
Figure 21: Histogram of the distribution at time t=20, with parameter θ=208.
(a) Run # 1 (b) Run # 2
(c) Run # 3 (d) Run # 4
Figure 22: Histogram of the distribution at time t=20, with parameter θ=72.
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(a) Run # 1 (b) Run # 2
(c) Run # 3 (d) Run # 4
(e) Run # 5 (f) Run # 6
(g) Run # 7 (h) Run # 8
Figure 23: Histogram of the distribution at time t=20, with parameter θ=117.
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before the moment of the calculation of the collision angles.
The results are the same, as shown in figures 24.
In conclusion: the results are the same for any of all the variations of
dynamics tested. That is, the tendency to the equilibrium macrostate
holds 1) for the actual laws, 2) for any laws corresponding to any
variation of the angle θ, and 3) for any iteration executed with the
(pseudo)-random dynamics.
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(a) Run # 1 (b) Run # 2
(c) Run # 3 (d) Run # 4
(e) Run # 5 (f) Run # 6
(g) Run # 7 (h) Run # 8
Figure 24: Histogram of the distribution at time t=20, low-entropy I.C., and
parameter θ=rand()*360 at each collision.
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5.5 concluding remarks
I have assessed specific results and objections of this chapter in 5.3
p. 138. Now I move away from the specialization of the chapter and
take a global perspective. So this section recapitulates in a concise
manner the results and objections of all the chapters and states the
future lines of research.
To begin with, the present chapter has shown continuity with the
previous while offering a different approach, as it has carried out a
delimited study into the well defined field of classical statistical me-
chanics (with a further extension to the quantum domain).Part II
The results of the present chapter, focusing on a simplified model and
on a single regular behavior (the tendency to the equilibrium macro-
state), show how difficult is to obtain something close to a proof of
the main claim, which is wider in scope —the claim that lawful be-
havior can emerge from a lawless level.
On the other hand, chapter 4 was more generic, following the ab-
stract study of the necessary properties for the method of arbitrary
functions to lead to stable behavior. In doing so the chapter is mak-
ing clear the directives for the future analysis of each particular case
of interest. This means that one could study certain systems and as-
sess whether the necessary conditions (microconstancy and random-
looking motion) obtain.
Both chapters constitute part II, which has focused on studying the
feasibility of the process of emergence of stable behavior / reduction
of complexity.
It would be interesting, for instance, to ascertain the feasibility of
such projects in areas of theoretical "fundamental" physics, as those
treated in Nielsen’s project, or the areas of those who research about
entropic forces. This comprises diverse fields, some of which appeared
in chapter 3, especially 3.3.2. Thus the continuity between part I and
II would be enhanced (even more).
Furthermore, even if not so linked to a metaphysics of laws, a devel-
opment of the applications in different complex sciences (as meteo-
rology or economics) suggested in [Strevens, 2003] would be worth
pursuing.
Part I has mostly focused on studying the plausibility of a bottom
level which is lawless. It started in chapter 1 motivating the interestPart I
of the whole project, reviewing the existent literature on the meta-
physics of laws, and underlining the lack of satisfactory answers. I
continued in chapter 2 with a reflection on how our most fundamen-
tal laws look like. I argued why such laws, formulated in the form
of gauge symmetry principles, are neither fundamental nor a priori
reasonable according to certain criteria. This excluded the otherwise
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interesting scenario of renormalizable local gauge theories of QFT, in
which laws appeared to be exclusively determined by the postulated
matter-content (treated in 1.5 and 3.3.1). Further, in chapter 2 I argued
for the unnaturalness of current physical laws, in support of an an-
tirealist metaphysics of laws. More in detail, I proposed a landscape
of plausible metaphysical scenarios, arguing for the plausibility of
a highly-complex or lawless one. This option is supported if one is
willing to find unsatisfactory the high contingency displayed by any
physical law —more specifically, if one finds puzzling the ’unnatural-
ness’, which I defined as the high contingency of the mathematical
expressions in which laws are formulated, chosen only because of
high empirical adequacy.
After defending the possibility and plausibility of such a metaphysi-
cal image, in chapter 3 I reflected upon the meaningfulness of such
a lawless scenario. To this end I set forth some arguments around
David Deutsch’s discussion of John Wheeler’s proposal. Then chap-
ter 3 concluded with a summary of the central points of the project
that attempts to explain a process of formation of symmetries.
what physical necessity? As I have stated throughout the the-
sis, the interest is to apply the results brought to the fore as the central
part of an explanation of the notion of physical necessity.
It has been proposed that this kind of modality is grounded in math-
ematical, probabilistic facts. That is, the occurrence of apparent phys-
ically necessary behavior is due to the fact that the context displays
conditions such that it is overwhelmingly more likely that a specific
stable behavior occurs. This is assumed to hold of an unknown, unde-
fined, fundamental level of reality. The fundamental level is assumed
to consist of a highly complex or random dynamics (part I), which
leads in a higher level to simpler and stable regularities (part II).
This stable behavior is the result of what can be called a statistical
necessity. Thus, the stability has been explained in terms of probabilis- Statistical Necessity
tic reasoning plus further non-dynamical conditions. This is all the
"physical necessity" that there is.
Is this a sufficient explanation of what we used to describe as phys-
ical necessities and non-accidental regularities in 1.1 p. 6? It is obvi-
ously not the explanation of those specific high-level non-accidental
regularities gathered in the sentences (i) to (vi) of p. 6. But it is un- Does this work for
’All emeralds are
green’ or ’electrons
repel each other’?
controversial to assume the reductionist doctrine according to which
higher-level laws supervene on lower-level laws. This supervenience
presumably holds up to the actual laws of physics, and they in turn
supervene on others below, up to the bottom fundamental level. So
in this way the conclusions of this dissertation can be understood as
a possible explanation of how some regularities, no matter in which
level of reality they hold, appear to be non-accidental.
I have been elaborating this claim in an abstract context in chapter
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4, studying the generic conditions of applicability; in a more delim-
ited domain (a classical gas in a container) and for a specific behavior
(entropic behaviour) in chapter 5; likewise I have brought up similar
insights, in quantum physics (in 5.3.1) and in all the current Standard
Model physics (in 3.3.2).
It has been assumed that nothing can emerge from nothing —ex ni-
hilo nihil—, so a stable factor has to appear in the explanans in orderThe assumption of
stability to account for the stability of the explanandum. The stability here is
postulated not in the dynamics but in the stable spatial symmetries
required for microconstancy20 and in certain basic constraining prin-
ciples (like principles of conservation).
Given this and other assumptions, we arguably obtain a stable proba-
bilistic outcome, which can be described by a stochastic dynamics. Re-
member the explanation of a coin toss. In the long run the sequence
exhibits a stable output frequency —the frequency of the strike ratio,
1/6 for a die, 1/2 for a coin, etc.— and, surprisingly, for this to hap-
pen a necessary ingredient is just the sensitivity to initial conditions.
As [Strevens, 2003, 61] explains, the generator of chaos creates not just
short-term disorder but also long-term statistical order. Thus, macro-
scopic order is explained in part by microscopic chaos. This seems
magic, as Maudlin and Strevens literally say each on his own. But it
is explained by our current knowledge of complex systems.
This project leads to a weak notion of physical necessity, weaker at
least than what is granted in some contexts when speaking of the im-
mutability and universality of the fundamental laws of nature. From
a certain perspective, this weakness is a virtue, as it rules out any mys-
terious metaphysical status to the laws. This is so because their type
of modality gets demystified when elucidating on what it is based. As
said in chapter 1, in this picture there is only the category of logical
necessity and all the rest is contingency. Then, what we call physicalPhysical necessity
as robustly stable
contingencies
necessities are "just" robustly stable contingencies.
Thus, physical necessity is to be understood as a matter of degree,
and in that sense it can be linked with the works of Marc Lange’s
"Laws and Lawmakers: Science, Metaphysics, and the Laws of Na-
ture" [Lange, 2009] (cf. [Lange, 2005] and [Lange, 2008]) and James
Woodward’s "Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explana-
tion" [Woodward, 2003]: the first spells out an account of laws inSimilarity with
other philosophy
about laws
which there are different layers of invariance under counterfactual
perturbation, thus establishing a hierarchy of degrees of necessity. A
similar idea is found in Woodward but from a different approach.
Woodward appeals to generalizations with different degree of invari-
ance. He also faces the dichotomy law vs accident in the same line
20 More generally, the symmetry need not be only spatial, but any basic property
(thanks again to Michael Strevens for this observation).
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of eliminating any abrupt threshold between them21. The approach
of this dissertation, though addressed from a different viewpoint, fits
well with these versions. An interesting future line of research would
be to analyze to what extent can be merged and complemented all
these approaches.
A rationale of the whole project has been that an explanation of
physical necessity can be achieved by focusing on understanding why
it is that there are certain stable symmetries (analogous to question ’2’ of
1.1 p. 6) and why it is that there are these symmetries rather than others
(analogous to question ’3’ of 1.1 p. 6). To this end, the existence of The dialectics
two opposite approaches has been envisaged:
1) understanding the actual presence of symmetries by considering
that they are a result of a process of [spontaneous] symmetry breaking,
coming from an initial situation of absolute symmetry. In this op-
tion, absolute symmetry is assumed from the beginning, as the initial
state of the universe. The breaking of symmetries is thus the process
responsible of arriving to the present situation in which some sym-
metries remain —being the ground of the current fundamental laws.
2) The other option assumes the lack of any particular symmetry prin-
ciple for a generic initial state, thus without any defined dynamics.
That is, the initial state will exhibit a random walk. Thus it argues
for the likeliness of the formation of symmetries in the long term, for
most of the possible evolutions that can be taken from that initial non-
symmetric situation.
This second option is the one explored and defended in this chapter.
This fragment from [Barrow and Tipler, 1986, 256-257] illustrates
the plausibility that the second option may have:
”matter and radiation have a purely random origin, and even
gauge invariance may be an ’illusion’: a selection effect of the
low-energy world we necessarily inhabit. Some preliminary at-
tempts to flesh out this idea have shown that even if the un-
derlying symmetry principles of Nature are random —a sort
of chaotic combination of all possible symmetries— then it is
possible that at low energies (10−32 oK) the appearance of lo-
cal gauge invariance is inevitable under certain circumstances.
A form of ’natural’ selection may occur wherein, as the tem-
perature of the Universe falls, fewer and fewer of the entire
gamut of ’almost symmetries’ have a significant impact upon
the behaviour of elementary particles, and orderliness arises.
Conversely, as the Planck energy (which corresponds to a tem-
perature of 10−32 oK) is approached, this picture would predict
chaos”.
21 As indicated in [Samaniego, 2011], other approaches press in the same direction,
namely Michael Redhead [Redhead, 1987] who appeals to the notion of robustness,
and Sandra Mitchell [Mitchell, 1997], who appeals to stability.
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further objections Depending on the expectations, it could
be thought that the results are too programmatic and incomplete. For
instance, this is clearly so if the reader expects a sort of full proof
of the metaphysical account of laws of nature here proposed. ThisRefine the
expectations disappointment, though, can be fairly resolved just by properly read-
justing the scope: this dissertation analyzes certain arguments for a
metaphysical account of laws of nature, highlights certain virtues and
defects of the account, studies specific applications through which its
feasibility could be defended, and summarizes the key arguments of
the diverse authors that have pursued the same goal (philosophers
and physicists, like Peirce, Wheeler, Nielsen’s team, and a long etc.).
Furthermore, there is a general objection to the whole project re-
garding the separated treatment of laws and initial conditions (of
matter content), which I am somehow uncritically inheriting. I myselfThe separation of
laws and I.C. reflected in [Filomeno, Forthcoming] about the separated ontological
nature between the two notions, where laws are supposed to apply
onto the matter content22. Many others have raised the doubt on this
apparent independence of laws and initial or boundary conditions,
e.g. [Barrow, 1988] or [Frisch, 2004].
What has been said in this respect, at least, is the observation of the
link of symmetries and matter content as developed in 1.5, plus the
further reflections in 3.3.1.
future lines of research Let me summarize concisely other
open branches of research. Given that the quantity of different ap-
proaches that I wanted to mention in the dissertation prevented to
treat all of them thoroughly, an interesting future research is to con-
tinue critically assessing all of them:
• For instance, I only gave a summarized presentation of the key
points of the typicality approach in the quantum domain.
• Likewise, probably further experimental results can be found
in support (or against) the conclusions of the section on the
typicality of dynamics in the classical gas in a box. In such a
way the results can extend, or restrict, the scope of the claim of
the typicality of dynamics.
• Another project would be to critically assess the "random dy-
namics" project of Nielsen et al. There is an interesting variety
of dialectics present in their work. It is obvious that this was too
much —it has already been a long task to discover, realize that
it was worthwhile, and summarize their key features.
22 More in detail, in the paper I interpreted the mathematical inconsistency (infinities)
of some physical equations with some initial conditions as suggesting a case against
their separated nature; specifically, I cited the cases of Maxwell’s equations, follow-
ing Mathias Frisch’ investigations.
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• The similarities between ch. 4 and 5 should be evidentiated so
that it becomes clear the role that perhaps the method of arbi-
trary functions plays in the claims of typicality. My intuition is
that the former is a more precise explanation of why the more
generic claims of the latter hold. Explanations in classical sta-
tistical mechanics with the method of arbitrary functions (and
with Strevens’ insights in particular) have been already carried
out —in [Engel, 1992], [Strevens, 2003, 4.8], [Strevens, 2013].
• As to the applicability of the results in a metaphysical theory
of laws, is it meaningful to consider a certain epoch of the uni-
verse as a certain closed system which possessed the property
of microconstancy, given the postulation of spatial symmetries?
Perhaps good or bad arguments can be found in this respect
focusing on our most fundamental physical theories.
• How reliable are the parallel lines of research cited before? In
particular, 1) that of entropic gravity, or 2) the recent project of
Lee Smolin (see references for both at the beginning of 3.3.2). As
far as I know after reviewing their papers, the projects are not
developed to the point that a proper philosophical assessment
of them can be carried out. Perhaps further research improves
the situation.
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a.1 introduction
This annex surveys how the sometimes overlapping notions of ran-
domness and objective chance have been fleshed out. Among the
different senses in the literature I discern the most relevant for our
philosophical purposes. More in detail: in A.1 and A.2 I introduce
the discussion exposing some claims found in the philosophical lit-
erature about the notion of objective chance, in relation with notions
like probability, indeterminism or subjective chance. I make some re-
marks and then I differentiate the relevant sense to our purpose.
In A.3 I carry out a survey of the mathematical formalizations of the
sense of ’randomness’. A formal definition of the ’law of large num-
bers’ is also included, plus a theorem regarding the inevitability of
the presence of patterns in random sequences —what I found as ’Van
der Waerden theorem’.
Finally, in A.4, I reflect upon the notion of more interest here, the
so called ’process-randomness’. In A.3 I was referring to the so called
’product-randomness’, and there I summarized how it has been achieved
a precise formulation. In A.4 I outline an elucidation of ’process-
randomness’ in terms of the previously well defined ’product-randomness’.
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Roughly, this is a way of fleshing out such notion in terms of its out-
comes.
To frame the exposition, a source to begin with is [Maudlin, 2011],
which expounds three main approaches to the notion of objectiveThree roads to
objective chance chance. He calls them ’stochastic dynamics’, ’humeanism’ and ’de-
terministic chances’. Of the three, the one that most concerns us is
the first, for the others share a sort of deflationist or antirealist spirit,
contrary to the chance that we want to entertain1.
The first type, ’stochastic dynamics’, is the objective probability that
is present in indeterministic systems, in which the state of a systemStochastic dynamics
at one time and the laws are jointly compatible with different states
at later times. The paradigmatic case of this type of chance is to be
found in some interpretations of quantum mechanics —in which the
assignation is not of equiprobability, but of a Normal (or Poisson or
Binomial) distribution—, where these probabilities are interpreted as
reflecting a genuine indeterminism of Nature. It is worth noting that
these are dynamics governed by a law, though in this case a probabilis-
tic law. That is, as I remarked at the very beginning, in 1.3 p. 11, this
is an intermediate degree between the two notions of deterministic
laws and pure randomness, where both of them are present —and
both demanding philosophical elucidation.
There is, though, no further elucidation of the nature of these prob-
abilities, where do they come from and why. For Maudlin, there
is nothing in need of explanation, literally: "the notion of irreducibly
stochastic dynamical laws is perfectly clear and requires no philosophical
elucidation at all" [Maudlin, 2011, p.5]. He adopted the same strategy
in what respects the traditional (i.e. non-probabilistic) notion of laws
of nature [Maudlin, 2007, ch.2]. I am personally sympathetic to the at-
titude of "dissolving" problems that are not really such, as sometimes
has been proposed (Wittgenstein being a famous example): perhaps
the correct attitude towards some current philosophical disputes has
to be this2. However, it does not seem a legitimate move to resolve the
difficult issue of the nature of laws by taking them as a brute fact: even
granting the advantages that this strategy yields —as Maudlin argues
in [Maudlin, 2007]—, I have devoted 1 (especially 1.3 and 1.4.1.2) in
justifying the pertinence of this subject. As we can explicitly realize in
1 About the humean view on chance, see e.g. [Lewis, 1980] or [Hoefer, 2007]. About
deterministic chances, see our well-known [Strevens, 2011].
2 Let me speculate with some possible candidates for a "dissolution": the metaphysical
debates about personal identity; those about the persistence of objects —in fact, a
metaontological view is that philosophers talk past each other—; or the failure of
the truthmaking principle —that is, it is not a problem that such "principle" fails.
Perhaps, even for more settled debates the answer is to dissolve the problem, e.g.:
the disputes between normative ethics —because relativism is the correct position—;
the definition of ’art’ in aesthetics —for the same reason—; as well as ancient issues
as the meaning of life, or the existence of God —because there is not a clear-cut
meaning nor reference of the terms involved.
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some of the fragments I quote in annex B, C. S. Peirce also manifested
a clear opposition with respect to Maudlin’s attitude. As a represen-
tative point, in what respects the case of stochastic laws Maudlin’s
move is at odds with the discussion that arose at the beginnings of
quantum theory among their founders —Bohr, Pauli, Schrödinger,
Einstein, et al3. Borrowing Einstein’s quote, if God does play dice,
then this fact does require philosophical elucidation. See further ar-
guments in 1.4.1.2 p. 20.
a.2 a map of the senses of ’chance’
A certain sort of randomness has popped out implicit in the definition
of stochastic dynamics. This section seeks to distinguish the diverse
ways in which ’randomness’ or ’chance’ has been fleshed out in the
literature4.
The first thing to remark is that two senses of randomness are to
be distinguished. One is the so called process (or genesis) sense, the Process and product
sensesother the product (or performance) sense. The product sense remits
to a feature of an already occurred sequence; it regards whether the
resulting outcomes, as they appear, present certain characteristics so
that the sequence merits the qualification of random. As we will see,
this sense is accurately defined in terms of complexity, disorder and
typicality. The process sense, instead, is in principle orthogonal with
the appearance of the outcomes of a sequence. It is related with the
process that generates an outcome, with its generation. John Earman
[Earman, 1986, p. 137] describes the process sense as that of a process
that is without principle, without guidance of laws (whether determinis-
tic or not), whereas the product sense is referred to the output of a
process that is disordered or lacking in pattern.
It is obvious that 1) we have to be interested in the process sense,
and that 2) there is some sort of stronger or weaker link between
both senses. It is rather plausible to bestow process-randomness to
a process that presents a product-random outcome, and, conversely,
to predict a product-random output for a process we know to be
process-random. At the same time, it is also very straightforward to
realize that this does not need to be the case necessarily, having one
without the other. Antony Eagle devotes the Stanford’s Encyclope-
dia entry ’Chance versus randomness’ [Eagle, 2012] to analyze this
link. There the author (idiosyncratically perhaps) associates the term
3 An extended recopilation of part of these discussions can be found in the book
"Quantum Theory at the Crossroads: Reconsidering the 1927 Solvay Conference"
[Bacciagaluppi and Valentini, 2009].
4 The terminology can be confusing, so let me make an initial clarification. At the mo-
ment, as some literature does, ’chance’ refers to stochastic dynamics, which amounts
to a probabilistic distribution function. However, as we will see, other bibliograph-
ical references use ’chance’ in a different way, i.e. to refer to a specific sense of
’randomness’ (’process-randomness’), which is something "stronger" than stochastic
dynamics. As to the term ’randomness’, it is going to be defined in what follows.
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’chance’ with the process sense, and ’randomness’ with the product
sense.
Further, Earman talks about the possibility, at least conceptual, of
an intermediate option, which he labels as ’stochastic’, meaning not
wholly random, not wholly haphazard, but in accord with probabilis-
tic laws. The reader will realize that this coincides with the stochastic
dynamics referred by Maudlin before.
With respect to the investigations about the notion of chance andMathematical
literature on product
randomness
randomness in the history of philosophy and mathematics, the re-
sults are basically recent. There has been since the 70’s strong and
successful research regarding product-randomness, spelled out in a
precise mathematical language with the aid of computational theory.
Likewise, the subject of the philosophy of probability has also grown
in recent decades. However, regarding the point as to the precisePhilosophical
literature on
objective chance
meaning of process-randomness, the literature is more scarce, per-
haps because in the sciences (both in special sciences as in physics)
the presence of stochastic laws is just presupposed (or ignored in de-
terministic frameworks), while in the philosophy of physics is not
faced directly, as the main focus has been the related topic of chance
—understood as linked with probability and with stochastic dynam-
ics. Some approaches to chance are far from what we are interested.
For instance, the survey of philosophy of probability found in the
book [Gillies, 2000] never engages with the question about the defini-
tion and meaningfulness of process-randomness. Likewise, nothing
in the vicinity of process-randomness is ever faced in the (also good)
book [Handfield, 2012].
a.2.1 Chance
chance and probability Chance is usually associated with the
notion of probability. Chance has been defined (cf. [Eagle, 2012, secs.
1 and 1.1]) as the "objective kind of probability", and also the "single-
case objective probability". Nevertheless, there is a more generic way
of understanding chance which does not commit to probability: quot-
ing Leibniz, Eagle suggests the definition of chance as graded possibil-
ity.
It should be noted that the notion of probability stems as a subfield of
mathematics, and as such it is axiomatized in Kolmogorov’s "Founda-
tions of the theory of probability" [Kolmogorov, 1933]. Accordingly, it
is agreed that chance has to obey these axioms. It is this requirement
that I see of dubious necessity, and it is one of the reasons why I
would like not to tie a priori ’chance’ with ’probability’. Alan Hájek’s
fragment in the Stanford’s Encyclopedia entry on interpretations of
probability [Hájek, 2012] recognizes the problems in this association:
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"Kolmogorov’s axiomatization [...] has achieved the status of
orthodoxy, and it is typically what philosophers have in mind
when they think of ‘probability theory’. Nevertheless, several
of the leading ‘interpretations of probability’ fail to satisfy all of
Kolmogorov’s axioms, yet they have not lost their title for that."
chance and indeterminism Now, having suggested that chance
needs not be associated with probability, let’s face the following ques-
tion to improve the comprehension of the notion: Does chance have
to be necessarily associated with indeterminism?
[Eagle, 2012, sec. 5] assesses whether there can be cases of indeter- Indeterminism
without chance?minism without chance, to verify whether both concepts can exist
dissociated.
He does so by citing John Norton’s Dome example5. This example
has given rise to critical literature of all sorts, and indeed it is not the
best example of indeterminism, but anyway set aside the critics for
the sake of the argument (actually Eagle’s reception is the opposite,
as he dubs it as a "very elegant" example of classical indeterminism).
Thus, grant that we are in front of a case of classical indeterminism6.
The alleged particular problem that concerns us appears when trying
to assign probabilities for the time of the spontaneous excitation that
will cause the ball to fall. As Norton says:
"The symmetry of the surface about the apex makes it quite nat-
ural for us to add a probability distribution that assigns equal
probability to all directions. The complication is that there is no
comparable way for us to assign probabilities for the time of the
spontaneous excitation that respect the physical symmetries of
solutions. Those solutions treat all candidate excitation times T
equally. A probability distribution that tries to make each can-
didate time equally likely cannot be proper -that is, it cannot
assign unit probability to the union of all disjoint outcomes7.
Or one that is proper can only be defined by inventing extra
physical properties, not given by the physical description of the
dome and mass, Newton’s laws and the laws of gravitation, and
grafting them unnaturally onto the physical system." [Norton,
2008, p. 9,10].
5 For further information of this alleged violation of determinism in classi-
cal physics, see [Norton, 2008] or the explanation in the author’s webpage:
http://www.pitt.edu/ jdnorton/Goodies/Dome/index.html
6 Other example cited is that of space invaders, presented by [Earman, 1986, ch. 2].
This is even more disputable and "exotic". See [Hoefer, 2010] for a concise explana-
tion of both examples.
7 Norton’s footnote: "Since all excitation times T would have to be equally probable,
the probability that the time is in each of the infinitely many time intervals, (0, 1),
(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4),. . . would have to be the same, so that zero probability must
be assigned to each of these intervals. Summing over all intervals, this distribution
entails a zero probability of excitation ever happening".
166 annex . notions of randomness
The example is aimed to represent a case of indeterminism without
chance. But the answer against this reasoning can be found just in
the previous paragraph of Norton, where he refers to the assignation
of probabilities to each direction (not to the infinite times as above),
conveying what I previously said:
"One might think that (...) we can assign probabilities to the
various possible outcomes. Nothing in the Newtonian physics
requires us to assign the probabilities, but we might choose to try
to add them for our own conceptual comfort. It can be done as
far as the direction of the spontaneous motion is concerned."
[Norton, 2008, p. 9, italics added].
Here Norton does not refer to the assignation of probabilities to in-
finite possible times at which the ball could fall. Still, the important
upshot is the idea of not being obliged to assign a probability, some-
thing that holds also in the case of infinite possibilities —that is, of
infinite times.
So, against [Eagle, 2012, 5.3], given this dissociation of chance with
probabilities which I previously emphasized, Norton’s dome must
not be seen as a case of indeterminism without chance —at most, a
case of indeterminism without probability.
In sum, I have not found cases of genuine indeterminism without
chance. Not even in disputable cases within classical mechanics like
Norton’s Dome (let alone the space invaders), whose physical signifi-
cance is far from granted.
chance in the real world Antony Eagle talks about the main
candidate in physics for being the bearer of chance. As can be guessed,
this candidate is the presence of apparently irreducible probabilities
that come out in our current best theories, but especially in the the-
ory at the most fundamental level, i.e. quantum mechanics. Quoting
Eagle, "if our best physical theories did not feature probabilities, we should
have little reason to postulate them, and little reason to take chances to ex-
ist" [Eagle, 2012, section 1.2] . This sentence can be nuanced, though.
Recall that there are some approaches to the concept of chance that
do not confer a special status to the probabilities of QM more than
to the probabilities of other areas of physics and to other daily situ-
ations in which we talk about chances, namely the humean chance
or deterministic chance that I mentioned in A.1. So, even from a nat-
uralist and reductionist position, if physical theories did not feature
probabilities, but did not refute them either, it is still a conceptual
possibility worth exploring.
a.3 definitions of product randomness
Now let’s see how product-randomness is formally defined. Product-
randomness is a well defined notion that can help us in our research
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for a good elucidation of process-randomness, or so I argue. It is
the latter that is interesting for our purposes: what Peirce, Wheeler,
Nielsen, or chapters 4 or 5 refer to, is something like product-randomness.
Following Ahijip Dasgupta’s exposition [Dasgupta, 2011], we can
identify three approaches for defining product-randomness: unpre-
dictability, typicality, and incompressibility.
Unpredictability corresponds to the impossibility of there being Unpredictability
any successful gambling strategies for predicting future outcomes.
Von Mises has been one of the main responsibles of this approach
[von Mises, 1957].
Typicality is what a property of an infinite binary sequence is "if Typicality
the probability that the property holds is one" [Dasgupta, 2011] while, on
the contrary, a property is called special if the probability that the
property holds is zero. As Dasgupta explains:
"Consider the property of having no run of zeros of length
seven. It can be shown that the probability is zero that an in-
finite binary sequence has no run of zeros of length seven, thus
this property is special. The intuition here is that if a sequence
has a special property or attribute, then it cannot be random,
and randomness is equivalent to the complete lack of special
attributes." [Dasgupta, 2011]
The precise mathematical formalization was essentially developed by
Martin-Löf [Martin-Löf, 1966].
Incompressibility is the third way for characterizing product-ran- Incompressibility
domness. Some finite and infinite strings can be effectively specified
by descriptions much shorter than the string itself. The idea then is
that random sequences cannot be compressed at all. As Dasgupta
states, "A string is random if its shortest description has length equal to
the length of the string itself". This approach is known as Kolmogorov
Complexity [Kolmogorov, 1933] .
Additionally, it has been mathematically proved that these three
approaches, that seem to be independent of each other, turn out to be
equivalent! This is formally stated right away in theorem 3 p. 168. This
surprising equivalence between randomness as unpredictability, ran-
domness as typicality, and randomness as incompressibility, strongly
suggests that this common equivalent definition is satisfactory.
Let’s elaborate a bit more these definitions. It has been said that
there must not be any predictable pattern in the sequence. This can
be stated, in the case of infinite or finite binary sequences, as that
"for any string σ appearing in a sequence, it will as commonly be followed
by a 1 as by a 0. This lack of predictability based on the previous elements
of the sequence is necessary for genuine randomness." [Eagle, 2012]. The
same key point can be understood appealing to the impossibility of
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random systems being gambled (the von Mises approach [von Mises,
1957]); as Eagle comments:
"If the sequence were really random, then [...] the values of any
previous members of the sequence, and the place of the desired
outcome in the sequence should be of no use to you in this task.
To suppose otherwise is to suppose that there is an exploitable
regularity in the random sequence; a gambler could, for exam-
ple, bet reliably on their preferred outcome and be assured of
a positive expected gain if they were in possession of this in-
formation. [...] A random sequence should not be such that any
initial subsequence x1, x2, xk−1 provides information about the
content of outcome xk" [Eagle, 2012].
The approach of typicality, due mainly to Martin-Löf, takes as a
central feature that random sequences are those which are not special
in any effectively determinable way. And having something ’special’
amounts to having any sort of "special hallmark", as for example,
having a ’1’ every 13 places.
The third approach, of Kolmogorov complexity, focuses on the in-
compressibility of the sequences. Random sequences result to be im-
possible of being generated by a compact algorithm. Following [Ea-
gle, 2012], a random sequence is one such that the shortest algorithm
which produces it is approximately the same length as the sequence it-
self. Thus, randomness characterises the algorithmic or informational
complexity of a sequence.
We can realize that Kolmogorov complexity fits well with the intu-
itions about disorderliness of the Martin-Löf account, as well as with
the impossibility of gambling systems. It is the so called Schnorr’s
theorem which proves the striking result:
Theorem 3. Schnorr’s Theorem.
A sequence is Martin-Löf random if and only if it is prefix-free Kolmogorov
random.
product-order With all these definitions in place, a comprehen-
sion of order of sequences can be directly deduced as the opposite
of the definition of product-randomness. Therefore, an ordered se-
quence has to be predictable, special, or compressible. More specifically,
only a "minimal" degree of predictability, specialness or compress-
ibility is required, while the opposite concept requires total accom-
plishment of the opposite properties (i.e. absolute unpredictability,
typicality and incompressibility).
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a.3.1 The Law of Large Numbers
One of the main results of probability theory is the theorem called
’Law of large numbers’ (LLN). It can be stated as (from [Dasgupta,
2011, section 3.2]):
Theorem 4. The Strong Law of Large Numbers, or Borel Strong Law.
For independent infinite sequences of flips of a fair coin, let B denote the
event that the proportion of successes Sn among the first n flips, 1nSn , ap-
proaches the limit 1/2 as n→∞.
Formally stated:
B :=
{
x ∈ {0, 1}N : lim
n→∞ Snn =
1
2
}
The probability of the event B is 1, i.e. the set B has Lebesgue measure 1.
This is the strong version of the law, but a weak version also exists,
more adequate for real physical finite events. The latter permits a
small difference between the expected mean value and the effective
outcome. In fact, the weak version states that the sample average con-
verges in probability towards the expected value. Following [Loeve,
1977], being each outcome Xi, the number of trials n, the sample av-
erage Xn = (X1 + X2 + ... + Xn)/n, µ the expected value, and ε any
positive number:
lim
n→∞ P
(
|Xn − µ| > ε
)
= 0
The weak version allows for a bit of the "freedom" that a finite
random sequence is intuitively thought it will have. The freedom is
quantified by the small quantity tolerated, ε. This version leaves open
the possibility that |Xn − µ| > ε happens an infinite number of times,
although at infrequent intervals. Instead, in the strong version, for
any ε > 0 the inequality holds for all large enough n [Sheldon, 2009].
In any case, X1,X2, ...Xn are assumed to be an infinite sequence of
independent and identically distributed integrable random variables
with expected value E(X1) = E(X2) = ... = µ .
a.3.2 The order from randomness of the LLN
An upshot that can be drawn from the LLN is that, in the long run,
order arises. The expected value of a six faced die will converge to-
wards an average value. No matter if the die is not fair and there is
bias, the converging value will just be some other. The LLN can be
seen as the mathematical, logical source of order arisen from process-
randomness.
Perhaps, the order that we are recognizing around us and willing to
explain might correspond to the existence of an average whose value in-
evitably converges. But how could this be translated to the physical
realm?
170 annex . notions of randomness
Figure 25: Average value of a six faced dice over an increasing number of
tosses. The average converges to the expected value for all the
trials depicted, as the LLN states.
The convergence of the LLN arises because what it is doing is the
mean of all the accumulated values. Therefore, as more time passes,
more difficult is to get away from the mean value 8.
The converging expected value is like an attractor in dynamical sys-
tems’ theory (see e.g. [Pollicott and Weiss, 2004]). You will sooner
or later approach it; for instance, in a die it is more probable to get
values near the 3 than near the 6. Then, when you approach, it will
store this information, as it takes into account each value occurred in
the past and recollects the new one. Thus, you know that slowly it
will store more and more information about having been near that
point. And the average will approach more and more that expected
value, with probability one. In the very definition of a mean it is im-
plicit the existence of some sort of memory. Thus, every time it will
be more difficult to escape from that value. In other words, in order
to escape at a certain moment from approaching the expected value,
8 There are, however, sequences without convergence in frequency. E.g. a binary se-
quence whose outcome consists every time in a string of outputs with the inverse
value as the string before, with the length of each new string increasing in propor-
tion to the length of the already occurred global sequence. This creates a graphic for
the expected value that oscillates regularly from one of the values to the other. But
these counterexamples can be replied in many ways. The more straightforward is to
say that these are just pathological cases that represent an extreme minority of all
the possible random sequences, being then very unlikely. It can be also remarked the
important fact that for not converging they must follow this precise pattern always,
otherwise, if they fail, the convergence will be each time more difficult to avoid. And
we must not forget that we are dealing with random sequences, not ordered ones,
so these ordered sequences should appear (and hold forever) by mere hap. This is
extremely unlikely. In any case, they are not a threat to our matters given that the
output of the expected value, even if it does not converge, it presents a cyclic pattern,
and this is even more in tune with what we are seeking, which is regular behavior.
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the inputs ought to insistingly be far from the center to counterbal-
ance the tendency imposed by the already occurred events; moreover
these outcomes must all be "pressing" in the same direction (e.g. in
the die all should be above the mean or all below) because otherwise
they can balance one each other thus again converging to the mean
(a 6 and a 1, though far from the mean, together converge to it).
In sum, the crucial factor for the system is to have something that
amounts to the storage of past and present information, i.e. a mean.
If the system has this memory, then it allows the Law of large num-
bers to be applied, so that the mean value will converge towards a
fixed point.
a.3.3 Impossibility of product-randomness?
That being said, there are interesting theorems constraining the space
of possibilities of a product-random sequence [Dasgupta, 2011, p. 15]:
"randomness cannot be identified with complete and absolute
lawlessness. We may try to think of a sequence to be random
if it satisfies no law whatsoever (“absolutely lawless”). But, as
pointed out by Calude in [Calude, 2000] (see also [Volchan,
2002]), no such sequence can exist, since every digit-sequence
satisfies the following Ramsey-type combinatorial law first proved
by [van der Waerden, 1927]: The positions (indices) for at least
one digit-value will contain arbitrarily long arithmetic progres-
sions. Thus we have to abandon such ideas of ’complete law-
lessness’."
Some theorems of probability deny the possibility of absolute product-
randomness. Do these results help our inquiry of understanding the
emergence of order? The upshot is that they do not serve for the
sought explanation of the onset of physical necessity. Basically be-
cause they refer to the product sense, not the process. On the contrary,
these theorems could be taken as an objection, given that I will lay out,
in the next section, an attempt to understand process-randomness in
terms of product-randomness, and those theorems attack the possi-
bility of the latter.
Specifically, I am going to present Van de Waerden’s theorem. Con-
fining again to binary sequences, the theorem indicates a nontrivial
regularity shared by all sequences:
Theorem 5. Van der Waerden’s Theorem.
In every binary sequence at least one of the two symbols must occur in
arithmetical progressions of every length.
As explained in [van der Waerden, 1927], the theorem states that
for any given positive integers r and k, there is some number N such
that if the integers [1, 2, ... , N] are colored, each with one of r different
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colors, then there are at least k integers in arithmetic progression all
of the same color. The least such N is the Van der Waerden number
W(r, k).
A clear explanation from [Graham, 2007] is the following. When
r=2, you have two colors, say red and blue. W(2, 3) is bigger than 8,
because you can color the integers from 1 to 8 like this:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
B R R B B R R B
Here, no three integers of the same color form an arithmetic pro-
gression. But now you cannot add a ninth integer to the end without
creating such a progression. If you add a red 9, then the red 3, 6,
and 9 are in arithmetic progression. Alternatively, if you add a blue 9,
then the blue 1, 5, and 9 are in arithmetic progression. In fact, there is
no way of coloring 1 through 9 without creating such a progression.
Therefore, W(2, 3) is 9.
The proof of the theorem provides only an upper bound for the
value of W(r,k). For the case of r = 2 and k = 3 the argument given
below shows that it is sufficient to color the integers [1 ... 325] with
two colors to guarantee there will be a single-colored arithmetic pro-
gression of length 3. But in fact, the bound of 325 is very loose; the
minimum required number of integers is only 9. Any coloring of the
integers [1, ..., 9] will have three evenly spaced integers of one color.
a.4 process-randomness from its outcomes , i .e . from product-
randomness
With the knowledge attained about product-randomness, could we
gain insight on the notion of process-randomness ? The first intuitive
answer is ’yes’, for a common thought is to identify both concepts:
something is random (i.e. product-random) if and only if happens
by chance (i.e. process-random). The identity can be more precisely
stated, as in [Eagle, 2012, sec.3]:
Randomness Chance Thesis (RCT)9:
"An outcome happens by chance if and only if, were the trial
which generated that outcome repeated often enough under
the same conditions, we would obtain a random sequence
including the outcome (or of which the outcome is a subse-
quence)".
That would be great for our research of process randomness, be-
cause in function of a good survey of the outputs we could conclude
9 ’Revised Commonplace Thesis’ is the meaning actually ascribed in [Eagle, 2012], but
I change it for sake of clarity.
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about the nature of the generator process. We would know what is
empirically produced by the process-randomness that has been en-
tertained and assumed along the whole dissertation. I am going to
argue in favour of this thesis, that is, I am going to argue (only) for
the left to right direction of the RCT biconditional.
However, it is rather straightforward to find apparent counterex-
amples for both directions of the biconditional, i.e. cases of product-
randomness without chance involved and chancy outcomes without
them being product-random.
Process-randomness leads to process-random outputs; yet, one of
those possible outputs can be an ordered sequence, so it is not ran-
dom in the product sense, but it would still be a random output as
what regards its origin, its genesis.
I advance that my answer (as already commented along the the-
sis, in 3.2 and 4.4) is based on the fact that most of the trials of a
process-random process will indeed produce a product-random se-
quence. Crucially, when appealing to the long run, the unlikely cases
fade away, increasing the likeliness of the product-random outputs.
Being the long run sufficiently long, the product-random outputs be-
come overwhelmingly likely, so the "spurious" cases can be neglected.
In this respect, Laplace made a similar observation, relying on
something that has been so important along the previous chapters, i.e.
the proportion (measure) of ordered versus non-ordered sequences:
" [...] the almost infinite number of combinations that can arise
in a hundred throws are divided in regular sequences, or those in
which we observe a rule that is easy to grasp, and in irregular
sequences, that are incomparably more numerous." (italics are
mine) [Laplace, 1826]
In the coming subsection the left to right direction of the RCT bi-
conditional is defended. Independently, the final subsection briefly
defines process-randomness from a different framework.
a.4.1 Deviating from absolute randomness: bias
I am going to dispute the failure of such conditional, that is, I am
going to dispute that there are cases of a chancy (i.e. randomly gen-
erated) outcome but which, being the trial repeated often enough
under the same conditions, we would not obtain a product-random
sequence (including the chancy outcome).
More exactly, I am not going to deny that there are counterexamples,
but that they are a negligible proportion, i.e. they form a set of mea-
sure 0.
To begin with, I am going to dispute that there are general types
of cases in which there is chance without randomness. According to
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[Eagle, 2012], there are compelling cases of chance without random-
ness; namely, those in which there is a biased chance process.The counterexample
of bias Consider a sequence of unfair coin tosses; it will have an unbalanced
number of heads and tails, so such a sequence is not random. How-
ever, such a sequence, and any particular outcome in that sequence,
happens by chance [Eagle, 2012, sec. 4.3]. So it seems we are facing a
problem for the RCT thesis.
A biased coin toss will have an expected mean that will converge to a
number different that 1/2. The counterexample shows how product-
randomness is incompatible with any bias. This is correct, for bias
involves the denial of absolute typicality (since there will be special
privileged outcomes in the sequence) and of absolute incompress-
ibility (as compression algorithms exploit such biases10). As Earman
stresses in [Earman, 1986, chap. VIII sec. 3], Kolmogorov randomness
is conceptually linked to disorderliness, while on the other hand Eagle
cites Dasgupta highlighting a link of biasedness with an increase in
orderliness of a sequence. Therefore, it can hardly be the case that we
have a biased product-randomness.
Likewise, it is incompatible with unpredictability, as it will be possi-
ble to gamble betting in favour of the biased zone.
Reply
However, this example of bias should not be taken as a counterex-
ample to the RCT thesis. My point is to refuse the assumption that
the process is chancy. In such case the antecedent of the conditional is
not true, so the conditional is not false. Take the unfair coin toss. Take,
for instance, that the coin used is biased because gamblers fabricated
it with some particular asymmetric weight. We can grant that, paying
attention to this process that generates the outcome —not in the re-
sulting sequence— we can hardly admit that the process is absolutely
chancy. Thus it disappears as a counterexample of a chancy but not
product-random case.
Other threats of
chance without
product-randomness
There are other possible threats to the left to right direction of RCT;
let me make a brief survey of them. Following [Eagle, 2012], they are:
1) unrepresentative outcome sequences [ibidem 4.1],
2) the reference class problem [ibidem 4.2],
3) the dependence on history [ibidem 4.4], and
4) pseudorandom sequences [ibidem 4.5].
All are rather innocuous. Unrepresentative outcome sequences are
convincingly solved in [ibidem 4.1]. The reference class is indeed a
problem, but a problem of chance in general, that should not be seen
as a specific threat to RCT. The objection of pseudorandom sequences
is just an error in the sequences chosen —so that they are not really
10 The well-known softwares ’Zip’ and ’Rar’, as well as jpeg and mpeg image and video
compression formats, do exactly this: they exploit the biased resulting outcome in
the same way that they exploit the regions with patterns in ordered sequences.
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random.
Finally, dependence on history is a contextualization to the surround-
ing setup purported to hold for chancy processes (and not to product-
random sequences). But this is just a way of interpreting what is part
of the process and what is not, so it is only relative to intuitions that
this can be harmful, so the few examples presented are utterly miss-
ing the point. Indeed, all the setup could be included in what the
random process is, thus avoiding any alleged problem —this is the
same sort of move as that made in the discussion of deterministic
causation, specifically in Mackie’s account of INUS conditions, when
one solves some counterexamples just by taking into consideration
the whole universe (or the past light cone).
inferring process-randomness from the outputs After
the defense of the left to right conditional of the RCT thesis from
specific counterexamples, let me now spell out the association of the
generation of a process-random process with a product-random se-
quence. Because, even if the several objections of [Eagle, 2012, sec. 4]
have been answered, there still remains the fact that a random pro-
cess should, by definition, be able to produce any resulting sequence,
product-random or not. So, as said at the beginning of the section, let
me lay out why, even if this is true, it is nonetheless much more likely
that the resulting sequence will be product-random.
It has been never doubted that the right to left direction of the bi-
conditional fails. This means that just by looking at a single resulting
sequence we cannot conclude that the generator process is process-
random. It just cannot be identified like that. Yet, we can do better in
comprehending process-randomness. Starting by the correct intuition
of this fragment I shall elaborate an elucidation of such notion:
"the main feature of randomness is some degree of indepen-
dence from the initial conditions. (...) Better still, if one per-
forms the same experiment twice with the same initial condi-
tions, one may get two different outcomes" [Ekeland, 1988, 49,
italics added].
Following this quote, a random process can be defined as the pro-
cess that can have any possible outcome at any trial.
So the first feature of a random process is the unrestricted theoretical
space of potential outcomes. It is not sufficient to look at the actual
outcomes, because anything can be the result of a random process,
so it cannot be empirically verified by looking at a single outcome.
This absolute lack of constraint, this "total freedom" of the outcomes of
a random process, is its defining characteristic. I have italicized the
’may’ in Ekeland’s quote because the modal content of the claim is
crucial in the definition of process-randomness.
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That being said, we could pay attention to various sequences ("prod-
ucts") generated by the same process: which relations they show may
suggest that the process is process-random. We can often have se-
quences that are not product-random, that display some pattern —
they are not typical, not incompressible, not unpredictable. As said,
a random process can perfectly give rise to a very biased sequence.
But the crucial point is to be somehow able to infer that they are
an exception, a minority in the space of possible sequences. To this
end, remember that I said in 4.4 that the random-looking trajecto-
ries are the overwhelming majority of the dynamics-space, i.e. their
measure is 1. This is what I wrote there as µ(C) << µ(C) or, equiva-
lently: µ(C) = 1, where C was the set of random-looking (actually the
’chaotic’) trajectories.
So we would need to be able to repeat the process of generation of
sequences in a fixed setup. The underlying idea is to exploit the con-
vergence theorems that hold for random sequences. So, we should
try to apply the same idea not to a single randomly generated se-
quence, but to a sequence of sequences, in a sort of "second order"
LLN. Thus we should be able to infer that the process that generated
such sequences was probably process-random.
The LLN demands i.i.d. variables, but what I propose here does
not require a prior identical distribution among the variables. The
outputs of the random process are not fruit of a stochastic dynamics,
so they do not have any probabilistic distribution endowed —not a
uniform distribution either.
The proposal consists in summing the occurrences of each of the
possible results11 of all the sequences Si[1..l] of size l → ∞ (infinite,
or very long) generated by a generative process X. In the long run, i.e.
after an infinite (or very high) number of trials n→∞, we can check
the global distribution of the results of all the sequences, gathered in
a nxl-dimensional array S(nxl) =
n∑
i=1
Si[1..l], and infer that:
proc-from-prod :
’It is overwhelmingly likely that if S is not approximately equidistributed
among all the possible outcomes, then the generator X is not a process-
random generator’.
Intuitively, this strategy of employing this sort of second order LLN
(as it averages various sequences together) is a way for washing out
the disturbing counterexamples. If it is true that the not product-
random sequences/trajectories in the dynamics-space are of a ne-
glectable size, then the statement proc-from-prod should be true.
How could proc-from-prod be false? If no option has any pref-
erence in being chosen —which does not mean that I am setting an
identical distribution to each possibility, but that I am not setting a
11 Like a histogram, as those of 5.4.
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preferred fixed expectation to any specific possibility—, then there is
no reason to think that in the long run there will be a substantive pref-
erence for certain possibilities after averaging a high enough number
of trials.
Grant that the measuring step is not controversial12. The measure
says that the product random generated sequences are much more
numerous. Then, from ’more numerous’ we step to ’more likely’. This
intuitive move, though, is not necessarily true (and this is a threat to
several sections of this thesis). I justified that move in 4.2.1. I did so
by making explicit and justifying the hidden premise that ’no option
is more likely than any other’. Given the latter, if something is more
numerous it follows that it will be more likely. Formally, being xi
each possibility in the space of possibilities, and given that the event
X to be explained tends to occupy most of the possibilities, we have
that:
lim
n→∞P(
n∑
i=1
xi) ∼ 1
So the event X, composed of the majority of xi is much more likely
to occur. In 4.2.1 I phrase it in terms that those two premises consti-
tute an explanation of the occurrence of X.
Summing up, realize that proc-from-prod has the logical form
of (¬α → ¬β), where α is ’S is approximately distributed’, and β is
’X is a process-random generator’. More accurately, the claim proc-
from-prod refers to most of the cases, which I have phrased in
terms of likeliness. So the claim has the logical form:
proc-from-prod: P(¬α→ ¬β) > 1− 
where  is a very small positive real number. This is logically equiva-
12 But it is controversial. To what extent is difficult to assess. The problem comes in the
choice of the type of measure. As it has been remarked elsewhere ([Handfield, 2012,
91], or [Sklar, 1993, sec. 4]), there are infinite measures to choose. One might hope to
choose the most "natural" measure, and argue for it. Such candidate is the Lebesgue
measure, for both its empirical success as well as its theoretical virtues. But some do
not find it fully justified. See [Sklar, 1993, sec. 4] for a more fair explanation of the
problems around it. See also this concise fragment of [Handfield, 2012, 94]:
"There is one measure, known as the Lebesgue measure, which does
not flout any of the physical constraints we might like to impose on the
choice of measure, and which is in some sense ‘uniform’. It treats all
dimensions of phase space equally, in a manner of speaking. But even
so, this is scant reason to be confident that it is the correct measure. Can
we really be so confident that the correct measure is uniform? Recall
that the different dimensions of phase space track completely different
properties. Half of the dimensions relate to velocity, and half relate
to position. Why should we expect these dimensions to contribute to
the correct measure in the same way? These questions should make
us very uncomfortable about boldly picking a measure without any
independent basis to verify that choice".
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lent to:
proc-from-prod: P(β→ α) > 1− 
Which is to say that: for the vast majority of cases, if X is a truly
process-random generator, then the resulting sum of an infinite (or
very high) number of sequences S will be approximately equidis-
tributed among all the possible outcomes —i.e. it will be approxi-
mately product-random.
a.4.2 Process-randomness from Ergodicity
Having defended the relation between process and product-randomness
in the previous subsections, now I lay down an approach to the notion
of process-randomness with the same conclusion but from a different
framework: from the so called Ergodic Hierarchy. This subsection is
aimed to complement the outline carried out in section 4.4.
The Ergodic Hierarchy allows to understand randomness in deter-
ministic dynamical systems. What is the notion of randomness in
such context is something that seek to clarify [Berkovitz et al., 2006],
[Frigg et al., 2011], and [Eagle, 2012].
The Ergodic Hierarchy (EH) consists of the following classification
of dynamical properties of a deterministic dynamical system:
Bernoulli ⊂ Kolmogorov ⊂ Strong Mixing ⊂Weak Mixing ⊂ Ergodic
A central claim defended in these references is that the different
levels of the hierarchy correspond to different degrees of unpredictability,
which in turn correspond to different patterns of decay of correlations
between their past states and present states. This is how randomness is
identified. Process-randomness is to be understood as unpredictabil-
ity, coinciding with what has been defended by [Eagle, 2005] and
with Von Mises account, as explained before (A.3). Unpredictability
should not be understood in the sense of an epistemic limitation, but
in the sense of the ideal impossibility of prediction.
Within this framework, randomness is a matter of degree, whose de-
gree is quantified by the hierarchy. In its highest degree randomness
is thus associated with the Bernoulli level, in which there is a total
lack of correlation between the present state with the past states. The
lower the degree, the more the correlations arise, yielding a weaker
notion of randomness.
As I argue in 4.4, p. 114, this definition of randomness easily con-
veys the intuitive thought that chaotic trajectories, even if determin-
istic, share some relevant properties with randomly generated trajec-
tories. As said, the highest degree of randomness, the Bernoulli level,
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includes the properties of what is usually meant to be a chaotic sys-
tem, identified by displaying the degree of mixing. Hence, a random
system includes the properties of a chaotic system. Therefore, if we
get some results in virtue of the properties of chaotic systems, we can
get the same results with a truly random system, which will also pos-
sess those properties.
It is objected that the Ergodic Hierarchy is irrelevant because real
physical systems are not ergodic. But [Frigg et al., 2011] replies against
this charge, in the same vein that I have been defending many of my
claims throughout the dissertation, so I think it is worth reading:
"Almost all Hamiltonian systems are non-integrable (in the sense
that non-integrable systems are of second Baire category in the
class of all normalised and infinitely differentiable Hamiltoni-
ans) and therefore in large regions of their phase space the mo-
tion is random in various ways well captured by EH. Further, as
[Werndl, 2009b] argues, EH could also be used to characterize
randomness and chaos in dissipative systems. So EH is a useful
tool to study the dynamical properties of various ergodic and
non-ergodic systems".

B
A N N E X . H I S T O R I C A L A N T E C E D E N T S : P E I R C E ’ S
E V O L U T I O N A RY M E TA P H Y S I C S
To provide a wider perspective of the proposal I have been inves-
tigating, this section sketches some similarities of the metaphysics of
the American pragmatist Charles Sander Peirce (1839–1914).
First of all, as in almost all other branches of philosophy, some
ancient greek philosophers deserve their recognition as the pioneers.
The first philosopher to propose an emergence of order from a chancy
world is, as far as is known, Leucippus (V century B.C.), within
his also pioneering theory of atomism. Leucippus’ guiding chance Precursors in
ancient Greecewas later recovered by Epicurus and the epicurean tradition, in what
they called ’fortuna gubernans’. Fragments of this philosophy can be
found in Lucretius’ "De Rerum Natura" [Lucrezio, Ist c. BC, 5.107].
It is interesting to note to what extent this hypothesis endured: just
after Leucippus, his pupil Democritus embraced his master’s atom-
ism, but he displaced the presence of chance by that of necessity.
The proposal of a fundamental underlying order rather than chance
is prior to Democritus and Leucippus; indeed, it is what some estab-
lish to represent the very beginning of Philosophy after the theistic
cosmogonies. The postulation of a principle of order, Arché (A`ρχη´), is
a distinctive sign of all presocratic philosophy, from Thales of Miletus
onwards.
Be it as it may, here I center on Charles Sanders Peirce’s elaborated
metaphysics, dubbed as ’evolutionary cosmology’. I am deliberately
going to select only the parts more in tune with my account, leav-
ing aside the more idealistic elements of his thought. The bibliogra-
phy upon which I base my survey is mainly: the article ’The Com-
plementary Roles of Chance and Lawlike Elements in Peirce’s Evo-
lutionary Cosmology’ by Fred Kronz and Amy McLaughlin [Kronz
and McLaughlin, 2002] (from [Atmanspacher and Bishop, 2002]), the
last chapter of Ian Hacking’s ’The taming of chance’ Hacking [1990]
which briefly surveys Peirce’s metaphysics, and the more extensive
study of the book ’Peirce’s Scientific Metaphysics’ [Reynolds, 2002].
The relevant works of Peirce can be found in [Peirce, 1867–1893].
Fundamental
randomnessPeirce’s metaphysics is clearly reminiscent of the account proposed
in this thesis, with some substantial differences. According to Peirce,
the world is fundamentally random. Regarding the laws of nature,
none of them is absolutely exact, and they have evolved from a random
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original primeval state.
He was strongly inspired by the then recent evolutionary theories in
biology. With the passing of time, Peirce believes, there is an increased
tendency from less to more order and more complexity.
In his evolutionary cosmology, a crucial element is the role of prob-
ability; specifically, the law of large numbers. [Reynolds, 2002, 3] de-
fends that the law of large numbers is the architectonic principle that
ties together the phenomena of cosmic evolution and indeterminism.
Another central methodological belief in agreement with this thesis
is what Peirce called the ’first rule of inquiry’. As Reynolds states:
"The first rule of inquiry requires that no fact be accepted as
brute or inexplicable. This, as we saw, led Peirce to require ex-
planations of laws themselves"
"In Peirce’s opinion, it is regularity above all else that requires
an explanation. Using a series of coin tosses to make his point,
he notes that if we observe no regularity in the outcomes, we
feel no need for an explanation. If, however, we observe all
heads, we do find this peculiar and seek an explanation. “Law
is par excellence the thing that wants a reason” (Peirce 6.12).
Conversely, irregularity does not require an explanation, and
because Peirce identifies irregularity with chance, the starting
point of his explanation of the order and regularity in the uni-
verse is chance". [Reynolds, 2002, p.16].
The reader will remind that the same sort of methodological consid-
eration has been remarked at length previously, in chapter 1, esp. 1.3,
about what is to be explained —laws of the lack of them, symmetry
or asymmetry. Further:
"because regularity is the thing par excellence that requires an
explanation, Peirce maintained that it was legitimate for him to
suppose in the beginning a chaos. Irregular chance is the one
thing that does not require an explanation, neither does this
primordial state of unorganized and nonpersonalized feeling".
[Reynolds, 2002, p.116]
A primitive
direction of the
cosmos towards
higher order
A controversial trait of Peirce’s metaphysics is the existence of a
direction of the cosmos’ evolution towards an increasing degree of
order —thus, a primitive temporal asymmetry. There is an evolving
and end-directed universal trend toward what Peirce named the cos-
mological "growth of reasonableness".
More specifically, [Kronz and McLaughlin, 2002] concisely summa-
rizes Peirce’s evolutionary cosmology, making clear that the evolution
of the universe is due to a tendency of entities to take habits. This ten-
dency is the responsible of the formation of order from lawlessness.
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This is the key underlying concept. But it is immediate to question
what is supposed to be this tendency and where it comes from —
especially: is it not a law?
Furthermore, it seems, prima facie, that recurring to a ’tendency’ is
in harmony with the parlance of dispositions and propensities, dis-
cussed in chapter 1.4.
Even so, this sort of approach, as I argued in 1.4 regarding disposi-
tions, is at least an incomplete explanans. So why there is this ten-
dency would still remain a mystery.
Peirce, however, proposed some insights for justifying this tendency,
closer to a process metaphysics than to a traditional substance meta-
physics:
"Once you have embraced the principle of continuity, no kind
of explanation of things will satisfy you except that they grew.
The infallibilist naturally thinks that everything always was sub-
stantially as it is now. Laws at any rate being absolute could not
grow. They either always were, or they sprang instantaneously
into being by a sudden fiat like the drill of a company of sol-
diers. This makes the laws of nature absolutely blind and in-
explicable. Their why and wherefore can’t be asked. This abso-
lutely blocks the road of inquiry. The fallibilist won’t do this".
[Peirce, 1867–1893, 1.175]
Likewise:
“from mere non-law nothing necessarily follows, and therefore
nothing can be explained; for to explain a fact is to show that
it is a necessary or, at least, a probable result from another fact,
known or supposed” [Peirce, 1867–1893, 6.606]
What is to be
explained? Order or
chaos?
As the fragments above show, I want to underwrite that Peirce’s
approach reverses the usual direction of explanation: traditionally it
is from symmetry (of laws, and maybe also of I.C.) to asymmetry,
whereas now it is proposed a process that goes from asymmetry to
symmetry. This reverse approach, the reader will remind, underpins
the whole dissertation, and in fact it has been explicitly defended in
chapters 1 and 2.
There is a tendency toward increasingly more regular behavior,
which Peirce compares to the formation of habits in an organism —
inspired as he was by the evolution of species in biology.
There is an argument in support of the tendency of taking habits, and The only law, the
’law of habit’about how the increase of this tendency is produced by the tendency
itself. It can be shown in this illustrative fragment:
"The state of things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the
nothingness of which consists in the total absence of regular-
ity. The state of things in the infinite future is death, the noth-
ingness of which consists in the complete triumph of law and
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absence of all spontaneity. Between these, we have on our side
a state of things in which there is some absolute spontaneity
counter to all law, and some degree of conformity to law, which
is constantly on the increase owing to the growth of habit. The
tendency to form habits or tendency to generalize, is something
which grows by its own action, by the habit of taking habits
itself growing. Its first germs arose from pure chance." (Peirce
8.317; bold added)
Peirce speaks of a first seed of an habit-forming tendency. This
tendency toward regularity or habit could arise, Peirce proposes, by
chance alone.
The law of habit is a self-organizing tendency, destined to be rein-
forced by acting on itself in an autocatalytic fashion —like autocat-
alytic systems of chemical reactions create a self-sustaining feedback
loop (on the notion of auto-catalysis in complex systems and in biol-
ogy, see respectively [Haken, 2008], [Dawkins and Wong, 2005]).
Here, an immediate worry is about how a tendency can affect itself.
But the actual cases of auto-catalysis are the best answer. As well
as autocatalytic chemical reactions do occur and persist —and they
are surely surprising phenomena, but they exist and are well-known
indeed—, and as well as certain well studied phenomena emerge,
likewise some minimal constraints can be proposed to suit for the
emergence and persistence of regularities from a process-random dy-
namics.
It might be illuminating to recur to the analogy with biology, specif-
ically with the persistence of life through natural selection, and the
importance therein of heredity. Richard Dawkins stressed this point:
"Theories of the origin of life need to account for both hered-
ity and metabolism, but some writers have mistaken the pri-
ority. They have sought a theory of metabolism’s spontaneous
origin, and somehow hoped that heredity would follow, like
other useful devices. But heredity, as we shall see, is not to be
thought of as a useful device. Heredity has to be first on the
scene because, before heredity, usefulness itself had no mean-
ing. Without heredity, and hence natural selection, there would
have been nothing to be useful for. The very idea of usefulness
cannot begin until the natural selection of hereditary informa-
tion does." [Dawkins and Wong, 2005, p.468]
Then, further metaphysical assumptions should be sought, in order
to justify how a process of "heredity" —i.e. a memory— might occur
and persist (cf. A.3.1 for reflections on the need of a memory for the
obtaining of the mean in the Law of Large Numbers).
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Then, following Peirce’s metaphysics (now different from the di-
alectics that pervaded the chapters of this thesis), these chancy regular-
ities will become self-reinforced, ultimately achieving what we nowadays
take to be ’necessary’ behavior. That is, it won’t be strictly necessary
behavior, it is just that from a chancy origin, some phenomena bol-
stered their own repetition, producing in the long run a stronger ten-
dency to repeat themselves. This would then signify a progressive
increase in their degree of necessity, in that each time will be more dif-
ficult to run against their occurrence.
Such a tendency is just one of many that had arisen from the origi-
nal chaos by sheer chance. The habit-taking tendency, once arisen by
chance, is destined to become ever stronger and to result in the kind
of systematic world in which we find ourselves.
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The following algorithm does not include the creation of graphics and statistics.
The comments within the code self-explain the most complex parts.
2 %% Based on ’Billards2d.m’ from Mathworks.com
% IMPORTANT VARIABLES:
% X(i,j) = matrix with the coordinates x and y of the particles
% V(i,j) = matrix with the info of velocities x and y of all the particles
% Bound=[-4 4 -2 2]; %% The limits of the container, from -4 to +4 in horizontal, and -2
to +2 in the vertical axis.
7 % THE VARIABLE THAT ALLOWS TO VARIATE THE EFFECT OF THE COLLISIONS:
theta=0; % The range of the value is [0..360]. Each increment has the precision of a
double. Each variation of theta yields a different post-collision direction. It could
be changed automatically, but for ease of simplicity here it’s changed manually each
turn. So each run of the simulation with a different theta amounts to a variation of
the actual newtonian collisions.
%There is also the interesting case of theta=rand() in which it changes randomly for *
each* collision each turn, resembling more a random dynamics.
% GOOD VALUES FOR THE FIRST TRIALS IN MY LAPTOP: With graphical simulations: 80 balls of
r=0.03. O 20/30 balls de r=0.1 O 5 bolas de r=0.3
12 % Without graphical simulation: 2000 balls, r=0.0001
NumberOfBalls=2000;
%%%%%%%%%%%% PRELIMINARY SETUP %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
close all;
17 %hold on;
drawflag=1;
factor=82; %Scaling factor; for fullscreen should be adjusted.
DT=2e-2; % time differential
Bound=[-4 4 -2 2];
22 Color=[0 1 0]; % Green color for the particles
TableColour=[.4 .5 .8];
%Plothandle
axis(Bound);
set(gcf,’color’,[1 1 1]);
27 set(gca,’Color’,TableColour,’xcolor’,TableColour,’ycolor’,...
TableColour,’PlotBoxAspectRatio’,[1 abs((Bound(3)-Bound(4))/(Bound(2)-Bound(1))) 1],’
xtick’,[],’ytick’,[])
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%Set the radii, hence the dimensions of the molecules
%r=0.25+0.25*rand(NumberOfBalls,1); % Random value of the particles, but between
[0.25..0.5]
r(1:NumberOfBalls)=0.03; % Radius of molecules. CHANGE FOR BETTER PERFORMANCE
32 r=r’; % Traspon
% Storage of the sum of radii of each pair of particles (fix for my simulations)
for j=1:NumberOfBalls;
for i=1:j,
rmatrix(i,j)=r(j)+r(i);
37 end;
end;
rmatrix=rmatrix.*triu(abs(-1+eye(size(rmatrix))));
%Mass
mass=pi*r.^2;
42 %OffsetIC=1:NumberOfBalls; % Offset for allocating the particles wherever
%OffsetICCol=OffsetIC’; % column format
%%% Initial position of particles: Random
X=[(Bound(2)-Bound(1)-2*max(r))*rand(NumberOfBalls,1) + Bound(1)+max(r),...
47 (Bound(4)-Bound(3)-2*max(r))*rand(NumberOfBalls,1) + Bound(3)+max(r)]; % posicion
inicial ’x’ e ’y’
% Move all the particles into the left down corner
X=-abs(X);
%%% Other options for checking it works: Initial position symmetric (for two particles):
e.g. for X1=(-1,-1) y X2=(1,-1). Would be: %X=[[-1,-1] ; [1,-1]];
%X=[[-1,0] ; [1,1]];
52
% Calculate distance among particles
for j=1:NumberOfBalls;
for i=1:j;
% This matrix stores the distance between i and j particles
57 distmatrix(i,j)=sqrt((X(j,1)-X(i,1))^2+(X(j,2)-X(i,2))^2);
end;
end;
%Initial Collisiondetectionmatrix
% The matrix ’CollisionMatrix’ sets the initial distances between borders of particles
62 CollisionMatrix=(distmatrix-rmatrix)+tril(abs(-1+eye(size(distmatrix))))+eye(size(
distmatrix));
while find(CollisionMatrix<=0);
X=[(Bound(2)-Bound(1)-2*max(r))*rand(NumberOfBalls,1) + Bound(1)+max(r),...
(Bound(4)-Bound(3)-2*max(r))*rand(NumberOfBalls,1) + Bound(3)+max(r)]; % X stores
the coordinates ’x’ and ’y’ of each particle
X=-abs(X);
67 for j=1:NumberOfBalls;
for i=1:j;
distmatrix(i,j)=sqrt((X(j,1)-X(i,1))^2+(X(j,2)-X(i,2))^2);
end;
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end;
72 CollisionMatrix=(distmatrix-rmatrix)+tril(abs(-1+eye(size(distmatrix))))+eye(size(
distmatrix));
end
%Initial velocities
V=2*(-1+2*rand(NumberOfBalls,2)); %% V stores v_x e v_y of each particle
77 %V=ones(NumberOfBalls,2); %% Set all at the same velocity
% Other values tried:
%V=[[0.6,0.6];[-0.8,0.9]];
%V=[[16,16];[-16,16]]; % For symmetric collisions of 2 particles.
82 %Plot starting positions:
for k=1:NumberOfBalls;
plot(X(k,1),X(k,2),’o’,’MarkerEdgeColor’,Color,...
’MarkerFaceColor’,Color,’MarkerSize’,factor*r(k));
end
87 drawnow;
%%%%%%%%%%% HERE STARTS THE MAIN LOOP: %%%%%%%%%%%%%%
while drawflag==1;
92 cla; % Clear screen
%Case Edgedetecton positive
% ’d’ is a matrix with the info of distance (just adds the radius):
d=X+repmat(r,1,2)-repmat([Bound(2),Bound(4)],NumberOfBalls,1);
dt=(d>=0).*d./V; % t=x/v
97 X=X-V.*dt; % Calculate new position
V=V.*(2*(d>=0==0)-1);
%Case Edgedetecton negative: IDEM. Only the limits of the axis change, now the
negatives and d<=0
d=X-repmat(r,1,2)-repmat([Bound(1),Bound(3)],NumberOfBalls,1);
dt=(d<=0).*d./V;
102 X=X-V.*dt;
V=V.*(2*(d<=0==0)-1);
%Calculate new distances:
for j=1:NumberOfBalls;
for i=1:j;
107 distmatrix(i,j)=sqrt((X(j,1)-X(i,1))^2+(X(j,2)-X(i,2))^2);
end;
end;
%Correction with the radii:
CollisionMatrix=(distmatrix-rmatrix)+tril(abs(-1+eye(size(distmatrix))))+eye(size(
distmatrix));
112 %=====================================
% HERE CALCULATE WHAT IS GONNA HAPPEN FOR A PARTICULAR COLLISION
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if find(CollisionMatrix<0); % If there’s a pair of particles with distance 0, then (in
rounds when there are no collisions, it does not enter here)
[I,J]=find(CollisionMatrix<0); % I & J have the index of the particles A and B in
collision (p. ex. ’2’ and ’5’)
for i=1:length(I)
117 % Normalized distance to 1 between particles I and J. normdist(1) corresponds to
’x’ component, normdist(2) to ’y’ component.
normdist=normr([X(I(i),1)-X(J(i),1) X(I(i),2)-X(J(i),2)]);
%Velocity component along the line connecting the centres of ball A and ball B:
vaA=(V(I(i),1)*normdist(1)+V(I(i),2)*normdist(2)); % Suma de vectores
componentes x e y
vaB=(V(J(i),1)*normdist(1)+V(J(i),2)*normdist(2));
122 dt=abs(r(I(i))+r(J(i))-distmatrix(I(i),J(i)))/(abs(vaA)+abs(vaB)); % t=x/v
%Set back the positions of the colliding balls====================
%X(I(i):J(i),:)=X(I(i):J(i),:)-V(I(i):J(i),:)*dt;
end
for i=1:length(I) % This second bucle calculates the velocities post-collision
127 normdist=normr([X(I(i),1)-X(J(i),1) X(I(i),2)-X(J(i),2)]);
%Coordinate transformation matrix
% M is based on normdist
M=[normdist(1) -normdist(2);
normdist(2) normdist(1)];
132 v_old=[V(I(i),:)’;V(J(i),:)’];
%Calculate velocity in the new coordinate system
v_new=[M’ zeros(2);zeros(2) M’]*v_old;
137 f=(1+mass(I(i))/mass(J(i))); % I make mass fixed, so always f=2
g=(1+mass(J(i))/mass(I(i)));
%f=(1+mass(I(i))/mass(J(i)))*60*rand; % RANDOM VALUE EACH TIME. THUS THE
INTENSITY OF POST-COLLISION VELOCITY IS DIFFERENT
%g=(1+mass(J(i))/mass(I(i)))*60*rand; % *30*rand; works well
142 %%%%%%% THE COLLISION IS DETERMINED HERE : %%%%%%%%%
CollisionEffectMatrix=[0,0,1,0; 0,1,0,0; 1,0,0,0; 0,0,0,1;]; % THE ORIGINAL
MATRIX.
% VARIATIONS THAT ALLOW FOR DIFFERENT COLLISIONS (though the variation is
finally introduced after this matrix, so I maintain the original matrix)
%CollisionEffectMatrix=CollisionEffectMatrix*0.6 ; % Reduction (or increase if I
will) of speed intensity after collision
%CollisionEffectMatrix=-CollisionEffectMatrix; % negative sign (interesting
result)
147 %CollisionEffectMatrix=[0,0,1.3,0; 0,1.1,0,0; 0.2,0,0,0; 0,0,0,1;];
%CollisionEffectMatrix=[0,0.7,sind(theta),0; 0,sind(theta),0,0; sind(theta)
,0,0.7,0; 0,0,0,sind(theta);]; % VALUES WITH DIFFERENT COLLISIONS! (Good
but diverges to infinite velocities, because momentum is not conserved!)
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%CollisionEffectMatrix=[0,sind(theta),1,0; 0,1,0,0; 1,0,sind(theta),0;
0,0,0,1;]; %% This only changes Vx between [-2Vx..+2Vx].
%% Then change Vy with a cos(theta) so velocity does not diverge:
%CollisionEffectMatrix=[0,sind(theta),1,0; 0,1,cosd(theta),0; 1,0,sind(theta),0;
0,0,cosd(theta),1;];
152 %%CollisionEffectMatrix=[0,sind(theta),0,0; 0,0,cosd(theta),0; 0,0,sind(theta)
,0; 0,0,cosd(theta),0;];
%%CollisionEffectMatrix=[0,0,sind(theta),0; 0,cosd(theta),0,0; 1,0,0,0;
0,0,0,1;] ;
%%CollisionEffectMatrix=[0,cosd(theta),sind(theta),0; 0,sind(theta),0,0; sind(
theta),0,cosd(theta),0; 0,0,0,sind(theta);];
v_new_col=CollisionEffectMatrix*v_new ; % final velocity post-collision
157
%Put the velocities in the old coordinate system
V(I(i),:)=M*v_new_col(1:2); % Put it back in variable V
V(J(i),:)=M*v_new_col(3:end);
162 %%%%% CHANGE IN THE POST-COLLISION, IN FUNCTION OF ARBITRARY VALUE THETA
(not changing intensity):
% THETA ranges between [0..360]
%% The value of theta is added to a new angle beta=alfa+theta (where alfa is the
old angle).
alfa=abs(asin(V(1,2)/sqrt(V(1,1)^2+V(1,2)^2))) ; % In radians. v_new_col(2)
corresponds to v_y
alfa=rad2deg(alfa); % Change to degrees
167 beta=alfa-theta;
%%% Uncomment this for the version that assigns a random value to theta at each
iteration
% theta=rand()*360; % Random value constrained between 0 and 360
V(1,1)=sign(V(1,1))*abs(cosd(beta));
V(1,2)=sign(V(1,2))*abs(sind(beta));
172 % IDEM FOR PARTICLE 2
alfa=abs(asin(V(2,2)/sqrt(V(2,1)^2 + V(2,2)^2))); %In radians. v_new_col(4)
corresponds to v_y of particle 2
alfa=rad2deg(alfa);
beta=alfa-theta;
V(2,1)=sign(V(2,1))*abs(cosd(beta));
177 V(2,2)=sign(V(2,2))*abs(sind(beta));
%V
%Update the positions after collision
X(I(i),:)=X(I(i),:)+V(I(i),:)*dt;
182 X(J(i),:)=X(J(i),:)+V(J(i),:)*dt;
end
end
%Propagation. Free motion of particles when there are no collisions
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X=X+V*DT;
187 % Plot the new turn
for k=1:NumberOfBalls;
plot(X(k,1),X(k,2),’o’,’MarkerEdgeColor’,Color,...
’MarkerFaceColor’,Color,’MarkerSize’,factor*r(k));
end
192 drawnow;
%drawflag=0;
end
close all;
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